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CB.APTER I

INTRODUO!ION: .A PROSPECTUS POR THE WHOLE PROJECT
This chapter is introductory.
tor the entire stu47.

It serves as a prospectus

In it will be given an overview ot the

basic problem tor which an answer is sought as well as the overall purpose and general procedures to be followed in this study.
Ea.ch of the succeeding chapters will be an elaboration ot the
basic direction indicated in this chapter.

But before the pro-

cedure is outlined it is necessary to state clearl7 the problem
tor which an answer is sought.

fW!. Problem this

Stud.y Seeks 12, Answer

The basic problem tor which this study seeks an answer is

this: how can one discover adequate criteria for testing the
reality of the transcendent

ob~ect

ot religious experience?

That is, can sufficient tests be devised b7 which one can determine it there is a basis in reality tor the ultimate
his religious experience?

ob~ect

ot

This stud.7 does not attempt to come

to a conclusion as to whether or not there is a transcendent
reality.

Rather, it seeks to discover some criteria by which an

individual may determine whether or not there is a basis in
reality' tor the ultimate

ot

ob~ect

l

~s

religious experience.

2

But in order to more fully understand what is implied in this
basic problem it will be helpful to have a better understanding
ot the meaning ot some key terms like experience, religious, and

reality.
Meaning ot J:x:perience
Eq>erience is not easy to define.

But in general experi-

ence •81' be described as consciousness or awareness such as indi·
viduals have.

Experience is something which subjects have, and

it is in this sense that experience lD8.7 be said to be sub3ective.1

!l'b.is is not meant to imply, ot course, that all exper-

ience is merely sub3eotive, 1.e., that there are no ob3eetive
referents tor at least aoae experiences.

Experience is the state

ot consciousness ot an 1ndiY1dual who may be aware of something

as other whether or not it is really other.

Ot course experi-

ence •81' be an awareness ot one's sell or self awareness.

But

even here there is at least a psychological distinction between
the self which is the subject ot the awareness and the selt ot
which it is aware.
Experience may be viewed in two ways, generally and specitically.

Experience in general is the totality ot consciousness

like that ot being alive.

A apeoitic experience is a tocusing

1 Paul Van Buren seems to overstate the point when he says,
"EYer.y experience is subjective by definition. Ve use the word
with a person as its subject 'I' have an experience. A atcn·e
does not ••• •" !'he Secular Meaning ot the Gos2el (New York:
!he Macmillan Oompaiij°; !IJ63), P• 871'.. !liiri""is no good reason
why we can't speak ot animals and even plants having awareness 01
consciousness in our sense ot the word experience. In this wa:r
1t makes more sense to sT>eak ot overlat>'Dintt levels ot _ __.

3

on a given aspect of moment within the whole of one's consciousness like a certain event in one's lite.

Or, the difference

respectively is like that ot the awareness of beins in a state

ot marriage (i.e., the consciousness of being a married man) and
that of settias married (i.e., the consciousness ot taking a
wife in the ceremony of marriage).
cerned primarily with

~el1gious

In this study we will be eon·

experience in general rather

than with specific religious experiences for the following
reasons. 2 Yirst, because experience in general is the backdrop
and basis for particular experiences like Yi.sion is the general
field which makes it possible to focus on this or that particula1
object.

Secondly, religious experience in general is more readi·

ly available to men in general.
religious experience like a

Not everyone has had a special

117s~ical

experience.

But as shall

be argued subsequently• religious experience in the general
sense is both more readily available and understood by men in
this will be made more explicit once religion is de-

genera~.

fined.

~irst,

however, we must distinguish different levels ot

experience.
the most basic level ot experience •ST be oalled prilla.J:7
awareness.

It is the basic unreflective oonsoiousness an indi-

vidual has.

Secondary awareness is the consciousness ot being

conscious; it is being aware ot the fact that one has awareness ...'
2•o.r a further discussion of this see chapter 3.
'Michael Novak makes a similar distinction between primary
and seconda17 awareness. See Beliet ~ Unbelief (New York:

4

Within this secondary awareness there are many activities such
as remembering, reflecting, relating, and reasoning.

All ot

these presuppose or build upon primary awareness.
!he study ot religious experience undertaken here will

treat both kinds ot experience.

It will recognize, however,

that primary awareness is tund.amental to secondary awareness,
even though secondary awareness may be necessary tor getting at
primary awareness.

Furthermore, it is recognized that in order

to get at the religious awareness of other people one does not
have direct access to either their primary or their seconda17
awarenesses.

In order to understand the religious experiences

ot others one must depend on their expressions of these experiences.

In brief, expressions of experience will be studied to

understand the experiences behind these expressions, and secondary

experience must be studied in order to understand the pri-

mary experience behind it.

And primary religious experience in

general (as opposed to special religious experience) will be
the primary center of concern.

Special religious experiences

may be used to illustrate a focusing or intensifying of the
experience which is more generally available tor men in general.

But precisely what is meant

by a religious experience?

Meaning ot Religion
Attempts to define religion have been notoriousl7 unsuccesa·
'!he New American Librar;.r,

1965), PP• ?2-75•

5
tul at gaining universal acclaim, 4

And ;yet th.e vast majority ot

these detinitions ot religion have at least one common element-that religion involves awareness of the transcendent.
differt of course. in what kind

or

what is meant by the transcendent.

fhey

awareness is involved and
Ye will begin with what

appears to be common to most definitions, and then attempt to
discover what must be characteristic ot an awareness of the
transcendent to make it qualify as a distinctive experience to
which we may give the title of religious.
!'here are at least 'two senses in which religious experience
may involve transcendence.

First, transcendence may refer to

the Rrocess ot overcoming the conditions ot one's tinitude,
frustrations, etc.

!his may also be called selt-transoendence.5

franscendence is also used in the sense ot the object of religious experience, viz., the transcendent.

It is in this latter

sense that we are primar117 concerned with religious transcen•
dence in this study.
It should be pointed out that the transcendent is not
4 w. O. Smith wrote: "It is perhaps not presumptuous to hold

that no definition of religion so tar proposed has proven oompelling, no generalization has come anywhere near to adequacy."
The Keani? and End of Religion, !Wew Yorlu !he New American
?3:'5rar.y o lJ&rid!I'tiraiure, Die;, 1964), p. 16.

':But selt-transcendenoe can be misleading in a religious
context it it is taken to mean transcending b7 one's selt or on
one's own. Yor, as shall be seen, one ot the characteristics of
religious awareness is what Schle1ermacher called a "feeling ot
absolute dependence" (see chapter 3). It a religious experience
involves a sense ot dependence, then it cannot in the same WB.7
involve an attitude ot independence.

6

intended to be a synonym for God; it is not equivalent to a theistic conceptualization.

God as defined by western theisms is

one (specific) form or way of viewing the transcendent.

What is

meant by the transcendent is a much broader, more general and
less specific notion which is inclusive ot pantheistic as well as

theistic, personal as well as impersonal religious views.

Brah-

man of Hinduism, !firvana ot Buddhism, the ko ot Taoism, Schleier•acher' s All, otto•s 1'uaen, and Tillich's Being beyond being are
all ways ot viewing the transcendent.
The transcendent not only has
also have many dimensiona.6

ma.n:r descriptions but it may

It need not be viewed·as being

"above"; it may be thought ot as a transcendence in ndepth."
~en

too, it Dl&7 be the tr8.ll8oen4ent "origin" or even the "goal"

ot one's religious experience.

In brief, we do not intend in

this analysis of religious transcendence to narrow down or limit
the meaning of the transcendent to any particular direction or
dimension.

B7 the transcendent we mean simply two things.

Jirst,

something is transcendent it it goes beyond or is !!2£! !!!!!! one's
immediate consciousness.

In this sense the subconscious is

transcendent, tor it goes beyond one's illlllediate consciousness
and yet he is somehow aware that it is there.? !he transcenden-

6In chapter 3 a detailed analysis is given of the multidimensional possibilities of transcendence.
?w1111am James calls the subconscious the "hither side" of
the transcendent but it is definitely beyond the individual's

7
tal ego is also an example, 8 for we are conscious ot it but are
conscious that it is beyond our conseiousness.9

Even other

selves are transcendent, for we are conscious ot them but conscious ot them as being beyond ourselves.

Kant's noumenon is

transcendent, tor he somehow knows that the nou.menon is there
even though he cannot say what it ia, 10 further, it is more
than what is experienced in the way that the whole is greater
than its parts (e.g., there is a wholeness, struoture, or relationship missing when the parts are scattered).

It is more in

the wa:y that a word. or sentence is more than letters (viz., a
unity of meaning not in the parts ta.ken separatel7) 1 11 or the WB:J
conscious self. See Varieties of Reli~ious ;sxperienoe (Hew York:
Modern Library, 1902) , p. 508';' Cl. p. ,2.
8Peter KoestenbaUDl develops this point in an excellent summary of a phenomenological approach to religion, "Religion in the
Tradition of Phenomenology• in Religion in Philosoih1cal and Cultural PersReotive, ed. Ol&l'ton Jeaver ancr-w!ii!am orosz \Princeton, N.J.: b. fan Nostrand Co., Inc., 1967), PP• 186-193·

9ve are not here arguing for the existence ot the suboonscious, the transcendental ego or other minds. We are simpl7
saying that it they exist, the7 would be real examples. ot what
we mean by transcendent. It they do not exist they would be
merely possible examples.
10see Immanuel Kant, fht: Cri;g~ue ot Pure Reason, trans.
Lewis White Beck (New Yorlfr-Tfie'6s-Hirrl11 t!o. , inc. , 1956),
p. 273, where he says, "• •• on the contrary, it itself limits
sensib111t7 by appl7ing the term noW1enon to things in themselves
(things not regarded as appearances). llit in so doing it at the
same time sets limits to itself, recognising that it cannot know
these noumena through 8!17 of the categories, and that it must
therefore think them onl7 under the title or an unknown something."
11 It is noteworthy that even Bertrand Russell uses this illustration in &!1 *1!guln into Meaning !!lS. Truth. PP• 335-336.

8

there is more in a painting than the pigaent aad colors. 12 !bat
18 , something is transcendent it there is aore in it than •aeets

the e7e.•

It there ia a depth or perspective that ia aore than

the empirical experience ot it, then it transcends the eapirical.13
Second,

'b7 l!1!.. transcendent ob.tact ot religious experience

is meant frhat we ue aware ot as going be:yond or being more in

81'

ot a total oomaitaenti that tor which one would make eTen the supreme aacritice. 14
ultiJlate W&.7•

It ia tha• which is the

ob~ect

The uanacendent i• the object of ultiute coneern because it ia
thought to be ultiaate or taal.
sees no need to go.
more be7onda.

It ia that be7ond which one

It ia the be7ond beyond which one seeks no

Examples ot auoh coamitaent outside ot religion

are ditticult to find but to aoae degree the patriot's "1'7

country right or wrong," or the aoraliat•s "duty tor dutJ''•
sake," or 1Jhe artist's ooaaitaent to Beaut7 are exaaples. 1 5
It he were consistent with the illplioations ot this illustration
it would indicate the meaningtulneaa ot what we call the transcendent.
12ot. John Wisdom•a article •Clods• in !aaasigal and Oonteanorarv
,l!
~oaofl!Z ot RelisAon, et: :oliil'Hlci
(En.gJ.evo
tlrts, . . lentii-lil! !no., 1964), PP• 413-428.
13
s.e xan) Ramser~ ~lifiou1A~e (New York:(~• Mac a111an 0o., 1957 , PP• -..c;or a
sousaion ••th 11 luatrationa) ot this point.
Johll B. Smith calla this a "religious

Rs4iffa

f!

Q•

41

41aena1on" 1:0 experience, l!Hripce an.4 !Id, (Oxford Universit7
Press, 1968), PP• 46 t.
14
~or a development ot what is meant b7 •total comaltment"
see Ramae7, .22• git., PP• 172, 35-41, 55•
1 5A further and clear elaboration of what we mean by this

9
!o restate the problem in view ot these clarifications: we
seek to disoover adequate criteria tor

testi~

the reality of

that object of consciousness which is more than and goes beyond
one•s consciousness and to which he makeA a total commitment or
by which he is grasped with an ultimate concern.

Or to put it

another way, how does one know that beyond to which a man will
commit himself without reserve is real?
there is a basis in

rea.lit~

Row can one tell if

tor the object

or

a man's ultimate

Is the goal or ideal to which men are willing to dedi-

concern?

cate their whole lite, and for which they are willing even to
die, real?

But, before determil'ling whether the transcendent is

real the word real must be detiaed..
Meaning of Reality
J'irst there a.re several things that are not meant
1ty.

b7 real-

Yor it would be easy to conolude that the transcendent is

real it the word is used in a Yery broad sense.

Only after one

sees clearly what is not meant by the word reality (.tirst tour
points below) can he fully appreciate the problem o.t trying to

determine the reality of the transcendent.

!he last two points

attempt to provide a more positive characterization of the meaning of reality.

l.

Realit1

!!. ?!2£!

~ ~ Sub~ective

Condition

a!

Human

§!;perience.--!'hat aen have experiences which they teel are ulti-

mate and religious no one can reasonably doubt; it is not the
kind of concern or commitment will be found in Paul Tillich's
Ult'1Jate Concern, ed. D. Jl!ackenzie Brown (London: SOM Presa L'td.,
I96 , pp. ?, 8, 11, 30, 106 and below in chapter 2.

10

experiences but their reali'fcy" basis which is in question.

!he

problem is compounded by the tact that in •8ll7 religious and

111'•-

tical experiences there seems to be no sure ws;r to separate the
hallucinatory from the real.

As Henri Bergson noted, even the

great :mystics have recognized this fact and have warned their
disciples about it. 16 !here is alW&J"S the possibility that one's
religious experience can be explained on a purely pa~ohologioal
levei. 17 Tb.ere is no question that religious experience is subjective; if it were not, it would not be an experience.

-- -

important question is: i• it more than subjective.

The

As even reli-

gious men admit, "• •• •here cannot be 8.J17 important sense in
~bich

God is &or !!. unless there is some real and

ob~ective

sense in which God !!.• irreapHtive of my belief or ST laok ot
beliet. 18 Beligious tranaoeadenoe must be more than a aub~eetive
condition in religious experience before we are willing to call
it real.

2.
In

Reality Ia

~

.!!!!!! .! Projection !!. Hwaan

~agination.

briet, religious transcendence is not real it LudWig Feuer-

bach is right that it is eotbing l!!!. a pro3eotion of hum.an nature
16Kenri Bergson. !he ho §!urces of 11oral1tz and Relifion,
trans. R. Ashl•~ Auclra~.-irerefon, W:-H. Oii'ier "{Biw'Tor ,--

Doubleday and Oo., Inc., 1935), P• 229.

1 7aee William Sargant•s Batfle tor the l'lind (William Heinemann Ltd.• 195?), where he exp!a ns rel:igfouseiperience like
brain washing in a behavioristic wa;y along the line of Pavlov's

conditioned response.
18
David E. Trueblood, fb.il2•~f1~ .2! Religion (New Yorks
Harper and Brothers Publishers, 1 1 , P• '4.

11

which is commonly called God.

He wrote, "• •• the nature ot

!!. nothing .!!!!. than an expression ot the nature ot teeling"
tor "the object ot any subject is nothing !!!!, than the subject's
God

own nature taken objectively."
is not real it man makes it.

!hat is, the object ot religion
It what man thinks is God be

nothing but an unconsciously worshipped projection of the best
in his own human nature, then it is misleading to call it real.
It consciousness ot God. be no more than unwitting self-conscious-

ness; it while adoring God one is worshipping nothing but his own
nature; 19 if every adT&noe in religious thinking is nothing but
an advance in self-knowledge, then certainly it is a meaningless
use ot words to call it real.

As Karl Marx wrote.

•!fan,

who

looked for a superman in the fantastic reality of heaven and
found nothing there but the £tflexion ot himself, will no longer
be disposed to find but the 9eablanoe of himself, the non-hwaan
D.!mienschJ where he seeks and auat seek his true reality." 20

!hat ia, it man is a reality aeeker and should discover religion
is but a projection ot his own imagination, he will turn to the
human realit7 instead of worshipping the mirror which retlects it

3.

Reality l!.

!!!:!£! 91.an !I Object £l1.

~-f9:ltillment.-

Jreud contended that religion was an illusion, not in the sense
that it is necessarily untrue, but that it is suspect because it

l9Ludwig :reuerbach. !he !!••nee ot Christianitz. trans.
George Eliot (Bew York: Karper an! Bro-Ehers, lg51), PP• 9-12, 13t
29.
20Xarl ftarx and Jriedrioh Engels, On Religion (New York:

Schocken Books, 1964) , p. 41.

-

resulted trom a wish that there be a God, etc.

"An illusion,"

he said, "is not the same as an error, it is indeed not necessar117 an error • • • • It is characteristic ot the illusion that it

is derived from men's wishes." He differentiates an illusion
trom a delusion which ia necessarily talse, whereas "!he illusion need not be necessarily talse, that is to s117, unrealizable
or incompatible with reality.•

However, the religious illusion

is highl7 suspect ot not being true tor several reasons.

71rst,

because ot the primitive (ignorant) period in which it arose,
then because ot the specious, inauthentic grounds upon which aen
would justify it.

Jurtheraore, it is suspect because ot its

very nature as an illusion, Yiz., that human wishes plq a dominant role in its motivation.

•we s117 to ourselves: it would in-

deed be very nice it there were a God who was both creator and
a benevolent providence, it there were a moral world order and
a tuture lite, but at the same time it is very odd that this is
all ~ust as we should wish it ourselves." 21 In view ot this, we

hold as minimal to the definition of real that it be more than

an illusion in :rreud.'s sense.

!hat is, it must be more than

something men wish, or even deeply wish, to be so; it must actuall7 )!,! so apart trom their wishes.
4.

Realitz !!

!22!!. !!!.!!! !. fuboonscious 7orce !! Human

;lxperienoe.--Villiam James somewhat side-stepped the basic issue

hfi?.
ot an Illusion,
eq&ntroo., Inc.,

21 Sigmund 7reud, !he
Robson-Scott (l'ew Yorki'"'louf;

53, 40-50, 54, 57·58·

trans.

w.

D.

1957), pp. 52-

13
when he defined the "hither" side o:t the transcendent in terms

ot the subconscious.

He wrote, "• •• whateTer it may be on the

farther side (that is the crucial questionJ, the 'more' with
which in religious experience we reel ourselves connected is on
its hither side the subconscious continuation or our conscious
li!e." 22 !he "farther" side is a matter o:t what Jaaes called
ttover-beliets" which he personally ~usti!ied on pragmatic
grounds. 23 But the concern here is not with how James justified
the •farther" side ot transcendence but whether or not there is
a "farther" side.

Oerbainl7 one should not consider the "hither"

side or "subconscious continuation of our conscious lite" to be
the transcendent of which the religious man speaks.

1'here would

be no difficulty in saying, as James admits is possible, that the
subconscious is the doorw8.7 to the divine, 24 that the ultillate
transcendence which men call God works in and through the subconscious.

But to identity the transcendent with the subcon-

scious torteits the right to call it real in a meaningful sense

ot the word.
Ia seems undeniable that certain subconscious patterns ot
mental activity and symbolism occur and have depths ot meaning
not always obvious to the consciousness ot the indiVidual in
22Jam.es. 1!l! Varieties .2! ltl:l.gious §!Rerience, P• 502.
23James "!'he Vill to Believe," Prmatism and other Eas&s
1
(liew York: Washington Square Press, tnc., !91,),pp. 193=213.
24Ibid., PP• 232, 23? 265.
1

14

whom they occur. 25 In view ot this tact men cannot help but wonder whether the

ob~ect

ot their religious experience is any more

than a product of subconscious S1Jllbolism.

Nor Will it suffice

to do as Jung and call the collective subconscious the real, tor

as JTomm observed this does not in itself show that the tran.scendent is more than a as.as delwsion. 26 As Alfred N. Whitehead
indicated, to move toward the dark recesses ot the subconscious
is to surrender finall7 &n7 hope ot a solid foundation tor religion. 27

I.t by the real1t7 ot ultimate tranaoendence one does not

mean something more than the huaan subconscious, whether individual or collective, it seems inadvisable to call it real to say
nothing of the inappropriateness ot calling it ultimate or transcendent.

5. Realitt Means !2, have.!!! Independent Existence. 28It the transcendent is to be more than a mere

sub~ective

experi-

ence, more than mere human imagination. more than what men

deepl~

25111ntan Smart, '!he Reli5ious ~erience ot ftankind (New
York: Charles Scribnerr& Dona, X'697P• !6. !Ven though Sartre
strongly denounced Freud's view ot subconscious determination in
bis Existentialism and Psychoanalzaia, he admitted to a 'depth of
consciousness* that woU!d not necessarily conflict with the above
assertion of Smart.
26
Eryic JTUomm. t Paghr;zst;,e;d Reliron (1'ew Haven and
Lond on: a 1e n1versi y
ess,
, P• l •
27Altred North Whitehead, !'l15ion in !!!.! Hald.pg (Cleveland
and New Yorks V-orld Publishing o., 1ggor. p. im>.
281'.he word "existence" is not meant here to imply that the
transcendent has to be a being to be real. It has a broader
meaning such as the word "iresence" has as used b7 Leslie Dews.rt.
Ot. 1ound.ations Sl1. Belief (Kew York: Herd.er and Herder, 1969).

15
wish to be true (viz., an illusion), more than the realm of hm•• ...
subconsciousness, then it means that which has an independent
existence of its own. 29 Tb.at is, the transcendent must mean that
which exists outside of the minds ot the men who conceive it and

outside the experience(s) of the men who experience it.

Yor it

is certainl7 not proper to attribute to the transcendent a real1ty of its own it it exists onl.7 in the consciousness of finite
men.

Tb.at is to

S&.y',

it the transcendent is dependent on the

consciousness of others.for its reality, then it seems unfitting
to attribute to it an independent existence ot its own.

Por

example, by real we mean something like that a material object
would have (viz., outside ot a Jlind) as opposed to the existence
of a nwaber (which,
Sa.'7

•8.7•

exista onl7 in a mind).

that only things like material

things like minds can be real too.

ob~ects

fhis ia not to

can be real, tor

But this is to 887 that the

transcendent will not be considered real unless it has an existence on its own, outside ot the reality of other things that
exist.
6.

Realitz Means

12. b.ave

an Q)?s1eotive Edstence.-Another

we:r to describe what is meant by real is to &87 that
ob~eotive

existence.

By

ob~eotive

itJ has an

we do not aean aerely to be

29!'his does not mean that nothing dependent oa.n exist; it
can have a dependent existence (•87• de~endent on the Universe,
God, etc.) and yet exist independentl7 {i.e., separately trom
other things). That is, everything but a Necessary existence
would in some way be a dependent existence. Jut things that are
dependent ultimately tor their existence can still have (relatively speaking) an independent existence of their own.
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an object (of a mind) nor to objectify, tor in both of these sen-

ses something is got real.

Rather by objective we mean what is

not merely the objectification made by a subject but what is itself a subject or thing.

It should be noted that the meanings

ot subject and object have reversed since the Middle Ages.

7or

the Scholastics, subiectum. meant that which exists (objectively)
in itself and obiectwa meant that which is only (subjectively)

represented in a mind.

Whereas,_ in comm.on usage today (due to

the influence of idealism) objective means real in itself and
subjective means not having an independent existence ot its
own.30

So when it is said that real means to have an objective existence we mean objective in the modern sense which is to be a
subject (subieotum) in the medieval sense.

transcendent is objectively real is not to
object or objectification ot a Jlind.

!o claim that the
say

that it is a mere

In this sense objectifica-

tion is that which is done by'·a subject, in which case if the
transcendent were merel7 an

ob~ect

(or objectification), then it

would not have an independent existence of its own.
In summary, this stud;r seeks to discover adequate criteria

tor testing the realit7 of the transcendent object ot religious
experience.

And in View of the further definitions given this

means that we wish to find sufficient tests or

W&.78

to determine

30Heidegger makes this same point in "!he Problem ot a HonObj ectif ng Thinking and Speaking in Contemporary theology" in
Philoso
and 1tel1R1on, ed. Je1!J!7 H. 6111 (!11nneapolis: Burgess
s
tro:'
• 62.
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whether or not that be7ond or more to which a man. will collDlit
himSelt without reserve has an independent and objective existenoe outside of man's subjective awareness.

In other words,

does the object ot man•s ultimate concern exist on its own apart
trom his ideals and awareness ot it?

So it ma;r be concluded

that, whatever else 118.7 be implied by the word reality as applied
to the transcendent, it means that which has an independent and
objective existence ot its own apart trom
consciousness ot other things.

~

existence in the

It must be more than an object

ot other subjects; it must be a subject (or thing) itself.
!he f!!n?ose

a!

this Stuq

!he basic reason tor this study is to examine the alleged
reality basis tor religious experience.

Believers do make real-

ity claims both implicitly and explicitly, and our purpose is to

examine the basis tor such cla.ilts.
!'he credal con.tessions ot the existence ot God common to
major Western religions make an explicit claim tor the reality

ot the transcendent and prayer is an implicit testimon,' tor it.
Both the sacrifices ot preliterates and the ultimate commitment
of moderns reveal a belief in the reality ot the ultillate object
of their religious devotion.

Mircea Eliade contended that it

was part ot the very- genius of a religious man that he seeks
reality and thirsts tor it with all of ltis heart.31

31ru.rcea .lliade, !b.e Sacred and the Profane. trans. Willard
i. Trask (New York: Harcourt, lraC.aiidW'or'.1'.'.CI, fnc., 1959), p.
~o.
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It a religious man
to do so.

~

!!.21 seek reality, at least he ought

Por ot all men the religious person should be con-

cerned with fidelitl' and maturity, neither ot which is evidenced
a ref'usal to be concerned about the truthtulness ot one•s
religious beliefs.

As Freud observed, no mature man will be

satistied with his childhood beliefs simply because he wants
them to be true whether there be a 'basis for them in realit,' or
not.

!ro cling to religion sim.pl7 because it is a beautitul

dream or to hold to it as

!t 1t

were true are insufficient

grounds upon which to base the ultimate commitment which religion demands.32

Jurther, the believer ought to· examine the reality basis to
his belief in the transcendent because ot the haunting suspicion
that he may be wrong.33

A.a enn religious men acknowledge, "It

is hard to rid our minds completely of the haunting suspicion
that the entire religious structure may be nothing more than a
grand and beautiful castle in the air.~34 !he religious aan no
less than an;r other man is

sub~ect

to self-deception.

In tact,

as Blaise Pascal pointed out, the individual has a thousand

stratagems tor deception and there are not tour honest men in a
century-.35

Ev'en allowing for some over-statement here, the

32 s1gm.unct :rreud, f!l! b.tlu'e a! !!! Illusion, P• 50.
33see chapter 4 on the need for reasonable criteria in de-

ter.mining the reality ot the transcendent.

34Trueblood, ~losg.:eb;y !! Jttl1gion 1 p. 17.
35Paacal as

uoted by Michael lovak, I l

t

,p. 89.
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honest religious person will no doubt agree with Pascal that he
has some doubts ot his own about the reality ot the transcendent
object of his religious devotion.
Jinally, whether there be serious doubts or not, anything
which demands an ultimate commitment, as does religion. ought to
be examined as to its realit'Tt 11' the commitment is to be worthy
of a critical mind.

It may be meritorious to belieTe in the

reality ot the ultimate where one has had little eTidence or
opportunity to examine it• but it certainl.7 is not very noble or
worthy 01' a rational creature to totally subait hill8elt to something without haring reason t;o believe in its realit,-.

!o be-

lieve in a cosmic Santa Olaua aiapl7 because one wills to believ
or because it is comforting or aim.ply because it works is unsatisfactory tor a thinking man 1n search ot reality.

!!!!,,

Pr•SUPJ?OSitio~s

!£. this St94z

!here are several working principles involved in this atud.7
which are not tormally

~ustitied

but are clearly implied.

Some

ot them will be at least partially vindicated in a pragmatic or
indirect way, while others will be valuable because ot their. con
sistency with the problem and approach which we have chosen.

It

is not contended that th••• are the only WSTS to approach this
sub~ect

but that the7 do proride at least one significant way to

understand and evaluate the reality basis tor religion.
1.

!he basic working principle throughout this study is

that reli 1ous experience is a key to understanding the meaning

20

ot religion.36 !his implies that:mligious experience is at the
heart of religious expressions. that religion can be understood

well rrom the inside.

!his means that the believer, i.e., the

one who has the religious experience, is in a favorable position
to understand what is at the basis or religion.

1'his does not

mean that an outsider cannot understand a religious experience

which he has never had.

It means onl7 that if he is to under-

stand the religious experience ot another as a key to understand·
ing religion that he must

t~ ~o

enter into this experienoe in

an empathetic and imaginative W&.7•

this does not mean that one

has to become religious to understand religion, but it does implJ
that he must exercise a sympathetic and penetrative insight into
the situation or the one who does have a religious experience.

2.

Another presupposition

or

this work is that one is in a

better position to determine the reality of religious experience
attar he has a better understanding

or

the meaning ot it.

That

is• one is in a better position to e?aluate religion atter he
knows more fully what it is.

It is in view

or

this principle

that it is deemed necessary to tully discuss the various kinds

or dimensions
is offered.

or

religious expel"ienee betore an evaluation or it

~or

it is assumed here that one cannot sufficiently

judge the reality

or

a religious experience without knowing the

36!h1s is what w. L. King called viewing religion from a
ttdetached within" as opposed to the "within" ot the partisan deYotee, the "semi-within" of the mission&r'7t or the •semi-without•
ot the theologian or the "without• of the social scientists,
In'broduct!on to Religion (New York1 Harper and Row. Publishers,
!9!52i')' pp. 1~
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meaning of it.

J'rom this it tollows that a proper evaluation ot

religious experience can be made either by a critical believer
or by an understanding non-believer.

1'.b.e former has a,good "in-

side" vantage point for understanding the meaning of the experience, and he can develop the ability to oritieally evaluate it.
The non-believer alrea<cy- has the critical faculties since he is
not predisposed to believe it, and he oan develop the ab1lit7 to
understand it by sympathetic insight.

Consequently this study

proceeds on the premise that both believers and non-believers
will be able to add to our understanding and evaluation

or

reli-

gious experienoe.37

3. :Further. it is assumed. here that religious expressions
are the key to understanding religious experience.

This means

that initially at least the believer is in a better position
than the non-believer to understand the meaning ot his own reli-

gious experience.

It may be that once the believer has expressed

these experiences that a more articulate non-believer can state
them better.

Nevertheless, the •insider" 1a in a better posi-

tion to express what his experiences really mean, even it he
cannot express them as well as a more eloquent •outsider."38
O~

oourse one who has both had the experience and the ability to

37As Augustine confessed, •ao, many are awakened trom sleep
b7 the heretics, so that they m.ay see God's light and be glad,"
.2( ~' Rtl~ion. 1 trans. J. H. s. Burleigh (Ohieagot Henry Regnecy-Co., 1 6)• P• 16. ·

38~or a further discussion ot the relation between experience and expression see chapter 4.
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express it well is in the best position at all.

Thus it is that

so tar as the meaning of religion is concerned the expressive
believer plays a crucial role.
4.

:rinally. this study presupposes that verbal expressions

are a key form ot religious expression.39

9lat is. since lan-

guage is one of the higheat and most expressive vehicles ot oomm.unicating human experiences it is assUlle4 that religious language will be a key wa:r to understand. the religious lite behind

it.

!'his is not to 88.1' that verbalizations are the most vital

part ot religion nor the best W8.7 to •oatoh' a religious experience, tor this may be done more efteotivel7 through ob.aracter,
ritual, or art. 40 It does imply, however, that since language
is one of man's most efteotive powers of expression that it is

to be expected that it is a key area in the analysis of man's
deepest experiences.

~ere

are many ways to examine religion, but in view of this

study's problem and purpose--to examine the reality basis tor

39ot. \lilem ~. Zuurdeeg who characterises man as ef'o
19guens, A!! .AnaJ!!ical 1't1loso:e!!z: !1£. Religiqn (1'ew Yo 1 Abing!on Pieaa), P• 2 •
~olt Otto may very well have been correct when he said
ot religious experience (not expression): "It can.not be 'taught,•
it must be •awakened.' trom the spirit • • • • More of the experi·
ence liYes in reYerent attitude and gesture, in tone and voice
and demeanour • • • than in all the phrases and ne!ative nomenclature whioh we b.aYe found to designate it," Atl dea Rt. the
Hol:v. trans. John w. Harvey, (New York• Oxtord'Tniversity !rise,
J. "H'\•1 "\..

n..

f;.l ..
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religious experience--the following guidelines seem best suited.
While this is not the only valid W8.7 to work out a philosoph;r of

religion, it is .! valid W8.'3' to do so.
1.
~·

.An

Experiential Basie tor Studying Religion

is perhaps the most basic guideline of our methodolo87.

It

argues that however essential religious expressions a.re to the
understanding of religion that religious experience is )!fic. 41
In this approach consciousness of the transcendent is fundamental

to conceptualizations about it.

~t

i••

aa 1riedr1ch Sohleier-

macher pointed out, one must feel the absolute before he can formulate it. 42 Meardngtul affirmations about the transcendent are
lnd.lt on prior awareness ot it.

Whatever structure may be given

to religion by reason the basic •stuff" ot religion comes from

intuition.
state it.

A man must somehow senae the supreme before be can
~or

experiencing the presence ot the divine is a pre-

requisite to stating propositions about it.

Or as Whitehead put

41 0tto makes this sam~oint b7 S8.7ing that rationalization
or soheaatization ot the
nous is the moat important part ot
the histor,. of religion tor1 guards religion from falling into
fanatioiem and 117sticalitJr. However, he assumes a Kantian view
of the scheaa.,ization as a priori categ~t like Kant's oategor'l'
of causality (via., it operates oonstifN1'\J1Yel7 not in.tuitivel7),
fhe Ijff ot the lloiz' PP• 115, 146, 46-51, 116-120. But we re3ect
81!'.en""tiian aplication on the grounds t~: one cannot d~
an intuitive knowledP- ot res.lit;, (the noumena unless he alrea~
has an intuitive knowledge ot it. One can't I
t the bounds ot
knowledge unless he has ilread1' transcended those lill1ta. He
can't ·~ that he knows that he doesn't know reality without oon•
tradicti~ himself.
As Wittgena!fin said 1 "• • • lil order to
draw a lliii t to thinking, we ahou.a.4 hay•. vo
think both sides ot
this limit," f;Eactatus L05ioo-Ph1loso2h1ous, Preface.

:rriedrich Schleieraacher, On Rtl&fQof t~ana. John Oman
(Kew York: l'rederick Un.gar Pu.blisliing Oo., 1~55·
42
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1t. "'l'b.e true method ot discovery is like the tlight ot the aeroIt starts trom the ground ot particular observation; it

plane.
makes

a flight in the thin air ot imaginative generalization1

~d

it again lands tor renewed observation rendered acute by rational
interpretation. 4 3 But all these rational operations, William
James reminded us, presuppose immediate experience as their sub-

ject matter.

Er;planations do not replace the need tor the experience ot which it is the interpretation. 44
!bis does not render reason unessential in a philosoph)r ot

religion.

On the contr&r7, reason

pl~s

an essential role in

understanding, expressing and evaluating the religious experience.

However, experience

pl~s

a tundamental role, tor without

it there would be nothing tor reason to understand, express or

evaluate.

'What is being suggested is that

!! we are to under-

stand religion experientiall7, then a man's awareness ot or consciousness of the transcendent is tundamental.

Like Whitehead's

aeroplane, we seek constaAtl7 to keep in touch with down to earth
experience lest we are carried awa;y in the thin air ot pure speculative imagination.
2.

Religious .Expressions as a Key to Understanding Reli-

gious Experience (chapter 2).

In order to understand the basic

religious experience(s) one will analyse their expressions, par43Whitehead Process and Realill; (New York: Harper and Row,
Publishers 1929), p. 7. llirtehea! said elsewhere, "fhus the
real! prac!ical problems of religion have never been adequatel7
stud ed in the only way in which such problems can be studied,
namel7, in the school ot experience," lleligio9 Di1b.e !!'!!d!& Pt 141.
44Jamee, Varieties of Reli«ious
erience, p. 424.
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tioularly in language.

Hence, it will be necessary not onl7 to

iunderstand what the religious language intends to sa:r about the
transcendent and its alleged reality but whether or not language
is an adequate means for expressing religious experience.

In

other words, one muat tace squarely the challenge of Paul van
Buran and others that language is inadequate to express God, the
transcendent or any of its equivalenta. 4 5 Once assured that
~eligious

language ia both basically and adequately expressive

ot the transcendent, then we may proceed to analyze the meaning(•)
of what religious language reveals.
'·

!he Need to Determine the Character and Dimensions of

Religious BJcperienoe (chapter 3).

In order to fully understand

what is meant by religious experience an attempt will be made to
determine its essential cha.racteristio(e).

Religious experience

must be distinguished from moral experience and from aesthetic
experience.

Once the common oore of religious experience is

discovered, it must be clearly defined.

And one it is defined,

then we will examine the various dimensions which religious
transcendence has taken.

•or unleaa a t7Pology of the directions

of transcendence is outlined, one may mistakenly reject as nonreligious what is essentially religious.

In brief 1 one must

have a full understanding of what religious expei-ience is in all
of its basic oharaoteristics and dimensions before one can proceed to examine its alleged basis in realit7.
4

5van Buren, !he Secular Meaning .!?! lh!. Gospel,

P•

84.
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4.

Criteria for Testing the Reality of Religious Experience

(chapters 4, 5).

It is not enough for a philosophy of religion

to discover and define the meaning of religious experience; it
must also devise ways or testing its reality.

The crucial ques-

tion is not what do religious statements about the transcendent
mean.

The important questions asks: is the transcendent real?

Even proponents of the reality basis for religious experience admit that "All experience is liable to misinterpretation [andJ
• • • much which the experiencer is inclined to take for 'reli-

gious• experience is illusion." 46

To be successful these criter-

ia must show that the transcendent is more than a subjective
reality; they must establish it to be an objective reality.
Furthermore, the criteria must be more than logical tests which
would show only the possibility or impossibility or the reality
or the transcendent.

They must be epistemological, establishing

at least the probability or improbability or it.
Conclusion
The basic problem for which this study seeks an answer is:
how can one discover adequate criteria for testing whether the
transcendent object or religious experience is real?

Can we find

sufficient ways to determine whether that which goes beyond or
is more than one's awareness in such a way as to make him willin@
to make a total commitment to it has an independent existence
46A. E. Taylor, "The Argument from Religious Experience" in
The Existence of God, ed. John Hick (New York: The Macmillan Co.,

~). p.

155.- -

~

outside of himself?

Are there ways to test whether the beyond

to which men will devote themselves without reserve is more than
a subjective part of their own experience, viz., to discover
whether it is an

ob~ective

reality of its own?

not attempt to apply the criteria discovered.

!rhis study will
Rather, it will

content itself with the more modest (and yet essential) task of
discovering and defining sufficient criteria which can be applied
to religious experience.
Th.ere are some decided advantages tor not attempting to
determine whether the transcendent is real but instead to be content with merely laying down the criteria for doing so: (1) It
may be that both believers and unbelievers can agree as to how
the reality of the transcendent should be tested.

If so, then

there may be less disagreement in the end as to whether or not
there are some reality-based religious experiences.

(2) The

believer will be able to discover tor himself whether all of his
experiences are illusory or which (if any) are real.

From this

follows another advantage, viz., (3) No approval or disapproval
of religious experience(s) in general need be concluded.
experience must be judged on its own merit.

Ea.ch

It is not to be

ruled out a priori because others are illusory nor is it to be
accepted naively because others may be real.

RELIGIOUS EIPRESSION AS A DY TO
UNDERS'fANDING RELIGIOUS EXP:&'RIEICE
'!his chapter ia built upon the premise that religious expression. especially in language. is an illlportant key to understanding the basic religious experience(s) these expressions
intend to convey.

It eeeka to answer two questions: what is the

basic experience beneath religious expressions which character.
izea religious awareness in general?

And, is there an adequate

language tor expressing what is experienced?
•
The discussion proceed.a on the asswaptions
that: (1) there

may be something coaaon to religious experience in general; (2)
religious expressions, especially in language

m~

be helpful in

disooTering what element(s) 11117 be inTOlTed in religious awareness.

ZB!. Varie;t&r

gt_ Religious Expressions

Religious experience has been expressed in a Tariety' ot
basically different ways. .Aaong these the aost COJlll'Don are rituali
symbol, myth, and dog:ma. 1 !he first three will be treated only
1 0ther religious expression aay be found in art, image, conduct. and institution but they are not directly related to our
study here. W'. C, Smith has a good comparison of many ot these,
!!.! Meanipg ~a! ,2' Religion, p. 156 t.
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briefly.
Religious .Expression in Ritual
Some have argued that ritual is the earliest formal religious expression, even before myth, because ritualima can be observed in animals, while they are destitute of a l17thologr.2
Others argue that ritual comes before 117'tholo87, since it ia
more likely that pre-literates danced out their religious values
before they thought them out.3

On the other hand, it aa;r be

argued that the 'revelation• ot the Jll1"bh aust come before the
re-enactment of it in ritual. 4 Whatever the case m87 be, it is
certainly reasonable to conclude that somewhere behind the plethora of religious expressions there was tor someone an experience that gave rise to these religious expressions both mythological and ritualistic.5
In any event, ritual •8.7 be defined as that formalized

•1B-

bolic way in which a social poup periodicall7 e:xpress4ts and
strengthens its beliefs and 1"8.luea. 6 Or, Whitehead described it
2of. Alfred 1'. Whitehead, Religion in the , . p. 25.
However, he acknowledges that
apeclfiC-ciiis a h may precede the ritual.
3v. L. Xing, Introduction 12 R911sion, pp. 141, 142.
4ru.rcea Elia4e, lttth and Reality, trans. Willard R. Trask
(Bew Yorka Harper and--i&ii,-i.siibX!elers, 1963), P• 8.
Swb.ich comes first will probably depend on whether a Dcy"th or
a ritual was used to evoke the relifd.ous experience. If the reli
~ous experience came via a ~h, tfien the ritualistic expression
of that experience would be subsequent and vice-versa. If, however, the religious experience caae some other WB.'3; then uhe
tire~ means of expression would depend on whether ~he individual
had greater propensity to act or to talk.
6King, Introduction !!'!. Religion, p. 141.

in
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as "• •• the habitual performance of definite actions which
have no direct relevance to the preservation of the p1l7sical
organisms of the actor.•?
We are not concerned here with precise rituals or their
signitioance. 8 What is of significance is that religion is not
found without ritual.9

!hat is, a religious experience inevita-

bly engenders symbolic expressions.

It is through these expres-

sions that one is able to discover and analyse basic religious
experience behind them.

Since the ritualistic expressions are

represented in the llQ"thical forms (whichever were first) we will
analyze both of them together under the m;rthical.
Religic\18 Expression in Symbol
s,mbol is the broadest term tor religious expression including both myth and rituai. 10 Without pausing here to pass judgment on the validity ot the distinction. Paul Tillich draws between a "sign" (which, he says, does not participate in the reality to which it points) and a •syabol" which does, 11 it is sutfi?Whitehead, Rel11ion !B the Making, p. 20.
8 ror a treatment ot this kind the works ot Eliade are suggested, viz., ~~ Sacred and l!l! Pro.tane, ~t_}! and Rea113, and
~ lt'rth ot the!tei'iiil llirurn, trans. Wiliiil r.-!rasli
ew
xorkTl'intlieiii1foois , !nc. , 1954).
201

• 9see Bergson,

.!!!!. !!.2

Sources !!.!. Moralitz ~ Religion, P•

·lOPaul Tillich, ~ios of ·Paith (Bew York: Harper and Row,
Pu.blishers 1 1957}, p.~ fiITi!I calls these latter two the
"intuitive and the "active" forms ot s:rmbol expression respectivel7.
llsee the discussion ot Tillich's special use of "symbol"
later in this chapter.
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cient to note that "81mbols have one characteristic in common
with signs: they point beyond themselves to something else." 12
To summarize

w.

L. King, symbols are non-literal figures which
point beyond themselves. 1 3 !'hat is, religious symbols are direc-

tional but not contenttul pointers toward the transcendent.
Michael Novak likens symbols to arrows shot in the

directio~

of God but which fall back to earth betore they touch Him. 14

In

other words, since a syabol points beyond itself it is a titting
way of getting at the transcendent which goes beyond man.

And

it may be safely assumed that aq long as religious experience

involves something which transcends this empirical world, there
will be a need tor so•e sort ot symbolical or non-literal means
ot expressing it. 15 !his is why !'illich argued that • ••• no
symbol should be removed.

It should only

b~

reinterpreted.•

"!heir symbolic character is their truth and their power.

No-

thing less than symbols and .rqths can express our ultimate con-

12Till1oh, l?lpamics

2!.

Paith, p. 41.

1 31:ing, Introduction

!2. Religion, PP• 134-136.
14Miohael Novak, Beliet !Bi Unbelief, p. 110.
l5"It (de~holizationJ ie an attempt which never

can be
successful, because symbol and JI01;h are torm.s ot the human consciousness which are alw&.J"S preeent. One can replace one JITf;h
by another, but one cannot remove the myth from aan's spiritual
lite. ~or the JD.7th is the combination of symbols of our ultimate
concern," fillich, ~cs o:t !'&1th, p. 50. With this Jaspers
agreed when he wrot~e real-iiiilt, therefore, is not to dem;rthologize, but to recover J117thioal thought in its original purity • • • • " Xarl Jas:eers, _M_b and Ohris'tiianity, ed. Karl Jaspers
and Rudolf Bultmann Cl'ew rorJIT Ki loonC!ay Presa, 1958), P• l?·

,2
oern."16

Tb.at is, religious .,_bola are an attempt to express

the object of one's ultimate concern, and no words in their ordinary meaning express this extraordinary object.

Religious sym-

bols are an attempt to express what ca.nnot be literally and em•
piricall7 stated.

!hey point to something beyond the ordinary

experience, something transcendent.
Religious EJcpression ln liJ"th
Religious experience spontaneously and inevitabl7 engenders
myth. 17 !hat is, as ~illich said, "-.rb.e symbols ot taith do not
appear in isolation.

fhe7 are united in •stories ot the gods,'

which is the meaning of the Greek word 'J11thos'--IQ'th • • • • Myths

are s111bols ot faith combined in stories about di'f'ine•hUll&D enoounters. •18 Religious aan is a lll1'th-aalter, tor he has the irrepressable tendency to express what he experiences, and l17'tha are
the verbal expression ot his religious experience(s).
Perhaps the most important thing that can be said about JITtb
to the modern reader is that tor the religious man a Ifl7th is a
true sto17. 19 !he JQ'th is regarded 'by the primiti'Ye as a 'true•
storJ' because it alw&T• deals with what they consider to be
16!illich, Ultimate Oonoern, PP• 96, 97, 53.
1 7ot. William James, The farietie~

p. 423.

18ot. fillich, pznamios

91.

.2t ~eligious 15»erience,

Jaith, pp. 48, 49.

k9"What is i.Jlportant, is the fact that •primitives' are alaware of the ditterenoe between lq'ths (•true stories') and
tales or legends ('false stories')" .Eliade, ~h ~Reali.ti,• P•
lln. Eliade points out that it has only 'bee!i'D ow 20th f ntury that western scholars have rediscovered myth as a •true story as opposed to a •table' or 'fiction,• OD. cit., p. 1.

WQTS

realities.

!he eosmogonio DIJ"'th is

the World is there to prove it; the myth of the

of death
is equall7 true because man's aortalit7 proves it, and so on. 20
o~igin

Of course the mere tact that pr.1mitives belieTed their neyths to
be true in no wa7 guarantees that they were true, but it does
suggest that tor a tull appreciation ot their religious experience it is necessary to view them!.!.
a

it

the7 were true (1,e., by

&J'mpathetic insight).
While the concern here is not to trace the origin ot Jcyths~1

it suttices to say that the Jll1'th-making ability is coterminous
with rational man. 22 What is iDlportant, however, is to note tha

myths are the s:rmbolic forms b7 which the religious man expresse
his awareness ot transoendence. 23 A myth, said Karl Jaspers, is
20or. Eliade, ~ and ltealitz, p. 6. Jrom the time ot
Xenophanes (c. 565-ZPlOJ iii'; fiie Greeks came to reject more and
more the myt~ological expression• tound in Bomer and Hesiod unti
the word 'JITth' was eventuall7 eaptied of 8.JJ7 metapb.7sical value,
Ibid., p. 1, ct. pp. 152-153·
21 0n the origin ot JITths aee 'I'. ft. Cornford, ~ Religion
to l'hilo•oCf (?few York: Harper and Row, Ptlbiishera;-I9!~), pp.
n'9 f.; Ii a e, .ltf'..i1! and Realiff~ pp. 145 t., and Bergson, the
!!g_ Sources 5?! Hor&IitZE t!• gion, PP• U9 t •
22Bergson writes, "Let us take, then, in the vaguel7 and
doubtless artificially detined realm ot imagination, the natural
•cut• which we have called Jll1"th-ll&k1ng and see to what use it is
naturall7 put. ~o this tacult7 are due the novel, the drama,
llJ'thology together with all that preceded it. But then, there
have not always been novelists and dramatists, whereas humanity
has never subsisted without religion," .22• cit., p. 108.
23"1'ths have other tunctions too: (1) !hey are the means by
which religious men became aware ot the transcendent (ct. Jas~ers.' 22•. cit., P• 3); (2) !hey supply models tor hwaan behaTior
(ct. lllad~ ~Reali&, P• 8).
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a "cipher" ot the transcendent, a "code" pointing to God. 24 In
tact it is the very incomprehensible nature of the transcendent
which a myth reveals that gives rise to the nature ot a uq-th as
such.

Yor "When the will to comprehend (which does not content

itself with external cognition) runs headlong into the incomprehensible, the latter either shows itself in mythical figures and
speculative concepts, as though it were striving to disclf')s" itself, but still concealed in magn.iticentl7 ambiguous language.• 2 5
So then it is because the object ot JQTth ia the transcendent
which necessitates that a myth be understood symbolically but
never literall7.

"If a JQ'th is understood literall7," wrote !11-

lich, "Philosophy must reject it as absurd." 26

On. the other

hand, the myth understood symbolicall7 "• •• is the fundamental

creation of ever7 religious communit7.• 27 It is because a JDTbh
is not to be understood literall7 that it cannot be eapiricall7

"•or the realit7 ot the uqth," said Jaspers, "is not
eapirical, 1.e., it cannot be investigated in the world.• 28 How-

verified.

ever, it is because the JD7th is not to be understood literall7
that it becoaes a s111bolical wa7 to 'open up• to the transcendence tor the religious man.
24Jaspers, £!1Yjh and Obristi!:!\tz• PPe 8,, 87•

25Ib1d., P• 29.
26tillich

1

lz'A!Dd:cs

at. Yaith,

p. 121.

2?Ibid. Of. also Jaspers, AD!! .f!!4. Christiyitz, pp. 16,17.
28Jaspers, M.rth ~ Ohristiani:tq, P• 85.
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!here have been m8J27 attempts to describe more tull7 what is
meant by a myth. Mircea Eliade listed five characteristics ot a
m:;yth, 29 but many ot them are applicable onl7 to l&Tths ot origin
within primitive religions and are, therefore, too narrow to
apply tol9ligion in general.
applicable.

He

Jaspers' analysis is more widely

wrote,

(1) !he m.yi;h tells a story and expresses intuitive insights, rather than universal concepts • • • • (2) !he
m;rth deals with sacred stories and visions, with stories
about gods rather than with empirical realities. (3)
!he myth is a carrie~ ot meaning which can be expressed
onl7 in the language of a :acyth. !he m;rthical figures are
S1ll.bols which, by their veey nature, are untranslatable
into other languages.30

fhis ma;y be sumaariezecl by saying that a lQ'th is a stor.y or
series ot images through which the transcendent world is a7J1bolized. 3l

It ia a s;yabolic wa:r ot expressing one's awareness ot

29El.iade aaid, •In general it oan be said that .,-th, as experienced b;y archaic societies, (1) constitutes the History- ot
the acts ot the Supernaturals; (2) 'tfhat this Histor;y is considered to be absolutely ~ (beoause it ia oonoerned with realities) and sacred (becau~t is the work ot the Bupernatural•)t
(3) that Dl!fbh i i always related to a •creation,• it tells how
something came into exiatenceHr how a patte1"11 ot behavior, an
institution, a manner ot work
were established& thia is whJ'
DJ.Tths constitute the paradiBllS or all si~ticant human acts;
(4) that by knowing the JQ'tli one knows the 'origin' of 1ih1ngs ~
lience oan control and manipulate them at willt this is not an
'external, • 'abstract' knowledge but a knowledge that one •exp•.r•
iences' ritually, either ~ ceremoniall7 recounting the J17th o:r
by rrtol'llin.g the ritual tor which it is the justification1 (5J
tha in one wai or another one 'lives' the IO"f;h, in the sense
that one is ae zed b7 the sacred, exaliiing power ot the events
recollected or re-enacted," lfth and Reality, PP• 18-19.
1 1
latabi~f;;P:?•:
~
GldtW.
Cl 11li1~i~n!f;i:ble~:t:1!;~thical (1.e., into non-•Jmbol language}. Jltnhs are translatable

f'rom one language (aa7, Greek) into another-(sq, English).
P·

a.

31 ot. Ninian Smart. The ReliiQoua Bg>erience 2! Mankind,

.:x>

ultimate transcendence1 it is an empirical W87 ot expressing the
non-empirical transcendent.

As men came to exercise more .tull7

their powers of verbal and rational expression it was inevitable
that these nqthologic·al expressions would take on a more permanent verbal and credal tor.m.

Religious Expressions in Creed and Dogaa
It is otten not easy to draw a clear line between the Jll11;hological and the doctrinal dimensions ot religion.

Usually the

tor.mer is more colortult SJ"Dlbolic, picturesque, and story-like.
"Doctrines," observed Binian Smart, "are an attempt to give system, clarity, and intellectual power to what is revealed through
the mythological and SJ"Dlbolic_lan.guage ot religious faith ••• ,3a
In brief, doctrinal representations of one's faith are attempts
to give a logos tor the mythos.33

wrote

~.

"To the mystics of all ages,"

K. Cornford, "the Tisible world is a myth, a tale halt

true and half' false, ea'boding a logs, the truth of which is
one."34

fhat is, dopa gzoowa out ot a more sophisticated atteap1

to generalize and universalise the earlier mTthologioal exprea-

32S'aa.rt,

JU lt+isious 191£i•nc• !!.

Mankind, pp. 15,

a.

33oorntord., Prom Belifion b Philosop)lz, p. 141. Oorntord'a
discussion is helP!UI' on i s pO!'n~. BUt we need not follow him
when he adds that "It then becomes ·an 'explanation' (aition),
professing to ac~unt f'or the .Xistence and practice ot tne ritu·
al, just as the L~latonic1 Idea is erected into an explanation oi
account <•osos) ot the thI'ngs that partake ot it •• •" Jbi4., p.
259. !here seems to be no reason why a logos can't be an ~res•
f@on ot a m;ythos without being an expl!Qation or juatitioa ~n Ol
• See the discussion below.
34co:rntord, !£2!! Religion 12. Philosoppz, p. 187.
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sions ot a religion.

'With this Whitehead agreed when he wrote,

"A dogma is the precise

e~unciation

of a general truth, divested

so tar as possible from partieular exemplitication."'5
As a result ot this close connection between JQ'thos and
logos, one can see

wb7

man7 philosophical concepts have JBTtholog•

ieal ancestors and that most JDTthological SJ11bols have conceptual
elements.36 And because literate cultures tend to prize intell•o·
tual knowledge, the historical religioDS generally have a sore
developed doctrinal dimension than there is in tribal and preliterate religions.37

Tb.is ha.a proven to be both a pea't advantage

and a grave danger tor religion.
!he great advantage ot conceptualizing and rationalizing

about one's religious experience is that by it he can better
understand, propagate, and preserT• his .faith.

.As Allred White-

head said, preeise expression is 11'1 the long run a condition tor
the vivid realization, tor ettectiveness, tor apprehension, and
for survival.

~or

progress in 't:ruth--whether the truth ot sci-

ence Or the truth ot rel1gion--1s maial7 a progress in the .fram0

ing of' concepts, in discarding artitioial abstractions or partial
metaphors, and in evolving notions whieh strike more deeply into

35Wh!tehead, Religion !! !.!!!. }1ak1ng, P• 122.
36aorntord lists seYeral exaDlples ot concepts bo~rowed bJ'
Greek philosopb7 trom their religious predecessors, Prom !!!!!gion !,2 Philoao1i$t, Chapters 1-4.

31ot. Smart, fB!. Religious 15Rerience !£. Mankind., P• 27.
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the root ot reality.38 Also, as Rudolf Otrto corzoeotl7 observed•
the process ot conceptualization of religious transcendence
gu.a.rcls a religion from sinking into tanatioisa and pure Jl1'Stioal11:Qr and qualifies it as a religion tor all of oiviliaed hUJl&D1t7• 39 otto went ao tar as to •81' that this prooesa of rationalization and moraliziag of the l!!&afl! is the aost iaportan.t ,;.....;
ot the llisto17 ot Beligioa. 40 tt is 1D. this sense that lfartin

Mart7 correotl7 obaert'94 that fashionable reaction in recent
theology to

ded.

re~ect

a belief ihat tor a belief in 1a over exten-

"Atteapts to J.'Ule out one at the expense of the other 40

violence to the fuller expression of faith throughout Ob:natian
.. . .
h1 8v0'J!7•

•

•

•
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hrthe:r, it mq be ugue4 that conceptualization ot religious experience 1• not o:nl7 helprul lntt it i• in aoae aenae

neceaaa.17.

Oertainl7 man's iaoeaaant propenaiv to o:reate SQ1;hs

and creeds would lend

auppo~

to '111• eontent;ion.

It might even

be ugaed with Jlegel tb.at a coDGept (lts&t() ia neoesaa.r.r to
•graap together' experienoe. 42 And eTen though experience ia

foundational to expressions about it, nevertheless experience ia
not meaningful. unless it is oonoeptualized.
38Whitehead, Religion !! ~ht nff!!Hs• PP• 139, 127.
39Ru4ol:t Otto, .I!!, Idea .U jhe HoJ:.z, P• 146.
40
11!&4•• P• 115.
41
Martin E. Pfart7t
!! Unbelief <•ew tork: Double481' and Oo., Inc., 1964), P•
•

I•n•Ji••
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aee

(I.

w.

7. Hegel, Sgienoe

!!

ii!U01 III.
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Ot course, as

w. o.

Smith rightly remarks, 8.117 attempt to

conceptualize completely a religion is a contradiction in terms,
tor there is always in principle more in any man's faith than aD1
other man can see and even more than he himself can .l!Z• 43 Nonetheless he admits that man must somehow conceptualize and intellectualize • • • • in such a way ae to do 3uatioe to the diversitJ
of the phenomena and at the same time not to do violence to a
conviction of those involved that through it all there is a common element of transcendence."44
!he real dangers in doctrine and dogma, in creed and concep..
tualization are overextension and disassociation

~om

experience.

overextension means that what is contained in dogmas oan become
distorted if it is stretohed be7ond its own sphere ot applioability. 45

Disassociation means neglect of the experience which is

at the basis of the oredal expression.

~or

example, when such

words as God, transcendent, and ultimate are used it is eas7 to
deceive ourselves by having no concrete understanding of their
meaning.

As Josiah Royce observed, "Ve forget the experience

from which the words have been abstracted.
4 3Smith, !he Me!»1.ns ~

.114

To these experiences

,g,t Relision, P• 128.

~., P• 151.

44

4'w!utehead wrote, "Accordingl7 though dogmas have their
measure of truth, which is unalterable, in their precise forms
the7 are narrow, limitative, and alterable: in effect untrue,
when carried over be7ond the proper scope ot their utility-,"
Religion !!_the Hakiy, P• 140.
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we aust return when we want reall7 to comprehend the world.•46

or,

if one is an outsider to the experiences. he must remember

not to substitute the rationalization tor what the believer feels
to be the reality.

Vb.itehead said it well:

•!he laportance ot

rational religion in the h1stoey ot modern culture 1a that it
stands or falls with its fundamental position, that we know more
than can be formulated in one finite systematized scheme of ab-

stractions • • • • -4? It one is not oaretul with his creeds he
may be guilt,. of clinging to words and neglecting the realit,.
they represent.
William. James was too severe in sa;ring that when a genuine
experience becomes ortho40X7, its dlQ' of inwardness is over. 48
Dogmas, he said, "• •• are only bit;s of truth, expressed. in

terms which in some

•BT• are over-assertive and in other

W81'8

lose the essence of truth ••49 At least we can satel7

Sa:/'

creeds :must be persoul and hOAest to be meaning:tul.

As Smith

that

pointed out, sentences have no meaning in themselves; on.17 persons mean (or intend) things.'° And what religious persons intend to express by their statements is th•ir experience with the

transcendent.

NJ••oJ>N Beii-

,
46Josiah Ro70e, "the P.N'bla ot Job" in
ot
iO!h ed. George L. Abe:rn.e'tb.7 aa4 thou.a A. Lai ora'. ewYo:r •
e~ollillan Oo., 1968), P• 442.
4?Wh1•ehead, Religion !!. the ~He• P• 137•
48.ru.es, the Tariei;iea .9! Religious lgerieace, P• 330.
49vhitehead, l!li&on ,!! the tfffiH• P• 139.
50Smith, !!!! ?!!Hil!I !!!! J!! al. Religion, p. 164.

r
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In brief, religious conceptualizations or creeds are saluatory, even necessary, but they must never be a substitute tor
religious experience.

However, this does not mean that religious
creeds cannot have authority, even final autborit,..51 Walter
Kaufmann engaged in overstatement when he said, "!he original sin

ot religion is to

the divine and to accept as final
some dogma, sacrament• or ritual ... 52 tillich is less severe and
ob~eoti.ty

more to the point in saying that creeds are not ultimate, rather,
their function is to point to the ultillate.53 But the danger ot
verbal idolatry is present wherever there are conceptualizations

ot the ultimate.
ot idolatry.

An

"It has led," said Erich Fromm, •to a new torm
iaage ot God, not in wood and stone but in words

is erected so that people worship at this shrine."54 ~t is,
to consider an image ot the ultimate as ultimate is idolatr,"

51ot. Whitehead, Religion in the Maki~, p. 125.

Whitehead
said, "You cannot claim abaoiute-tinal!ty Cir a dogma without
claiming a commensurate finality tor the sphere ot thought withim
which it arose," Il!:Lg., P• 126. !his is not true it by "dopa"
one means the tru"tll'Deing expressed and not the expression ot the
truth. 7or surely the finality ot the truth which is being expressed does not necessitate the tinality ot the way in which it
is bei.D§ expressed. 1urthermore, even a given expression ot trut~
can be final" within a given linguistico-cultural llilieu, in the
sense ot being the very beat wa.7 possible to express that truth
in those terms. !hen too, one should be caretul not to confuse
"finality" and •authority,• tor a given expression ot truth (dogma) J18.7 be authoritative within a given linguistico-oultural melieu without being tinal in the sense that no other or no f'uture
expression ot it could be better.
52walter Kautmann, 0r1519ue._.2t, Reli5ion !!!S Philosop:tg (Bew
York: Doubleday and Oo., Inc., 1961), P• 2'}.
53tillich, P;rp.am.ics

.2!

Paith, p. 29.

r
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hether the image is mental or meta1.55

Perhaps this is why the

God of the Old Testament so jealously guarded his own name, saying to Moses who enquired, "I AM WHO I AM" (E.Xodus 3:14).56
However, even if no doctrinal formula were ultimate and
final, one need not concede that all doctrinal expressions are
automatically fallible and insutficient.
a can be adequate without being final.

On the contrary, a dogIts adequacy, like all

other representations of religious experience will depend not

on~

ly on how well it expresses an awareness of ultimate transcendence but how effective this expression is in identifying and
clarifying this experience for others of like faith.5?

The his-

tory of the Christian Church, e.g., is a continuous narrowing
down and defining, without which many elements would have undercut and denied its existence.

"The dogma, therefore, is not

something merely lamentable or evil.

It was the necessary form

y which the church kept its very identity."58

In brief, intel-

lectual formulations of religious experience ref er only indirectly to the transcendent.

Doctrines are derived, historical con-

55John A. T. Robinson, Honest to God (Philadelphia: The
Westminster Press, 1963), P• !2?. -- ---

560n this point Ian Ramsey suggests, "Only God could know
his own name • • • • The inevitable elusiveness ot the divine
name is the logical safeguard against universal idolatry," Religious Langµase, P• 129.
5?0n this point Tillich wrote, "'Adequacy' of expression
means the power ot expressing an ultimate concern in such a way
that it creates reply! action, communication. SYJJ1bols which are
able to do this are a ive. But the life of symbols is limited,"
Pmamics .2! Faith, p. 96.
58Whitehead

43
structions which indicate but do not completely capture the reality they express.

In many respects, dogmas are negative and pro-

tective, trying to defend what is held to be a living reality
against distortion.59
What we must not forget about dogmatic (or any other kinds
of) expression of religious experience is that "Religions comm.it
suicide when they find their inspiration in their dogmas." 60

As Schleiermacher remarked, dogmas are but general expressions
of definite religious experiences, but the dogmas are not absolutely necessary to religion. 61 !hat is, religious experience
is tundruaental, and the dogmas of religion are the clarifying
modes of external expression. 62 "The Dogmas of religion," said
Whitehead, "are the attempts to formulate in precise terms the
truths disclosed in the religious experience of mankind." 6 3 And
closer examination of the religious experience of mankind will
reveal the primary function ot a creed or dogma· is its expressio!l
of the believer's awareness of the ultimately transcendent.

It

is his attempt to render the credible intelligible; to find a
59!illich, Ultimate OonceX'Jl, p. 66.
60Whitehead, Religion in ~h! Makin~, p. 138. But it is too
much to say as Smith does, ilia a VITI'.Ctaith has little need for
abstractions. On the contrary, one can't have a vivid understanding of his faith without abstractions (i.e., conceptualizations;
Smith, !!!!. Meaning ~ ~ .2! Religion, P• 116.
61 Sohleiermacher, S2!! Religion, P• 8?.
62 Wh1tehead, Religion

6311!li·. p. 57.

!!! ~ Malting, P• 132.

losos in the nqthoa ot his faith, or to penetrate the meaning ot
its

~st&r'T•

Perhaps this is wlQ" so 11an7 Terbalizations are

really only distilled J11.7Steries or paradoxes put in propositional

torm, because there is more to the JV&te17 than a word (.}.ogos) or
words can capture. 64
Perhaps, too, the inabilit,' ot words to completely conceptualize transcendence is the reason so aany religious assertions
are either direotl7 or indirectly negative.

JCa~

suggested

that eTen monotheism was not originall7 a positive concept but
an expression againat pol1'theiaa. 65 Possibly no one in the histol7" of thought haa held to the absolute siaplieitT ot the transcendent aore than did Pl.otirru, and he frankl7 conteaaea tha't
even •unity" is a negative notion. 66 Moses Maillonides and the
medieTal. thinkers atter him stressed the "f'ia negati'Ya as we11. 6?
Ot course, it knowledge ot transcendence is completely negative,

64-aee Vernon o. Grounds, •fb.e Postulate ot Paradox," ~
tin ot the e • l i o a l ft•ologige.l §ooieb, Vol. 7 (Winter~)
PP:- '3=°2Y-:e7 sugges a, too, iblt ibli is the reason aany of
the Ob.r1st1an•s verbal •od.els of locl are seeaingl7 incompatible,
such as God is both •apass1ble" DI "loving." l'either ten, he
said, is to be understood literaliy-but as a "model" (and we aay
have Jl.8.D1' "models" with va.ryi.ng degrees ot adequao7) which must
be understood not descriptivel7 as a "scale model" but as "disclosure model," capable ot eTOking a characteristicall7 religious
awareness, RU18e7, Models and mt•g (Londonz Oxford University
Presa, 1964), PP• 19=201 ana-Re iJ s 19&!1•• P• 101.

65xautmann, Q£1'!1gue ~ Reli&on ~ Philosopbl, P• 28?.
66Plotinus, 1PD1ads, V, 5,6 (qu.oted below, see n. 76).
67see Moses Maimonides, ~ tor !!!.!. Per"Dlexed, trans. M.
lriedlander (l'ew York: lover NliII'c'Mona, ~nc.t l~)J. Part one,
LVIII-LX, and. !hoaaa .Aq\U.nas, 8wmaa Deologioa , 13, C! and 5.
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it is legitimate to ask the question as to whether verbalizations

ot man's religious Tision have 8Jl7 meaning at all.

!hat is, is

language reall7 adequate as a •ediua tor the expression ot the
timate?

.!!!

Lia1tationa !! J,a.ngye !!. a Heans
15Pre1aing Vl.tiaate ~an.soendence

2'

ftan3" words have been uttered to lament the liJRits ot language as a means ot expression.

Among these lamentations J11'9tics

have contributed not a few siseable voluaes which attempt b7
language to S&7 what the7 sq language cannot reall.J' 8X})r'ess.
!his ver7 1ro117 itself

JllQ'

be an indication ot the 1n.41apensabil-

1t7 of language, whatever its inadequacies may be.

~.

problem

is thia1 how oan lia1te4 language express the unliaited? Bow
oan earthl7 terms convey heavenl7 truths?

Bow oan the immediate

and immanent reveal the ultimate and. transcendent?

Begative Language ot

~anscendence

!he ton of the problem is so torboding that JDall7 have 'ri.rtually despaired

or

,

speaking meaningfully ot the ultimate or God

in anything more than negative terms.

It is tor this reason that

Hegel identified religion with a philosophical dialectic, insofar
as both aust negate the given.

• equall7 with phil•
•Por religion

osopb.7 refuses to recognise in tinitude a veritable being, or
something ultimate and absolute, or non-posted, un.oreated and
eterna1.• 68 :!Yen Immanuel ~t admitted that "!he concept ot a

nouaenon is thus a 11erel7 lillitiy concept • • • and it is therefore onl.7 of negative emplOYJlent.•69 Tillich, 11ltewise, admit•
the need of negations to express the ultimate, s871ng it "• ••
0 an.not

be detined be7on4 these negative terms."?O Spinoza'•

famous dictwas all determination is b7 negation,?l ia i;J'pical of

a philosopb.7 of definition b;y negation that is traceable as far
back as Plato's "non-being.•?2

However, the classic example of negative theology in the
west is Plotinus.

the transcendent sou.t"Oe ot all things (which

he often called the "One") is so tar beyond all sensible and even

intellectual awareness that he sa7s it is even be7on4 all being?3

Agreeing with Plato, Plotinus said of the "One" that "• •• it
can neither be spoken nor written ot.•?4 When he does, neYertheless, speak of it in 8!17 other terms than absolute simplio1t7 or
oneness, he readil7 admits that these "• •• aasertions oan be no
more than negations.•75 In taot, "If we are led to think positively of the One," said he, •1;b.ere would be more truth in ai•
lence."

Sillilarl7, "Even in calling it the first we mean no aore

691tant, 2£a:tigue .!! Pare Jteaaop., P• 212.
?Otillich• Vltiaate Concern, p. 43.
71 1ene41ot Spinoza, JRistola 50 (QR!ra, IV, p. 240).
72Plato wrote, "• •• what 1• not, in aoae rea1~ot11 baa 'being
and conversel7 that what is, 1n a wa:y is not," Sg:p!QsS 241 d.

?3Ct. Enneads T, 2, l and T, 3t 11.
'14 ameads, TI, 9, 4, cf. Plato, Parmenides 142 a.
?51Qaeads, VI, 8, 11, ct. also T, 5, 6.

r
than to express • • • that it

ii.
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not of that compound nature

which would make it dependent upon any constituents."

.Although

Plotinus says many apparently positive things about the transcendent "One,• such as calling it good, supreme, absolute beaut7,
nevertheless he carefull7 qualities all these with warnings like
the following: "When therefore 70U seek to state or to conceiTe
Him, put all else aside1 abstraeti.ng all •• •I aee that

nothing1 be sure that there is not something which

70U

7~u

add

have taile<

to abstract from Him in 7our thought.•?6
Bow the merit of negative religious assertions cannot be denied, for the danger of verbal idolat17 is alwa7s a real one.
fo repeat, idolat17 ia 14olatJ:7 whether the illages are mental or

metal.

Literalism about the transcendent deprives it of its 111-

tiaao7 and its aa~eav, said ftllioh.77 But all of this is avoi•
ded b7 negative

a.sse~ions,

for it ia preciael7 all limitations

and fillitude which ia being negated so that the negative words

may

exp~ess

the ualiaite4 and tranaeend.ent.

However, there ia a serious, i t not fatal, ditfioulUJ' with
purel7 negative religious assertions.

Plotinua hiaaelt touched

on it when he admitted •It ia iapoaaible to aa,. •not that' if
one is utterl7 without experience or conception ot the 'that.••?a

!hat is, all negative predications presuppose some positive
?61rmeads• II. 9t 1; emphasis Dline.

??tillioh. PlB!!J.os

7819ga4s,

n.

2£.

1. 29.

taith, P•

,2.

1Understanding of that about which the predications are being
made.

Tillich said• "!here would be no negation if there were no

preceding affirmation to be negated • • • • • ?9

Peuerbach's re-

mark is instructive in this regard: "The truly religious man
can't worship a purely negative being • • • • Only when a man
loses his taste for religion does the existence or God become one
without qualities, an unknowable God.•80 Indeed, the llJ"Stic himself. said Henri Bergson, "• •• has nothing to do with properties which are mere negations and can only be expressed negatively; he believes that he sees what God is, tor him there is no
seeing what God is not.• 81
~course,

that is precisely the problem. viz •• the believer

sees the transcendent as a positive reali't7. but can he .!!l anything about it in language with other than a purely negative mean
ing (which would seem to be equivalent to no meaning at all)?
In other words• even it one can experience the transcendent, can

he express it in terms which have a positive meaning?

One attemp

ted answer to this problem has been the doctrine of analogy.
Analogous Language of Transcendence
In line with the many references of !h.omas Aquinas to the
doctrine ot analogy his followers have sensed its importance and

?9Paul !illich, !he Courage to Be (Bew Haven: Yale University Press, 1952), p.-.tm.
- 8 °Feuerbach,

.!!!.!. Essence £! Christianitz, P• 15.
81Bergson, .!!!!, f!2. Sources ,g! Moralitz sa. Religion, P• 252.
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have given a great deal ot time to it. 82

Since !homists do not

agree as to exactly what Aquinas meant by analogy, we will otter
a summary of our own interpretation. 8 3 Basically, therd are
three alternatives for language about God: ita meaning can be
~ eauivocal (totally different as applied to God), 84 univocal (totally the same), or analogous (similar).

Now it it is equivocal,

. then one is really not saying anything meaningful about God when
he affirms, e.g., that God is good.

For it the meaning of good

is totally different when applied to God from what it means as
applied to finite goods, then they are really

~

alike

~

!!!

in meaning. 8 ~
Nor, on the other hand, can one's language about God be univocal in meaning for concepts are finite and limited and God is
infinite and unlimited, and there is an infinite difference
82!he tirst systematic treatment was made by Cardinal Cajetan, !he A.nalof{ £! Names (Duquesne University Press, 1953). !he
most comprehens ve teXtUal stuc!J' is a recent one by George Xlubertanz, St. Thomas on A.nalogr (Loyola University Press, 1960).
Another s!gn1l!cant con~r!butron has come recently trom Ralph
Mcinerny, fhe Logic ot .Analogy (Hague: Nijhoff, 1961). But Eric
Maseal's Aiii!ogy and-'!XIstienee (Longmans, Green, 1949) is perhaps
more well known than the others. !he most significant treatment,
however, is that of Battista Mon.din, !he Principle of Analogy in
Protestant ~ Catholic Theolo!l (Hagiiii lljno?f, 19'b3'·
--83Much of this analysis is a summary of our uiJ.published master thesis, !he Use ot Analogy in !homistie Theism, Wheaton College, Illino!S; !9'59:84Aquinas sometimes Sa)"s it is "almost equivocal," De frini·
tate, VI, 3, reply, as translated by Armand Maurer in !he DIV'.!_.,,,
sion and Methods of the SCiences (Toronto: The Pontifical ?nsti-

tuii,~63).

-

-

85see George Xlubertanz, An Introduction to the Philosop~
ot Beirur (New York: Appleton-oiiitury-Cro?ts, IiiC.-;-r95;}, 53-6;.
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etween a finite and an infinite.

Or to put it another way, if

God is beyond and completely other than this world, then how can
ter·ms applied both to him and to the world mean entirely the same

Therefore, since language about God can be neither equivocal

~t~ferent),

nor univoeal (totally the same in meaning),
. must be analogical (partly the same and partly difterent). 86
e justification, then, tor analogous knowledge is that it is

only meaningful ground between the extremes of skepticism and
· ogmatism; between not being able to say al13'thing meaningful
bout God (on the basis of language as equivocal) and being able
o speak perfectly about God (on the basis of language as univoPerhaps the other most significant factor in the defense ot
analogy which Thomists have put forth is that analogy is based on
causality.

That is, the creature must bear some resemblance to

the Creator simply because an e.ttect must in some way pre-exist
in the causeo 8 7 !o put it another way it would be eontradictol'1"
to say that God can produce perfeotions which he does not himsel
possess.

That is, it would be contradictory to attirm that the

creature has a perfection which its Creator doesn't have.
!he attempts to defend analogy notwithstanding, it has not
met with wide acceptance in the modern philosophical world for
86"Partly" is not intended to imply parts.
alike and different or similar.

Summa

~~

It means at one

Gentiles I, 29-30; SWmna

~-

o basic reasons: it seems to them to prove either too little or
o prove too much.

Some medieval Scholastics after Aquinas (like

cotus) took the former position and many moderns (like Hum.e)
upported the latter view.

Let us briefly examine these charges.

~:.Ahe basic argument Scotus advances is this: unless there is

e .!!!! {univocal) in one's predications of God, he
e sure he is reall7 sa7ing aDTt;hing about God at all. 88

-_- a 9 unless one• s predications are univocal, he cannot be
·:"~. they are not equivocal. 8 9 !or it one maintains that this

·:,_:;,tis not true, "• •• a disconcerting consequence ensues;
·F< --

·.· ...'$ly that from the proper notion of anything found in creatures

/f-.. ·~.'

~.~

itl:ling at all can be interred about God, tor the notion ot what

~;_1t,.:_~~h
.. '

i

'~tlte

;.., .

~edge

:

is wholl7 different. n90

Basica.117, his argument comes

following: if' there is to be a c•rtaintT in one's knowabout God, then there must be univocity in his predications
him.91 !hat is, either skepticism or univocitJ".

Now it is preoisel7 this skeptical alternative that Hume
88!he reason tor this is that "God cannot be known naturall7
less being is univocal to the created and uncreated," John Duns
otus, Philosorhical Writipgs 1 trans. Allan Wolter (Hew York:
!he Bobbs-Merri 1
Inc., 1~64), P• 6.
8911e adds, "Oonsequently, every inquiry regarding God is
ased upon the supposition that the intellect has the sam.e univoal concept which it obtained trom creatures," Duns Scotus, Philoso hical Writings, p. 28.

eo.,

90ibid.

9l"One and the same concept cannot be both ce,rtain and dubious. !here.tore, either there is an.other concept which is certain] , or there is no concept at all, and conseq entl;r no certitude about any concept," Duns Sootus, ll• !!ll•t p. 23.
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J'undamentall7, he argued that analogy proves too much (and
vocity, a fortiori].

Por if God is like the world then God is

for there are imperfections in the world.9 2

He wrote,

no reason, on your theof7, for ascribing perfections to
Deity, even in his finite capacity."93
following up Hum.e's line of thought, Kaufmann argued that
"The whole theory of analogy, even it otherwise free of holes,
ould still be shipwrecked on the Christian conception of hell~gq.
is to say, if God is like everything he created, then (repug
t as it may sound to a believer in God) he is like hell.

It

s tor a similar reason that Plotinus held that God (the One) did

ot possess what he produced.

Por God produced finite, limited,

ultiple things, and he is none of these.95 But tor H1111e, it
alogv (or univocity) were true, then God would be finite,
ical, and evil since he has produced all of these.

p~

However,

ost theists are not content to accept these as characteristics
On the other hand, if nothing can be predicated of God
in an analogous sense, then it would seem to follow that
e must remain cognitively unknowable.
Despite the tact that the doctrine of analogy has not been
dely accepted outside fb.omistic circles among modern thinkers,

ork: 9;~~~M!~:iiDa!!~5!!:.?0¥9~)!n'1:~atural

Religion (New

93 Ibid., V.

94:raurmann, Oritigue .2! Re\igion ,eg, Pb.ilosoplq, p. 189.

95cr.

Plotinus, Enneads, VI, ?, 15.
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t seems to us that it deserves more serious oonsideration.96
ertainl7 Hume•s criticism is not definitive.

For it can be ar-

ed that only perfections, not imperfections, are to be applied
Imperfections are privations or lacks and no lack of
attributed to God who by nature is said to have
ll perfections.

Furthermore, it God is held to be infinite then

t course nothing which necessarily implies a limitation can be
ttributed to him.

At this point a theist mB.3' argue that what-

ver cannot be applied to G?d without necessarily implying limiations (such as materiality) must be said at best only metaphor..........~ or symbolically.

And whatever implies evil may not be

pplied to God at all, for he is held to be absolutely good.

On

he other hand whatever perfeotions can be predicated without
ecessarily implying limitations may be attributed to God meta.....,....,.............,_._ or substantially.
However, it it is granted that there is an intrinsic simiarity between God and creatures based on the connection of
960ne ot the reasons Thomistic analogy has been rejected by
any thinkers is that it has been wedded to Cajetan's view that
roper proportionalit7 is the basic !homistic analogj". •or it
seems to many that this analogy which is built only on the indirect relation between two relationships (e.g., finite love is to
he finite nature of man as infinite love is to the infinite nae of God, like 2/4::3/6) does not really establish~ intrinsic similarity at all. More recently, however, Tho:miats have
ome to acknowledge that St. !hoaas himself based his doctrine of
analogy on the intrinsic relation that God bears to creatures as
the cause to its effects. See Mondin, .Qlt• iit., chapter 4.
James F. Ross reopened the study of Thoirst c analogy in the context ot analytic philosophy in a significant article, "Analogy as
a Rule ot Meaning tor Religious Language," International Philosohioal Quarterly, Vol. l, No. 3 (September, 19G1) 1 pp. 468-562.

cause to effects, then it would seem to follow that what may be
oroperly attributed to both God and creatures is based on a univocal meaning of the terms.

For example, the term love which can

be applied to both God and man will have to have the same meaning
even though it is applied to the former without limits and to the
latter with limitations.

In this sense, the univocal-analogical

debate may be solved by saying that the meaning of the terms which
are applied properly to both God and creatures is the same but
they are not applied in the same way.

That is, the meaning is

univocal but the predication is analogica1.9?

For example, the

word love has the same univocal meaning in and of itself but
applied or predicated of man it means finite love and
to God it means infinite love.

~

~

applied

In one case the same meaning of

the word love is predicated without limitation and in the other
case it is predicated with limitations.

And since there is an in-

finite difference between a finite and an infinite, it cannot be
said that the predications have entirely the same meaning in both
cases.

However, if there must be an intrinsic relation between

the Source of all love (that is, Love itself) and love as it is
found in its finite manifestations, there must be some similarity
~etween

love as it is found in God and as it is found in his

creatures.

For even if there is an infinite difference in per-

fection between God and creatures, there nevertheless need not be
a total lack of similarity.

There could in fact be an analogy.

9?see Armand .Maurer, "St. Thomas and the Analogy of Ge-

nus,"

!fil! Scholasticism, Vol. 29 (April, 1955), pp. 143-144.
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Whether in tact there is an analogy between God and creaes will depend, of course, on whether or not there is a God
ho in faot did create creatures in his image.
ose here to decide this question.
s that

!!

It is not our p

What we can contend, however,

there were a God who is the cause of everr perfection

the world, there would seem to be no compelling reason why one
speak meaningfully about him even though he be intinAnd on the other hand, even it there is no such thing as a
reality, one can still speak meaningfully about such
supposed reality in analogous language.

As long as there are

ays to apply words which do have positive meaning beyond the
cope 0£ their usual finite application then it will be possible
o speak meaningfully of the transcendent.

If it can be shown

impossible to extend the positive meaning of a word
the limits of immediate human experience, then at best one
able to speak of the transcendent only negatively or sy:m.olically.

In order to complete the treatment of religious lan-

now be turned to other attempts to def end
meaningfulness of symbolic talk about the transcendent.
Disclosure Language about the Transcendent
Ian Ramsey seeks to elaborate a meaningful language about
ranscendenoe by what he calls "disclosure models."

Contrary to

"picturing models" or "scale models" a "disclosure model" does
ot attempt to describe
moment of insight.

"

~hing,

rather it becomes currency tor

"!he great value of a model," said Ramsey,

ongue-tied."

Disclosure models are the means ot the universe

evealing itselt to man, and they are to be

~udged

primarily on

heir ability to point to mystery, not on their ability to
icture it.

Indeed, it is part ot the purpose ot a model and its

ualifiers to leave a 181'Stery intact (e.g., God may be modeled
s 'love• and qualified by the word 'intinite•).98

!he intention

s to produce, from a single model, and by means of some qualiti-

r, an endless series ot variants, ••• 1n this way witnessing
o the tact that the heart of theology is permanent mystery.99

other examples Ramsey gave are words which have evocative
owers like indefinite pronouns or nicknames.

~e

latter is a

"• •• word which has intrinsically the fewest possible empirical
onnections, but is very much tilled out 'in use.••100 !hat is,
anguage about God is not declarative; it is evocative. 101 Ramey holds that by the use of non-descriptive, evocative language

ne can avoid being literalistic or purely anthropomorphic about
d, tor he has learned that no one model has single, all-exclu-

track to IQ"Stery any more than one metaphor can do tul.l justo a sunset or to human love and affection.

That is to

S81't

isclosure models "• •• are not descriptive miniatures, they are
98Ramsey, Models ~ ttz'ste£1, PP• ?i 19·20; 12-13; 71, 61.
99Ibid., PP• 60, 65, 21.
10°ttam.sey, Religious La.nguase, P• 162.

lOl":M7 suggestion is that we understand their r1.e., names
for GodJ behaviour aright if we see them as pri.marily evocative
of what we have called the odd discernment • • •"Ramsey, Relious La
e
•

5?
picture enlargements; in each ease they point to mystery, to
he need for us to live as best we can with theological and soien
itic uncertainties." 102
Is not this latter statement an admission of skepticism
God?

Is it not merely another way ot saying man does not

ow, or that his knowledge of God 1a equivocal?

To answer this

rom Ramsey's perspective one must remember that his concern is
ot with a descriptive knowledge ot the transcendent but, rather,

ith meaningful disclosure language about it.
~e

least that can be said tor Ramsey's "models" is that

hey do answer Wittgenstein's challenge to keep silent unless one
an speak meaningtully.l03

Even it disclosure models do not

llow one to speak descriptively about God., nevertheless they do
ermit one to speak. 104 Indeed, by virtue ot the tact 'that Ramsey's disclosure models are not cognitively descriptive nor emirioally verifiable (as are scientific models)l05 and by virtue
l02"!he intention is to produce, b:v a single model, and by
eans ot some qualifier, an endless series ot variants! • • • in
his way witness1Df to ~he tact that the heart ot theo 087 is
ermanent mystery, Ramsey, H041ls ~ rtrster.z, p. 20.
l03"It is interesting to notice, first, that the possibili~
of articulation is still 1 as it always was, the basis ot a model
setulness. The great Tl.rtue ot a model is that it enables us to
e articulate when before we were tongue-tied. But it is evident
hat articulation now is much more tentative than it was before,
that is when it was developed on the basis of a scale model • • •
In tact on the new view, the crucial question is: Bow oan we be
eliably articulate?" Models ~ t\Y•te£Y, pp. 12-l;:104In a doctoral dissertation on Ian Ramsey, Jerry Gill concludes that "Ian Ramsey's interpretation adequately meets the
challenge ot Logical :&apiricism concerning the cognitivity ot
Christian language." Ian Ramsey's Inter~tation of Christian
La
a e (University l'lrOrofl!ms, Iii'.c •• ~ Xrbor,-ilich, 196?), v.
l05"But now we must emphasize that models in science • • •

t the fact that they are indefinitely qualitiable, one cannot

nly speak about God but speak endlessly.

And in so speaking,

one's language does not suffer "death by a
housand qualifications" but rather gives "lite by a thousand

~e

question, said Ramsey, is not whether one oan speak

escriptively about the Divine Nature; the real question is: How
an he be reliably articulate?

Models help us to reliably artio-

ate theology when two conditions hold: l) "In all oases the
odels must chime in with the phenomena; they must arise in a
oment of insight or disclosure," and 2) "A model in theology
oes not stand or fall with • • • the possibility ot verifiable
eductions.

It is rather judged by its stability over the widest

ossible range of phenomena, by its ability to incorporate the
ost diverse phenomena not inconsistently."

fhis is what Ramsey

alls the method of "empirical fit," which has no scientific
eductions emerging to confirm or falsity the stated theories.
"The theological model," he said, "works more like the titting ot
a boot or a shoe • • • • nl06

In brief, religious language is em-

irically anchored (in disclosure situations)lO? and pragmatically tested by the way it enables one to piece together the
enable us to generate verifiable deductions, and models in theology • • • make possible empirical tit," Models !!!S, ftrste;z,
p.

19.

106Ibid., PP• 13, 15-1? •
..............
lO?see chapter 3 tor a discussion ot Ramsey's disclosure
situations.
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mpirical data.
Further. even though disclosure models are not ontologically
escriptive, 108 nevertheless they do help to build "fam.ily resem-

"Let us always be cautious," Ramsey warned, "of talkGod in straightforward language.

Let us never talk as

had privileged access to the diaries of God's private lite,

" When we speak of God as "supreme love," e.g., "• •• we
re not making an assertion in descriptive psychology • • • •"
ather, we are using a 9ualified model ("love" is qualified by
whose logical structure can only be understood in te
the disclosure-oom.mitment situation in which it arose. 109
What he calls "qualifiers" a.re "• •• words which multiply
odels without end and with sub.tie changes."

~ey

create what

ittgenstein called "family resemblances" or a family of models!
of qualification of one model or metaphor, 111 many of
be related in an overall meeting place between contexts.
d it is at this juncture where the mystery resides. 112 !hat
l08"The English pb.Tsicists of the nineteenth century were
ight in wanting some •ontological commitment," some •real exisence'; they were only wrong, but badly wrong, in thinking this
ould be given descriptively. It is this error which the contemorary use ot models makes evident and spotlights and is deterined to avoid," Ramsey, Models~ 11tste;:z, P• 20.

l09Ramsey, Religious Language, PP• 104, 99.
11°ttamsey, Models ~ lb';sten, PP• 60-61.
111A disclosure model and a metaphor are very much alike in
hat both "• •• enable us to be articulate and are born in insight," Ramsey, Models !!ll!, rtysterz, p. 48.
112Ibid.

61.
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Ls, by mapping out the similarities engendered by the meeting ot
the many metaphors, one may gain increased insight into the mystery.

As Max Black put it, "A memorable metaphor has the power

to bring two separate domains into cognitive and emotional relation by using language directly appropriate to the one as a lens

tor seeing the other • • • • nll3
~elp

It is in this way that metaphors

to visualize the silllilarity in various situations and thus

to begin to form a master map of family resemblances.

Metaphors then are not just link devices between ditterent contexts. fhey are ~eeessarily grounded in inspiration. Generalizing, we may say that metaphorical expressions occur when two situations strike us in such a
way as to reveal what includes them but is no mere combination of them both.114
Ramsey does not spell out what this common element is in
which the various metaphors and models coincide, but it is at
this point thGt he comes closest to admitting what the seholastiios were getting at in their "univocal element" in analogy.

In-

1eed, it bears a striking resemblance to what Sjlren Kierkegaard
~eant

by approaching a "paradox" trom many sides.

He wrote,

••• I entered into the whole £orego1ng discussion--not as
though Abraham would thereby become more intelligible,
but in order that the unintelligibility might become more
desultocy. l'or, as I have said, Abraham I cannot understand, I can only admire him.
By desultory Kierkegaard meant a "• •• leaping .trom one point
~o

another so as to illuminate the subject from all sides, or in

ll3Max Black, Models and Meta2hors, as quoted by Ramsey,
!"Iodels ~ n,yste;cy, p. $4.114Ramsey, Models !!!2, n,ysteg, p. 53.
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order that the unintelligibility might be broken down into its
several parts."ll5 But it each one ot Ramsey's disclosure illulaines a common meaning, or it each one ot Kierkegaard's perspectives helps one to understand the meaning of the paradox, then
there must be a common core of meaning (a univocal element)
which they all convey.

That is, if all the models converge to

give meaningful insights into the transcendence, then there must.
be a common basis for the•, otherwise the divergent models are
not really providing insights into the same thing after all.

In

this sense disclosure language is doing the same job that the
univocal element in analogous is intended to accomplish.
But the basic question which must be answered here is not
whether Ramsey's "disclosure" language is really "analogous" language or whether both are like Kierkegaard's "paradoxical" expression, but whether 8..llY of these are adequate ways or speaking
about ultimate transcendence.

However, before we are ready to

answer this question we must first review other approaches aimed
at discovering an adequate language tor the transcendent.
Symbolic Language about Transcendence
Paul Tillich suggests that the answer is to be found in
"symbolic" language about God.

"Han's ultimate concern must be

expressed symbolically," wrote Tillich, "because symbolic lanll5F.d.1tor•s note, {egr and T:rembli~, trans. Walter Lowrie
(New York: Doubleday an
o.-;-Inc., 1954 , p. 121. Kierkegaard
admits that there is a way to understand a paradox, saying, "However, 1! I regard the problem rot God COlllDlanding Abraham to transcend the moral law and kill Iiaac, as a paradox, then I understand it in such a way as one can Understand a paradox," 1ear and
Tremblinao .. 'De 84.
··
-
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guage alone is able to express the ultimate."
not the same as a "sign" tor Tillich.

But a "symbol" is

A sign is something that

points beyond itself, but a symbol is more.

"It points beyond

itself while participating in that to which it points."

For

example, the flag is a symbol of the nation because it not only
points beyond itself to the nation tor which it stands but in
addition it participates in the power and dignity of that
nation. 116
According to Tillich there are three criteria of a true symbol: l} True, living symbols should be immediately understandable; 2) '.l'here should not be resistance to them because of anxiety concerning the idolatrous use ot symbols; 3) They should be
expressed in a contemporary stylistic torm. 117
!he great sym.bol of faith tor Tillich is the word ''God" be-

cause somehow the word participates in all the honor and dignity
that is attributed to God himself.

However, this is not to say

that any of the attributes of God or even the word God itself are
really descriptive of God.

"All the qualities we attribute to

him, power, love, justice, are taken from finite experiences and
applied symbolically to that which is beyond finitude • • • • "118
They are symbols taken from daily experience, and not information
about what God is or what He can do.

!!!hey do not form a logos

about God but a D!:rjihos.

116!1llich, J?.t:rtamics .2!'. Faith, pp. 41, 45.
ll?!illich, Ultimate Concern, p. 92.
118Tillich, pyna.m.ics .2!'. Faith, p. 4?.

Tillich admits that symbols may lose their meaning and may
even die, 119 but adds that they may also be revived.
no symbol should be removed.

"Therefore,

It should be reinterpreted."

"Classical, traditional Christianity," he said, "has lived in
symbols--Creation, tall, reconciliation, salvation, Kingdom
God, Trinity.
lose them."

or

'l'hese all are great symbols, and I do not wish to
Indeed, Tillich envisioned his writings as "• ••

directed precisely to the interpretation of religious s,-mbols in
such a way that the secular man-and we are all secular--ean
understand and be moved by them." 120
Tillich's concept ot symbolic language about God has not
been without resistance by contemporary philosophers.

Kau.fmann•s

response is to the point:
Some people think that the conception or "symbols" which
is fashionable in our day can do the job that "analofJ7"
has tailed to do. It is argued that religious propositions which are literally false are true when understood
symbolically. !he first point to note here is that there
is no nonsense whatever which may not be said to be symbolically true, especially i t the symbolic meaning is
not stated.

It, on the other hand, Kaufmann continued, the "• •• claim that
religious propositions are symbolical means that they are richly
ambiguous, it is true--but put very Jlialeadingly • • • • 11121
ll9Ibid., PP• 4?-49.
120Tillieh, Ultimate Concern, PP• 9?, 96, 88-89.
121xaurmann, Critigue or Relifion and Philosop~, PP• 189,
191. lurthermore, !iiu?mann-Conten s thit"'T{!iich's istinction
between "sign" and "symbol" is both arbitrary and ridiculous,
tor "• •• it would make •mythical thought' and the 'primitive
mentality• of undeveloped peoples and children the norm tor all
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Tillich was eventually forced to acknowledge that one's

know~

ledge of God could not be completely symbolic by the argument,
"• •• that in order to speak of symbolic knowledge one must delimit the symbolic realm by an unsymbolic statement." 122 His
reply was that the one unsymbolic, and therefore unambiguous,
statement that can be made of' God is that he is "being itself."
"But," Kaufmann responded, "this is surely neither a symbolic
statement nor a nonsymbolic statement: it is no statement at all,
it is a definition--and as it happens, a definition utterly at
odds with the meaning ot 'God' in probably more than 95 per cent
of our religious tradition • • • •"

He continues, "Tillich's

'being itself' is nEdther the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob nor
the God of Jesus and Paul • • • • In short, Tillich's propositions about God are through and through ambiguous."123
However,inadequate Tillich's symbolic language of God may

be, Kaufmann is not entirely oonsj.stent in basing a rejection ot
it on its ambiguity.
~an

For Kaufmann himself wrote, "Propositions

be multivocal without being eguivocal: to the perspective

!they speak with many voices, signify many things, and mean a
great deai.•124 On the other hand, to argue (as Tillich eventuof us • • • • " tor they share alike the superstitious belief
that a sign is somehow real or participates in the reality which
it symbolizes, Kaufmann, rug., P• 194.
122A criticism given by Professor Urban of Yale which Kaut~ann relates, Critigue gt_ Religion~ Philosoph;r, p. 195.
123Ibid., PP• 195, 196.
124Ibid., P• ?2.

-
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ally did) that all symbolic statements must have a nonsymbolic
basis is reminiscent ot Scotua' contention that there must be a

univocal, non-ambiguous basis for all ambiguous and non-univocal
predications. 125
!he other alternative to arguing for a univocal basis for
all symbolic predications of God is to say that all language
about God is purely symbolic.

Such is what Jaspers does by call-

ing religious language "cipher" language.
Cipher Language About Transcendence
Jaspers said,

M•

••

the meaning of the cipher is that

through it I actually become aware of something that cannot be
expressed in any other language. • • • II For the idea of God,
taken seriously, excludes definite determinations, and requires
that one go beyond all languages.

!hat is, "• •• a cipher be-

comes a symbol of a reality that cannot be expressed in any other
way-."

Cipher language is

a~

language about God because there

is no content language about Him.

It speaks in a mythos about

God because there can be no logos about Him.

There can be np

clarity where there is mystery.126
It is interesting to observe in this regard that some of
contemporary philosophy is moving in a somewhat reverse direction
from the early Greeks who threw oft the vast symbolic visions ot
mythology and attempted to get a clear-headed picture ot the way
125see discussion in above notes 89-92.
126Jaspers, ~ ~ Christianity, PP• 87, 89; cf. 85.
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things really were--they sought a logos in place of a !llhos. 12?
It would seem that Jaspers and others are saying that the quest

tor the logos tor more than two millennia of Western thought has
proved futile; we must return to myths as means of describing
reality. 128
Be that

~s

it may, Jaspers' "cipher" language is admittedly

hical and non-objective.

It is in this respect that he oppo-

ses so strongly Rudolf Bultmann's attempt to de-mythologize.
"We should not destro7, but restore the language of myth," he
ites.

"fo speak of 'demythologization' is almost blasphemous.

ot myth is not enlightenment, but sham enightenment," he continues.

"Does the splendor ot the sunrise

ease to be a tangible, ever new and inspiring reality, a mythial presence, just because we know that the earth is revolving
round the sun • • • ?"

Bultmann, he complains, tails to reoog-

that mythical language conveys an untranslatable truth.
"The elements of truth in the myth • • • oannot be separated from
its historical garb, once the latter has been stripped away."
fb.e real task, therefore, is #Ot to demythologize, but
to recover mythical thought in. its original purity • • •
and indirectly bring us closer to the lofty, imageless
127oorntord, l!:2!! Religion !! PhilosoPB.Y, p. 42.
128Indeed, the later Heidegger's return to the pre-socratics
nd interest in the poetical utterances of Holderlin would lend
upport to this analysis, as would Altizer•s deep interest in
lake's mystical poetry. See William Barrett, Irrational Man
(!few York: Doubleday and Oo., Inc., 19.58), p. 2'5<}, and '!boiiii
tizer and William Hamilton, Radical fb.eolo~ and the Death ot
God (New York: The Bobbs-Merri!! Co., !nc.,~ pp:" 111 l.--
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transcendence, the idea of God which no myth can fully
express for it surpasses them all.l 29
The real task, then, is not to demythologize but to "remythologize."

Nevertheless, Jaspers admits there is a half truth in

demythology, viz., that of "• •• denouncing reitication, or conceiving the :m;rth as an alleged reality, opaque and tangible ... l30
In brief, Jaspers' "ciphers," Tillich's "symbols" and Ramsey's "models" are all attempts to avoid two extremes: verbal
idolatry (or identifying God with verbal images ot h1m) 1 31 on
the one hand and theological silence on the other hand.

But do

they succeed?

129Jaspers, ~ ~ Qhristianit,z, PP• 85, 17, 16, 33-34,
l30Jaspers conceives of his own task as one ot existential
nermeneutics which depends on two critical factors:
"First: Whereas mythical language is historical, and hence
its truth can lay no claim to the universal validity of knowledge, it is precisely by Virtue ot this quality that it can lend
the historical Existenz something ot the unconditional. The unconditional thua brougSt to light remains conditioned in expression, historically relative, and ob~eotively uncertain • • • •
Second: All mythical images are ambiguous. ~s idoa is
inherent in the Biblical commandment: Thou shalt not make unto
thee any graven image. Everything mythical is a language that
grows faith before the transcendence of the one godhead. While
we aee, hear. and think in the language of myth conceived as
code, while we cannot become concretely aware ot transcendence
without a code language, we must at the same time keep in mind
that there are no demons, that there is no magic causality, no
such thing as sorcery," ~~Christianity, pp. 16-17, 18-19.
1 31 " • • • it we were vouchsafed with God's name, our vision
might soon become atrophied--loving the name more than him who
had disclosed it--we can only meet this difficulty by supposing
that the name of God will never at any time be completely vouchsafed to us,• Ramsey, Religious Language, p. 12'}.
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Adequacy £! Language .!!!, ~ Means
JEcpressing Transcendence

sf

!he ability to avoid successfully these two extremes will be
part ot the criteria for the adequacy ot religious language.

Por

on the one handt surely no religious expressions about transcendence can be deemed adequate it they do not point beyond the oonines of limited empirical experiences to that which is ultimate.
Andt on the other hand, certainly no talk of the beyond is adequate if it is not grounded and anchored within tinite. human',
experiences.
~hich

Or. to state the criteria positively, any language

can point beyond limited,

human

experiences while re-

aining its basis within them has at least some adequacy tor exressing the transcendent.
Betore deciding whether or not a given language or way ot
speaking about transcendence is adequate, one must decide whether
or not language itselt of its very essence rules out this possiility.
Does Language Necessarily Imply Limitations?
It it could be determined that linguistic expressions

al~s

and necessarily imply limitations and are neither applicable to
or evocative of anything beyond empirical limits, then the batle for an adequate religious language is lost.

Or, to be more

specific, if language necessitates objectification, then there
ill be no way to speak of a transcendent subject which -goes beond all objectification.

Only a careful analysis of what
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language is can answer this question.
There can be no doubt that language often involves objectification.

Certainly scientific speaking involves objectifica-

tion, i.e., considering somQthing as an object of our study.

In

the scientific sense, said Martin Heidegger, "• •• thinking and
speaking are objectifying, i.e., positing something given as object in the field of scientific-technological representation

or

this field thinking and speaking are by no means objectifying," 1 32 To put it in
( Vorstellen). • • • It

He continues t "Outside

Ramsey's terms, "scale-model" language is objective but "disclosure-model" language is not. 1 33 the language of pure objectivit,
is empirically limited, but the language of subjectivity is not,
because the former tries to picture whereas the latter points. 1 34 ,
As Kaufmann observed,
The question is how we use language--to vivisect experience, killing it tor the sake of generalized knowledge,
or to capture experience alive. The scientist does the
form.er, the poet the latter, and the philosopher must
often try to do both and capture the experience before
anal7zing it.135
What probabl7 tends to mislead many Westerners into thinkine
that the nature of language is objective is the in.tluenoe of
1 32 cf. Martin Heidegger, »The Problem of a Non-Objectifying
Thinking and Speaking in Contemporary Theology," in PhilosopH
and Rel~ion, ~. Jerry H. Gill (Minneapolis: Burgess PUbll~ng
t
19 ) ' p. 64.

ro:

l33see Ramsey, Models ~ !:J;rstery, pp. 19-20.
1 34 see Ramsey, Models &W1. J1ystecy, pp. ?, 19, 20, and !!!!!gious Language, PP• 56, 162.
l35Kautmann, Critiq>J.e of Relittion an4_ PhilosoJ:>h:r, p. 88.
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scientific type thought in their culture plus the inherent ra+.-1,__
alistic bend inherited from the Greeks. 136 As P. H. Cornford
pointed out, the genius of the Greeks was to translate their
m;ythos into a logos, 1 37 i.e., to seek clarity where there had

-

been ambiguity.

The problem comes, however, when the logos is

taken to be an ontos, when language is given a being or essence

of its own.
It is to the credit of Wittgenstein that many philosophers
are coming to recognize that language has no essence. 1 38 To believe that language has a nature or essence is an illusion which
contributes to semantical confusion on empirical topics.

More

important for this study, it would imply that there are necessarily implied limitations of language which render it incapable
of speaking of anything beyond the empirical.

In Greek philos-

ophy an essence is definable and circumscribable and, therefore,
limited.

Essences reter to entities and, like the platonic

Forms after which they are patterned, they are distinctly limi-

ted.

So from the recognition that language has no essence fol-

lows the conclusion that language is not necessarily limited and,
therefore, not inapplicable to the transcendent.
l36 see A. J. Ayer, Languase, Truth and Logic (New York:
Dover Publications, Inc., i~J, pp. 42~
• 137cornf'ord, ~ Religion !2 Philosophl• pp. 141-142, 258259
138wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 28th ed.
{New York: Barnes and Noble, Inc., ·1gg9), p. 91.

?l
What Is Language?
This raises the question as to precisely what language is.
Plato and his followers language was a revelation of the
gos, an expression of the common wisdom which is in all men.
ccording to Cornford's interpretation of Plato, "The Logos is
evealed in speech.

The structure of man's speech reflects the

tructure of the world; more, it is an embodiment or representaion of it • • • •"

Language, like the visible world, is a mani-

old, and so halt unreal and false.
Language, that stupendous product of the collective mind,
is a dupiicate, a shadow-soul, ot the whole structure of
reality • • • nothing, whether human or superhuman, is
beyond its reach: Speech is the Logos, which stands to
the universe in the same relation as the :myth to the
ritual action.139
at is, as the myth is sometimes a verbalization of the action
ritual, so is speech a verbalization or logos ot the living
eality of the whole world.
Several things emerge from this analysis of language which
significant for this study.

First, if language is a kind of
community (or cosmosA140 the question arises again as

o whether language is not therefore limited by its very rational
tructure as a logos and, therefore, incapable of expressing the
limited?

Of course, the answer to this will depend on what is

l39cornford, From Religion ~ Philosopl:!l;, pp. 192, 141.
140oorntord contends that this is the original meaning ot
he word cosmos. "We are reminded. that the very word 2osmos was
political term among the Dorians, betore it was borrowea'. by
hilosphy to denote the universal order," .!£2! Religion !2, .E!!!!.so h , P• 53.
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meant by a logos.

A survey of the Greek usage of the term reveals that it had many meanings, 141 most of which may be diVided
into two broad basic categories: logos means either expression of
or explanation for; discourse or definition; a verbalization or

rationalization.
Now in the former sense of the word there would be no problem in calling religious language a logos.

~or

religious lan-

guage would be a word about God or the transcendent, not in the
sense of describing it but deolaripg it; not in picturing it but
in pointing to it; not in rationalizing it, but in revealigg
it.142
141!he Greek word logos may mean: l) A com~utation or reckoning (as to account, measuret esteem, or value); 2) relation,
correspondence, proportion; 3J explanation (as a plea, theory,
law, thesis, reason, formula, law); 4) inward debate of the soul
(as thinking, reasoning); 5) continuous statement, narrative (as
fable, legend, tale, speech); 6) verbal expression or utterance
(as single word{ talk, report or tradition, discussion, debate,
or deliberation;; ?) a particular utterance or S83ing (as a divine oracle, proverb or maxim, assertion, express resolution, command); 8) a thing spoken ot or sub~ect matter; 9) expression,
utterance, speech (as intelligent utterance, artistic expression,
phrase or complex term); 10) Word or Yisdom ot God (as Christ).
~aken from Greek-English Lexicon, PP• 105?-1059- Thayer, ea.
142 Especially would there be no objection for the Christian
in view ot the Incarnation. Christ was called the Logos ot God
who lived among men and manifested God's glory. Religious language could profitably follow this paradigm for logos, tor it is
dynamic and not static. It is not object-centered tor Obrist
was a living subject. Neither is it abstract and impersonal but
concrete and personal, and so on. or. John 1:1, 14.
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However, there are grave dangers with the other meaning ot
the Greek word logos, if not insuperable difficulties, in
ing 1 t to the transcendent.

appl~

It logos must imply a limi t.ed con-

ceptualization, then there would be no way to speak or the unlimited tor all concepts are by nature limited, involving as they
do some kind of mental picture or image.
Likewise, it language means logos in the sense of rationalization, it aeems to be virtually impossible to avoid what has
been called "reification" 143 or verbal idolatry-. 1'hat is, men
will inevitably be led to give explanations tor God rather than
be content with expression of God.

Perhaps it is this inherent

tendency in Western language to conceptualize and objectify whiob
has led some to reject the view of language as a logos.
Whatever the reasons may be, there is certainly some merit
in viewing language as a "macromyth" or "supermyth." 144 Since
the purpose of a myth is to point beyond itself, then religious
language as a macromyth would be suitable, could be appropriatel'
characterized as a "macroJ1l7th," tor that is precisely what religious language intends to do.
Further, as a myth is a kind ot "code'' or "cipher" to reveal transcendence, then language as a macromyth could be studie~
in order to decipher the transcendent which it conveys. 145 And,

143Smith, :!!.!. Meaning !!!S.

!!! ,gt.

Religion, pp. 10.5-108.

144Marshall McLuhan uses the former and w. L. King the latter term. See King, Introduction !2 Religion, pp. 138-139.
145T.b.is seems to be what Ramsey means when he says that we
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if language like myth is a revelation, a letting-be-said (by a
subject) as opposed to a saying-about (objects), then religious
language as a macromyth can avoid, as Heidegger said, " •• • the
untenability and arbitrariness of the thesis that thinking and
speaking as such of necessity are objectifying." 146 It would
seem to follow, then, that an adequate religious language must
be a language capable of expressing subjectivity, for it is precisely as subject that man transcends the limits of objectification and becomes a paradigm for speaking of the transcendent.
A Language of Subjectivity
As Michael Novak observed,
~inding

~n

one respect the difficulty of

a suitable language to speak about God is really in find-

ing a suitable language for talking about the self.

ttLanguage

oorrowed from the object world is systematically misleading when
applied to the self or to God. • • • "

Language which is formed

for the pragmatic purposes of everyday living, he said, "• •• is
wrenched out of familiar channels when it is used of God."

And

language that is sharpened for philosophical purposes "• •• is
more fitted for the needs of the system of which it is a part
than for speaking of him who • • • moves beyond every system."
$hould constantly be on the look-out for 'odd' language as a
'tip-off' of the Transcendent. See Religious Language, p. 54
where he says, "• •• a useful antidote to the craze tor
straightforward language might be found in suitable doses of
poetry or greater familiarity with words thrown up in scientific
theories • • • and we might even conclude in the end that the
odder the language the more it matters to us."
146lleidegger, Being and Time (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1962), P• b4. - ~ ~

?5

Even though Novak admits that ordinary language in its use ot

"I" and "you" provides hints for enquiry about God, he warns that
it is basically a language ot objects. and is inherently idola-

trous.

He concludes that "• •• if any language is even remotely

useful for talking about God, the likelihood ia that it will be
the language by which we speak ot intelligent subjectivity."l4 ?
Novak offers the following two interpretive principles for
a language of "intelligent subjectivity":

Our first assertion is that the experience on which religious language is best groundf is the experience a man
has or himself as a subject.
a Our second assertion is
that or all the experiences 0 rntelligent sub~ectivity,
the one most suitable as a guide to our thinking about
God seems to be that of intelligent consciousness, including insight and critical retlection.148
In developing this language he offers two guiding princi-

ples:
Thus, first, we will not use any predicate about God
that does not at least apply to ourselves as subjects.
Secondly, we wIIl heea the warning that language borrowed from the object world can mislead us into thinking that awareness is like sense perception, or that
the "worldn of subjects is an imitation of the world
of objects.
Therefore, tor a man to state fully what he means by 'God' he
would have to:
• • • 1) narrate many ot his eJq>eriences (at prayer, in
worship, even in secular action), 2) describe the contexts in which he believes he used the word 'God' well,
and, above all, 3) enunciate his understanding of human

14?Novak, Belief ~Unbelief, pp.
148 Ibid., pp. 98-99.

-

99, 94, 69, 28.

understanding. For what we mean b7 'understanding' determines what we mean by •man,' and what we mean by 'man•
guides what we mean by 'God.•149
However, Novak admits that b7 the language o! "intelligent
subjectivity",
We cannot answer directly what God's mode ot lite is
like; at best, we can single out which things in the
world he is not like, and which things he may be more
like. The chief virtue in taking intelligent consciousness as a model tor conceiving ot God is that it does
not require a corporeal body tor its referent.
For example, "In moments of intellectual concentration, or again
in moments o! artistic contemplation or communion, we !ind ourselves •rapt,• forgetful ot the demands of our bodies, of the
passage of time, of fatigue, of the need to eat."

It is such ex-

periences as these, Novak continued, that "• •• turnish us the
direction in which total, unlimited, unconditioned consciousness
is the upper limit."150
An

Adequate Language About Transcendence

And now to summarize the discussion and draw out a conclusion.

Does language necessarily imply limitation?

!'he answer

is negative, unless the .function o! language is misunderstood to
be a rationalization rather than a revelation.

Only if language

is mistaken to be a definition rather than a declaration is it
necessarily limited in its application.

It is not language as

such which is inadequate but objectifying language.

Therefore,

in order to have an adequate religious language one must avoid
149Ibid., pp. 101, 70.

l50ibid.,

-

pp. 102, 103.
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objectifying the transcendent.

Basically this can be done in

two ways: (1) By devising a non-objectifying language (as Novak);
(2) By using objective language with appropriate qualifications
so that it is not understood objectively (as Ramsey,

11• !,!J.

However, in either case if religious language is to be more than
purely evocative non-cognitive insights into the transcendent,
then there must be some common element or meaning at the basis
of all symbolical and metaphorical predications such as is provided for in analogy.

Otherwise, religious language could do no

ore than evoke an experience with a meaningless beyond, but it
could not provide any meaningtul understanding ot the beyond.
Without some common basis for meaning religious language will at
est be only metaphorical declarations but not metaphysical
descriptions of the transcendent.

It will be no more than an

exercise in what is lip.gqisticallz ROssible about the non-empirical; it will not provide one with what is ontologioall:
about the transcendent.

~

Without a comm.on basis ot meaning tor

etaphors, models, and symbols the best one can have is a meaningtul way that he may speak ot the transcendent, without any
nowledge of the wa7 the transcendent really !!. (if it really
is).

There are certain essential features ot an adequate language about the transcendent which emerge from this study.

•irst

as Tillich discovered, all symbolic statements must ultimately be
grounded on what is not symbolic.

Metaphysical statements are

?8
some univocal meaning betweP-n things which are applied to the
human experience and to what goes beyond it.

It means too that

if analogous language is to be meaningfully descriptive of the

transcendent that there must be an intrinsic relationship between
the transcendent and the immanent.

There must be a univocal ele-

ment or common meaning in the analogy.
Second, since all language taken from finite experience is
limited in the empirical setting from which it comes, there must
be some way to quality it before it can be appropriately applied
to that which transcends empirical experience.

Tb.is may be ac-

complished in at least two ways; by negation and by extension.
By negation or appropriate qualifications one may rid a term ot
what would otherwise be inapplicable to the transcendent. 1 51
However, since every negation rests upon some positive knowledge,
there must be some meaning at the basis of all the negations
which can be applied by extension trom its limited empirical circuastances to the transcendent.
This leads to a third point.

There are some terms which are

limited and empirical in meaning by derivation but are not neces-

__

sarily so limited in their aPRlication.

For instance, the con-

cept of "love" is limited as we ......_,._
know it, but it does not follow
from this that love .!! applied !g

!!!!

transcendent is necessarilJ

l51And when the language is not transparent; when it does
not point beyond itself, then it obscures God F!r. Buber, WritinRs
of Martin Buber, ed. Will Herberg (New York: Tlie World Publish1~n
-eG., 1956), p. loll, stifles the religious lite (ct. Whitehead,
Reli.rion !!! !!'!! MSking, p. 132), and leads to verbal idolatry.

r

79
limited and empirical.

Is there not something about the meaning

of the term love itself which makes it possible to extend it
without negating its positive content to the transcendent?

And

is this not also true of other terms such as "being" (in the
sense of "to-be-ness") 1 52 and "consciousness." However, there
are many terms which cannot be extended in their positive meanin@
to that which transcends the empirical.

The word "rock," for

example, is not applicable to the transcendent in any more than
a symbolic wa7.

For the very concept ot a non-empirical or in-

finite rock is contradicto17.

In brief, only those words whose

positive meaning is not essentially changed by extending it beyond the limited, empirical circumstances from which it is derived in hum.an experience can be adequate currency for expressin@
the transcendent.
Swama.r;y

.2! !J!!

Chapter

fhere are many ways religious men have attempted to express
their experience of the transcendent, in symbol, in myth, in dogma, etc.

The present study has chosen to examine the verbal ex-

pressions as a key to understanding what men mean by religious
experience.

Upon analysis of religious language it was discov-

ered that the fundamental purpose it manifests is to express that
which goes beyond the limitations of empirical experience.
Since language was taken to be a significant way of expres152It is in this sense that the Thomistic notion of God as
pure esse (from Exodus 3:14) was not inappropriate.

-
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sing the transcendent, it was necessary to ask which kind of
language, if any, is adequate for the purpose of expressing this
non-empirical object of religious commitment.
is two-fold.

The answer to this

Both negative and symbolic language are adequate

ways of expressing the non-empirical aspect of the transcendent.
~owever,
~on

in order tor there to be any cognitive content and eom-

meaning in religious language there must be at the basis of

these symbols and negations some positive knowledge which can be
extended without changing their essential meaning to that which
transcends the empirical confines from which the term comes.
There must be some metaphysical basis for all metaphorical predications about the transcendent. This is best found in the
Language of analogy.

OHAP'l'ER III

THE CHARACTER AND DIMENSIONS OF RELIGIOUS EXPERIENOE
!he plan of this chapter is to define more precisely what
is meant by a religious experience.

Tb.is will involve two thi.?lgs:

first, it will discover and define precisely what is characteristic of a religious experience, and secondly it will examine the
various dimensions which religious experience has taken.
The purpose for this chapter is twofold: first, a religious
experience will be defined and distinguished from other kinds of
experiences such as ethical and aesthetic experiences.

After re-

ligious experience is understood, then it will be evaluated.
That is, we will determine its identity before attempting to discover tests tor its reality; we want to know what it is before
deTising ways of determining whether or not it is real. 1 Secondly, we will seek to elaborate the various dimensions or directions which religious experience may take so as to forstall
1 Even it it were Eossible to know whether something is without knowing precisely wnat it is, it certainly would be more
helpful to be able to define it more clearly before attempting to
make determinations about its reality. lurthermore, it is probably impossible to know that something is without having at least
some general notion as to ~ it is. For example, one may know
that there are other persons without being able to define precisely what is meant by a person but probably not without some
general idea such as they are .. speaking somethings."
81
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istaking experiences which are essentially religious for nonreligious ones.

In brief, this chapter is an attempt to under-

stand what the nature of a religious experience is before seeking
to find ways to evaluate its reality basis •

.!!!.! OoJllDlon Characteristics .2! Religious 1$Jq>erience
Most ot

There have been many attempts to define religion.

these definitions have at least one common element--an awareness
of the transcendent.

!hat a religious experience involves the

transcendent is held not only by theists and pantheists but by
any atheists as well.

The dilrlension and definitions

or

the

differ, but a religious experience involves the
ranscendent nonetheless.
Religious Experience Involves an Awareness
of the !ranscendent
Some have denied that there is little or any cognitive content common to all religions, but few if any have denied that
there is a transcendent dimension which goes beyond the finite
individual and his empirical circumstances.

Those who believe

the transcendent has a reality of its own beyond the human have
identified it with the "Universe" or "All"{SChleiermacher), the
"Numinous" or "Holy" (otto), the "Wholly Other" (Kierkegaard),
"Being itself" or the "Being beyond being" (Tillich), the "Transcendental Ego" {Koestenbaum), and numerous other realities, personal and impersonal, pantheistic, deistic, or theistic.

On the

other hand, those who deny its objective reality often admit,
nonetheless, that belief in the reality of the transcendent is
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characteristic of religion.

Some identify it (at least in part)

with the individual's subconscious (James), the collective subconsciousness of men (Jung), the collective consciousness of the
group (Corn.tord), the projection ot human imagination (Feuerbach), man's absurd project to become self-caused (Sartre), the
illusory object of a universal neurosis (Freud), man's higher or
ideal self (Fromm), the imaginative unity of human values (Dewey)
and so on.

But whatever the description or name for the trans-

cendent there is something transcendent (real or not) which goes
beyond the individual in which or by which he transcends his
finite conditions •
.!!!!! Religious Person

!! Aware

~

!!!.! Transcendent .!.! Other•-

Not only is it acknowledged that religious experience involves
the transcendent, but it is also recognized that the transcendent is essential to religious experience.

Feuerbach contended

that it is absolutely essential that the religious man believes
God is really out there. for he would not worship it as the ultimately other if he knew it to be nothing but himselr. 2 Indeed,
it there is to be any kind of experience, there must be at least
a (mental) distinction, if pot an (actual) difference, between
the one which is aware and that of which it is aware.

Even in

the experience of self awareness there is a distinction between
the "I" and the "me."

It is difficult to see what the word

.. experience" (or awareness, consciousness) could mean i! there is
n. 1.

2Ludwig Feuerbach, The Essence .2,! Christianity, pp. 13, 30,
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absolutely no distinction between the "I" (finite individual) and
rthe "Thou," i.e., the transcendent.

As Koestenbau.m points out,

~eligion is an I-Thou but not an I-I relation.3

Tb.at is, there

is no meaning left to the word "experience" it there is an absolute merging of the individual and the transcendent. 4 And even

if it is possible to ettect an ontological merging of "man" and
"God" (though most mystics probabl7 refer to ps7chological not
ontological merging), this state could hardly be called one ot
awareness or consciousness (which is what we mean by experience).
It experience by its very nature will involve an "other,"
then it follows that religious experience must also involve something beyond or transcendent.

v. c.

Smith sum.med it up well when

he wrote, "• •• what they have in common lies not in the tradition that introduces them to transcendence, nor in their faith by
~hich

they personally respond, but in that to which they respond,

the transcendence itself."5
~
~ral

Unitz £.! Meaning

!!!

~

franscendent.--The point

or

gen-

agreement among scholars is that religions have a great di-

~ersi ty

~ontent.

of experience and expression and little if any unity of
With regard to the first point Schleiermacher argued

that multiplicity, tar from being bad for religion, is necessary
3Peter Koestenbaum, "Religion in the Tradition of Phenomen~logy," .21?.• .211•• PP• 204, 205.
4 In view of this, if the attainment of Nirvana is taken to
mean the loss of all awareness, then it would not be a religious
experience. It would be the experience of losing all experience.

5y. c. Smith, 1!'.!! Meaning !!!2:, ~ .2! Religion, p. 173·
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for the complete manifestation of religion. 6

James suggests that

plurality in religious experience is necessary to fit the plurality ot human needs.?

Tillich thinks that we should not pretend

an identity where there is a very fundamental difference in the
whole experience and attitude as between Western and Eastern religions (e.g., as to their views on history as liniar vs. horizontal).8

Nor does he feel that they should be mixed, tor "A

mixture of religions destroys in each of them the concreteness
which gives it its dynamic power."9
Having said this, however, is not to deny any possibility
of identifying a common meaning to religious experience.

Dewey

was no doubt not far from the truth when he argued that there is
little if any specifiable content of value which is common to all
religions. 10 However, this conclusion can be misleading, tor it
discourages the effort to find and define the elements which are
common to most if not all religious experiences.
The analysis of William James is more profound and reveals
a greater appreciation for the common elements of religious experiences.

He suggests that all religions have the following

6 Friedric Schleiermacher, .Q!!. Religion, p. 213.
?William James, The Varieties of Religious l!;x.perience, pp.
326, 368, 4??·
8 Paul Tillich, Ultimate Concern, pp. 152, 153·
9Paul Tillich• Christianity and Encounter with the World ReliSions, (New York: Coiumbia Univers!ty Press, l~,-p: 9S.
10John Dewey, A Common Faith (New Haven: Yale University
Press, 1934), pp. ?=1I.
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three characteristics in common:
1) 'l'b.at the visible world is part ot a more spiritual
universe from which it draws its chiet significance;
2) That union or harmonious relation with that higher
universe is our true end; • • • 3) That pr8.1'er or inner
communion with the spirit there-or be that spirit 'God'
or 'law'--is a process wherein work is reall7 done, and
spiritual energy tlows in and produces effects, ps7ohological or material, within the phenomenal world.ll
And as to the basic "creed" or cognitive content of all religions

James contended that it is two-told:

l) an uneasiness or sense

that there is something wrong about us as we naturall;r stand;
2) an awareness that

we are saved trom this wrongness b;r making

proper connection with higher powers. 12

!o rephrase this in our own words, James held that religious
experience involves transcendence in two wa7s: tirst, the need of
man to self-transcend, and secondly, the awareness ot the transcendent toward which this transoendence is directed.
is a

~rocess

!he first

and the second is the gbaect, or sphere in which

transcendence operates.
!he Need tor Selt-Transcendence.--Religious experience involves the need to transcend the unalterable displeasures ot lite
In this sense Koestenbau:m was right in describing religion as
"• •• man's ettort to do something about the desperate condition
of his own tinitude." 1 3 For that matter, Freud was correct in

11J8Dles, ~ Varieties

SI!

Religious !!J>erience, p. 4?5.

12Ibid., p. 498.

-

l3xoestenbaum, "Religion in the Tradition ot PhenomenolOS7t"

p. 182.

B?
depicting religion as man's search tor a Cosmic Comforter to help
him cope with the tearful eventualities of lite, as was Bultmann' a "Human longing to escape from this world by the supposed
discovery of a sphere above this world." 14 There seems to be
little reason to dispute Kaufmann when he said, "Religion is
rooted in man's aspiration to transcend himself • • • • "

0

Man, ..

he said, "is the ape that wants to be a god • • • • Whether he
worships ideals or strives to perfect himself, man is the Godintoxicated ape." 1 5
become God. 16

Or as Sartre put it, man's project is to

In this sense, one may say that man is the being

who is characterized by his need tor selt-transoendence. 1 ?
Even among the more humanistic definitions of religion
there is admission ot this characteristic feature.

Dewey's pur-

suit ot general and enduring ideals despite threats of personal
loss18 is definitely an aspiration tor self-transcendence. Even
Fromm's self-labeled "humanistic religion" admits the need tor
14see Bultmann, Xeqsa and~' Vol. I, ed. H.
(Harper and Row, Publishers, Inc.--;-rg53), pp. 26 £.

1 5xautmann, Oritigue

355, 359.

.2!

w.

Bartsch

Religion ~ Philoso;egz, pp. 354,

16sartre, Bei~ and Nothinf5Aess (New York: Washington Square
Press, 1966), pp.
2-;-'?sg.

l?Tillich said, "Human potentialities are powers that drive
toward actualization. Man is driven toward faith by his awareness or the infinite to which he belongs, but which he does not
own like a possession. This is in abstract terms what concretely appears as the 'restlessness ot the heart' within the flux ot
life," R:z!amics 91. faith, p. 9.
18 see Dewey, A Common Faith, P• 27.

-------
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self-transcendence.

Religious experience "• •• in this kind of

religion," he writes, "is the experience of oneness with the All,
based on one's relatedness to the world as it is grasped with
thought and with love." 1 9 With this stress on self-transcending
love, 20 T1i11ch's statement agrees, "Agape is a quality of love,
that quality which expresses the self-transcendence of the religious element in love." 21 All the religions of love, then, are
illustrative of man's attempt to transcend the conditions of
hate and disunity found in this world.

Love, said Koestenbaum,

is an a priori category by which the religious man unities his
world and overcomes the opposing otherness and attains selt-tultillment. 22

Whether it is viewed as love or some other force,

religious experience characteristically involves some means by
which a man can self-transcend, or go beyond his own frustrating
limitations.

Religion Involves !!!!. 'fransoendent.--Not only does religious
experience involve a process ot transcending or self-transcendence but it implies a dimension or sphere which is transcendent.
That is, it the religious aspiration to go beyond is to be realized, then there must be a beyond in which or by which this can

l9Fromm, Ps;rchoanalysis ~ Religion, p. 37.
20 see Erich

Fromm, The Art of Loving (New York: Harper and
Row, Publishers, 1956), &pter r.
21 Tillich, Moralit~ ~ Beyond (New York: Harper and Row,
Publishers, 1963,, p. ~ •
22xoestenbaum, "Religion in the Tradition ot Phenomenology,"
OD. cit., PP• 210 t.
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occur.

To

some this is a personal God; to others it is an imper-

sonal Force.

For some it is attainable in this life; for others

it is sought in another lite.

But for every religious experience

there is a transcendent dimension of one kind or another in whiob
the transcending occurs.

As shall be shown later, this transcen-

dence can and does take many forms including transcendence via
other men.

But in each case there is always some transcendent

involved in religious experience.
Many ot the definitions ot religion make this explicit.
Dictiona::z, e.g., calls it a "Recognition on the part
of man of some higher unseen power • • • • "2' All definitions

~Oxford

which use 8.D.7 torm of the words "God" or "gods" clearly recognize that there is a transcendent realm implied in religious experience.

What is not obvious, however, is that those forms ot

religion which do not have an7 such being or referent do likewise
involve a transcendent.

That is, the word transcendent is not

to be limited to personal theistic concepts nor even to pantheistic or impersonal modes of describing the ultimate object or goal
Nor is it to be limited to what is commonly called the supernaturai. 24 In point of tact, by transcenof religious aspiration.

dent we do not mean any or all of the particular conceptual

W8.7S

23o.xtord !nglish Dictionar;y, Vol. VIII, p. 410.
24 For many moderns this term implies a false bifurcation ot
reality. John Dewey feels strongl7 that the concept or a "supertnatural" religion is a hindrance to the religious experience.
See A Comm.on Faith, pp. 2?, 28. Paul Tillich said antisupernatu.l'o
alism Is fundamental to all his thinking, Ultimate Oonoern, p.
158. See Vol. I of his Szstematic Thtology on reason and revelatinn.
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of describing God.

Rather by transcendent is meant the supposed

eality that is beyond all of the actual and even possible ways
of speaking thereof'.

It includes the Buddhistic "Nirvana," Til-

ich • s "Being beyond being," Schleiermaoher• s ''Universe" and
"Infinite."
Even among those who deny the reality of the transcendent
here is still an admission that religion involves such an aleged reality. Sartre, e.g., uses the word "God" repeatedl72 5
nd characterized man as the one whose fundamental projeot is to
eoome God. 26 Promm is willing to retain the word God as the
of the transcendent, providing it be recognized that he

of the transcendent powers of man.

He said, "• •• in hu-

anistic religion God is the image of man's higher self, a symbol
of what man potentially is or ought to become • • • • "27 Although
euerbach categorically denies any reality other than human beind the term God, he not only uses it but recognizes that it is

essential to religion to believe that there is a transcendent
God.

Even though, for Fauerbach• consciousness of God is really

only consciousness of man himself, nevertheless man is not dir-

On the contrary, he said, "• •• ignorance
of it is fundamental to the peculiar nature or religion." 28 God
ectly aware of this.

25see Jean-Paul Sartre, The \lords, trans. Bernard Jlrechtman
d George Braziller (New Yor~l964), e.g., pp. 18, 97, 173 1
78, 185, 188, 190, 193, 227.
26sartre, Being ~ Nothingness, p. 776.

27:rromm, Fslchoanalysis !B,4 Religion, P• 41.
28 Feuerbach The Essence of Ohristianit
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is really nothing but the projection of man's own nature, but the
religious man isn't aware of this and that is why he worships
this as God. 29 However. the present concern is not whether God
or the transcendent is real.

Rather the concern here is with the

tact that religious experience seems always to involve a transcendent dimension.
To sum up, a religious experience is not only one ot selt~ranscendence

but one which involves a transcendent realm. by

~hich

or in which the transcending is done or at least toward

~hich

it is directed.

That is, in order to go beyond or deeper

there must be a beyond or depth {real or imagined) toward which
or in which the religious experience moves •
.§.2!! Paradigms

~

!!!!, Meaning

.2!

Transcendence.-Up to this

point we have spoken ot a religious experience as an awareness of
the transcendent, i.e., as that which goes beyond the conditions
ot man's finite circumstances.

No doubt it has occurred to the

reader that what is meant by this be7ond 1s not entirely clear.
In order to elucidate what is meant by this the suggestion of
Anton7 Plew will be followed, viz., that of giving some paradigm.
cases or examples trom experience.

Paul van Buren focused the problem when he writes, "· ••
the difficulty of speaking about •transcendence,• 'ground and end
ot all things,• or some other oblique phrase substituted tor the
29reuerbach said men come gradually to recognize that they
have been worshipping themselves, hence, "What was at first religion becomes at a later period idolatry,"~·
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ord 'God' • • • simply begs the empiricist's question."30
ecular age, what would that 'more• be?

"In a

It is our inability to

ind any empirical linguistic anchorage for that •more' that has
ed to our interpretation [that all God-language or its equivais dead]. n3l
Since van Buren has regard tor Ian Ramsey•s approach to this
uestion,3 2 we will begin with illustrations Ramsey used to exlain what is meant by more, beyond or transcendence.
hat Ramsey calls discernment situations.

!hese are

He lists a series of

iscernm.ent situations, which are ordinary empirical situations
hat suddenly "come alive" when the "ice breaks, .. the "light

awns" or that take on "depth."

~or

example, when a Judge sud-

reoognizes the accused as his long lost wite, "eye meets
or when it dawns on one that the twelve tlat lines on a
have the "depth" of a cube, when a formal party takes on
a "new dimension," or after someone splits his dinner
In each case, something more is revealed than what's
een in the empirical facts alone--the situation has a "depth of
imension" which goes beyond the sensory.
According to Ramsey, metaphors and verbally odd words have
same disclosure power.33

Por examples of verbally odd words

30Paul van Buren, la! Secular Jifeaning
31 Ibid., PP• 197, 198, er. p. 84.
32 Ib1d., p. 91.

.2! ~ Gosl?el, p. ?9.

33In fact, he goes so far as to StJ:T "What
dd is void or disclosure power," Models and

verbally
p.

69.
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b.e uses nicknames which evoke personal response (et. "sweetheart"
vis-a-vis "Elizabeth Mabel").

Ramsey also finds some tautologies

as "I am I" or "Duty- tor duty's sake," or'!Love tor love's sake"
to be significant and revelatory of more than they •say• linguistically.

In f'act he finds "I-language" and moral language to be

~he

key to "God language," in that both are verbally odd; both

~re

straightforward but strained, and both gain their meaning in

~se.34

That is the way moralists speak of' a sense of duty, reli-

gion speaks of a sense of' the unseen.

Both are literally and

logically odd but are tar from being completely nonsensical.
Quite the contrary, odd words and metaphors by their very similarity-with-a-difference can generate insight the way two pictures, rather similar but in some points significantly different,
can lead to the apprehension

or

depth in a 3-D viewer.'5

Another example is first-person subjectivity.

Tb.at is, "I"

cannot be exhausted by all that is said about ttme"; "I'' am. more
than everything that can be objectively said about me; subjectivity transcends objectivity.36 As Novak indicates, even an empiricist "• •• is more of a mystery to himself than his theory allows him to recognize, and every time he acts he uses the first
awareness his theory neglects."37
34Ian Ramsey. Religious Language, PP• 42-50.
35aamsey, l'todels

!!!2. !1lste:-z, P• 10.

36see !ill•• P• 41.
37Novak, Belief and Unbelief, P• 74.

--------

Other illustrations of what is beyond the purely empirical
experience could be developed, such as the sense in which Kant's
oumenon or thing-in-itself is beyond the phenomena or thing-fore38 or the way in which the so-called transcendental ego is be-

ond the empirical ego.39

Or the beyond or more may be illustra-

ed by the way the unity of a sentence is more than the words
hich comprise it or the way the whole is greater than its parts.
However, these illustrations suttice only to show how there
an be more in an empirical situation than •meets the eye'; what
hey do not do is show why this transcendent or moreness is the
bjeet of what the religious call worship, total commitment, or
ltimate concern.

Certainly a discernment situation which dis-

loses more than the empirical eye can see is not automatically
n experience ot religious transcendence.

That is to say, when

he twelve lines on a paper take on the ndepth 1 " the viewer
oesn•t commit himself to this cube.

Nor when a formal dinner

jacket splits does it thereby "disclose" God.

Indeed, there

38Kant, Oritigue of Practical Reason, trans. Lewis White
(New Yorlt: ffie !o'60s-Merr!11 do., :tiic., 1956), PP• 54-58,
11. "• •• on the contrary, it itself limits sensibility by aPlying the term. noumena to things in themselves (things not rearded as appearances). But in so doing it at the same time sets
limits to itself, recognising that it cannot know these noum.ena
through any of the categories, and that it must therefore think
them only under the title ot an unknown something," Critigue £?.!.
...,__r_e Reason, p. 273.

39aee Koestenbaum. 1 "Religion in the Tradition or Phenomenology," pp. 179 t. Por a similar distinction between Atman and
rah.man in Hinduism see Jess De Boer's article, "First Steps in
Mysticism," in Paith and Philosopbz, ed. Alvin Platinga (Grand
apids: William"!. Eerdaans I\ibfiihing Co., 1964), pp. ?4, 79,
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seems to be a missing dimension ot transcendence to these illustrations that causes them to fall short of being religious.
There must be something more to the meaning of more.

The missing

element is found in total commitment.
Religious

£t!perienc~

Involves

~

Total Oommitment.--A reli-

gious experience involves something beyond a mere disclosure,
something unconditional and ultimate; something to which men are
willing to commit themselves with utter loyalty and devotion.
That is, it involves not only an awareness of the transcendent
but an awareness of it !!!, ultimate and as demanding an ultimate
commitment.
In Ramsey's words the transcendent must be something to
which one is willing to give a "total commitment" betore it qualifies as religious.

For commitment situations he said, are those

which have a claim on a man and yet leave him in exercise of his
free will.

Acting from a sense of duty, the patriot's "my coun-

try right or wrong," and one's all absorbing devotion to his
~avorite
~wo

hobby are examples of total commitment.

Combining the

sets of illustrations, Ramsey argues that a religious exper-

ience of the unseen or beyond is one that involves both discernment which goes beyond the mere empirical facts of the situations
and which evokes a total commitment to it. 40 In a hobby one is
totally committed in only Rart of the universe (say, to coin collecting); in mathematics, on the other hand, one is only
40Ramsey, Religious ~age, PP• 19 t.

u;;.;:;;;;;..;;.......,,__. committed to the whole universe (1.e., a loose comm.it-

ent to the axioms, knowing other axioms are possible) 41 which
re applied to the whole universe; but in religion one has a

otal commitment to the whole universe. 42
because of the depth

or

A religious commitment

its loyalty, and it is "unive

"It is a commitment suited to the whole job

or

living

-not one just suited to building a house, studying (etc:;! • • •
d no more." 4 3
What Ramsey is getting at with his "total commitment," !11ich called .. ultimate concern ... 44 "The fundamental concept of
eligion," he said, "is the state

or

being grasped by an ultimate

oncern, by an infinite interest, by something one takes uncondiionally seriousl7. 045 He explains this to mean "• •• taking
omething with ultimate seriousness, unconditional seriousness"
one would be ready to suffer or even die for. 46
4 l!he commitment to a given mathematical system (say Eulid' s) is only partial or loose because its relation to all the
acts in the universe is loose. !hat is, Euclid's system doesn't
explain the areas of inter-planetaJ.7' space or sub-atomic physics.
Other mathematical systems fit better here, so we are only loosely committed to a given system. Nevertheless, once we are comitted to, say, the Euclidian definition of a triangle, this is
rue universally in Oxford, Moscow, or New York, ibid., pp. 36,37.
42

Ibid., pp. 35-41.

-

43 Ib1d., P• 55.
44 "Concern" is in one sense a better word than "commitment'•
ecause the latter tends to imply a more specific act presupposing a well defined conceptual framework, whereas religious experience in general (as vs. ~ special religious experience) does not
ecessarily presuppose a specific framework or a specific decision.
4 5!illich Ultimate Concern
46 Ibid.
0
8.

-
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Ultimate concern has both a subjective side and an objective
side.

Subjectively, it indicates that the subject or individual

is being unconditionally serious about something; objectively, it

refers to the object ot our ultimate concern tor which Tillich
!reserves the name "God.'*4 ?
Tillich argued that every man has an ultillate concern, be~ause

without an ultimate concern a being has no integrating cen-

ter ot his personal life.

"Such a state, however, can only be

approached but never tull7 reached, because a human being deprived completely of a center would cease to be a human being. 1148
"The ultimate concern gives depth, direction and unity to all
other concerns and, with them, to the whole personality." 4 9
Of course, not every ultimate concern is about something
~hich

is really ultimate.

"Perhaps the ultimate was once actu-

ally the parents, or the mother • • • • Later another ultimate,
perhaps a loved one, girl or bo7, liberates us from this."50
But "Man's faith is inadequate it his whole existence is determined by something that is less than ultimate.
~ust

Therefore, he

always try to break through the limits ot his finitude and

reach what never can be reached, the ultimate 1tselt."5l

That is

47Ibid., P• 11.
48 Ibid., p. 106. Whether or not every man does have an ultillate commitment is a moot question. See chapter 5 tor further
discussion ot this question.
49Tillich, ;pynam.ios .2! Faith, p. 105.
50Tillich, Ultimate Concern, p. 183.
5l!illich, BTAa.mies

.2!

Faith, P• 5?.

to say, to rest in what is not ultimate as though it were ultimate is idolatry.

!his is why !rillich is forced at times to re-

ject even the term "God" or "Being" and speak of the "God beyond
God" or the "Being beyond being," since to some the term "God"
implies limitations.
What Tillich called being grasped by an ultimate concern may
also include what is commonly called worship.

That is tn say, if

the individual responds to the transcendent with an ultimate com~tment

it is because of the ultimate worth he sees in it.

This

act is called worship, tor to worship something is really to respond to its worth-ship.

Hence, if worship is understood in this

basic sense of that attitude ot admiration connected with an
awareness of the ultimate worth

or

something, then it is closely

associated with a total commitment or an ultimate concern.

It,

however, worship is taken in the more specific sense ot prayer or
ritual, then it is not an essential ingredient
perience. 52

or

religious ex-

Por one may be totally committed without entering

into the ritual of prayer and one may pray without being ultimately concerned.

But in the broader sense of the word worship

(or even devotion to or love of the Divine) we are raced with
the same fundamental awareness that characterizes a total commitment or that is implied in being grasped by an ultimate concern.

52cr. A. E. Taylor, "The Argument from Religious Experience,"~ Existence .2.! ~. pp. 158-160.
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Schleierm.acher described this special kind ot religious

ot the transcendent as a "feeling ot absolute depenBy

that he meant a sense of creaturehood or an aware-

one is not independent from but dependent upon the All
It is a sense of existential contingency, a

ite in the infinite whole.54

otto agreed but felt that the

of ereaturehood resulted trom the one's awareness of the

......---.-

rather than being the basis of it.55

Even J'reud concurred

hat men have this sense of dependence, only he did not wish to
dentify it with religious experienee.56

Nonetheless, there is

the tact that men do have such a sense ot
ependenee, concern, or commitment which we have called religious
To summarize, a religious experience involves at least._,o

damental factors: (1) an awareness ot the transcendent, and
a total commitment to it as ultimate.

There are many differ-

ways the transcendent has been conceptualized and expressed,
these are the two basic factors in the religious experience
lrurthermore, to say the transcendent must be viewed as
53schleiermacher, The Obristian Faith, ed. B. R. Mackintosh
d J. s. Stewart (Edin~orgh: ! ' ! oiark, 1928, 1956), pp. 12,
9 passim; ,2!! Religion, PP• 2?5 t.

54at. Sobleiermacber, .9l Religion, p. 39.

55at. otto, l!!! Idea ,2! !!!!, Holz, PP• 9-11.
56a.t. Freud, ....
Fu-.t...,ur......_e £! !!! Illusion, p. 52.
.I
11.
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ultimate does not mean that it !.!, ultimate.57
a real possibility for the religious.

Idolatry is always

However it is difficult

to see how something can deserve the description "object of religious experience" it it is not at least viewed as ultimate by the
devotee.

Nor does the ultimate have to be static to be ultimate.

A commitment to a Hegelian dialectic as the divine unfolding itself in history is an example of a dynamic ultimate.

Nor is

Dewey•s definition ot "God" as the imaginative goal of all human
values :Ix> be excluded from the category of the ultimate.

In

other words, something does not have to be perm.anent and uncb.ange
able to qualify as a religious ultimate.

If a man is completely

committed to the sum total of human "progress" or "achievement,"
then it is a religious ultimate for him.

All that is necessary

for a transcftndent to quality as religious ia that it be something tinal and supreme, something beyond appeal and irrevocable.
That is, it must be something capable of evoking a complete com~itment,

utter loyalty, or ultimate concern on the part

or

an

individual.

5?Tb.is is not to say that these are all the factors there
ought to be in a religious experience. It does not mean that all
that is necessary tor an adequate or effacacious religious experience is an ultimate commitment to something beyond man which he
thinks (or feels) is ultimate. First, as we indicated earlier
~in chapter 1), the religious man ought to be concerned with the
reality of the transcendent, even though some appear to be content with it as an ideal or to hold it merely as if it were true.
Secondly, it is questionable as to whether or not--an ultimate
commitment is adequate if it is a commitment to something which
is less than ultimate. But we are not here discussing what a religious experience ought to be in order to be satisfactory but
what in fact it !!. in the experience of religious men. See chapter 5 tor a discussion or the adequacy of religious experience.
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Religious Experience in Contrast !2. Moral .E;xperience
Since a religious experience is similar to a moral experience and since some thinkers tend to identity them. a few words

ot clarification are in order.

Kant's definition ot religion as

"The recognition of all duties as divine commands" falls into
this general category.

Bishop Butler said that religion and mor-

ality "closely resemble" each other.58

Ramsey calls them "close

logical kinsmen" with "great attinities."59 and he suggests that
this is the reason that they have so often had the same friends
and the same enemies in the history ot philosopbJ".

R. B. Braith-

waite distinguishes them only in theory not in practice, arguing.
"Unless religious principles are moral principles. it makes no
sense to speak of putting them into practice.• 60 "A moral belief," he said, "is an intention to behave in a certain way: a
religious belief is an intention to behave in a certain way (a
moral belief) together with the entertainment of certain stories
associated with the intention in the mind of the believer." 61

Fromm "• •• believes that the difference between the religious
and the ethical is to a large extent only an epistemological one,

58As quoted by Ian f. Ramsey, Religious Language, PP• 32,
59aamsey, Religious Jfa.lilgU:age, pp. 34, 42.
6

~. B. Braithwaite, "Religious Statements as Ethically but
not Factually Significant," The Existence ot God (New York: The
Macmillan Oo., 1964) • P• 241:-- 61 Ibid., p. 250.
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though not entirely so."62
Even those who see a difference between religion and moral1ty tend to stress their inseparability.

Tillich wrote "• ••

morality is intrinsically religious, as religion is intrinsicall'
ethiea1.u 6 3 Bergson contended that "Originally [.e., among the
primitivej, the whole ot morality is custom; and as religion forbids any departure trom custom morality is coextensive with religion. •64
Despite the interrelationship and seeming inseparability of
religion and morality, they involve clearly differing experiences.

As Dewey observed, "The religious attitude signifies some-

thing that is bound through imagination to a general attitude.
Tb.is comprehensive attitude, moreover, is much broader than ~ny
thing indicated by 'moral' in its usual sense." 6 5 William James
summed up the difference by arguing that morality acceRts the
yoke

or

the universe, but religion welcomes it; religion isn't

a mere Stoic submission to the universe but a love

or

it.

Moral-

ity calls tor obedience, said James, but religion calls tor vol62 Jromm, Pszchoanalzsis and Religion, P• 93. Be does admit
"• •• there is a ?acior common
certain kinds of religious experience (viz., the B17Stica11 which goes beyond the purel7 ethical. But it is exceedingly litfioult it not impossible to formulate this factor or religious experience," P• 94.
6 3!illich, Morality !!A Bezond, P• 15.

to

64Bergson, ~ ~ Sources £! Morality and Religion, p. 123.
6 5Dewey, A Common Faith, p. 23. However, in the final analysis Dewey's detinition ol religion turns out to be one•s broad
•oral goal, which hardly shows that there is a basic difference
between them.
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teers.66

Sohleiermacher offers a further distinction when he

contends that morality is man•s duty to the universe; religion
is man's dependence on it. 6 7 But even in dependence there is a
kind of duty, only it is a more basic duty than moral duty.
Perhaps no one has drawn the distinction between a moral
duty and a religious duty more sharply than Kierkegaard in his
famous panegyric on Abraham. 68 The ethical, said Kierkegaard,
66 James, !'!l!, Varieties !1.! Religious Experience, pp. 41-45.
6?Schleiermacher, .Q!! Religion, PP• 2?5· t.
68Buber said Kierkegaard rejected this sharp distinction in
is latter works. •0ur rejection can be supported by Xierkegasrd'
own teaching. Be describes 'the ethical' as 'the only means by
hich God communicates with •man• {1853) • • • • The ethical no
longer appears here, as in Kierkegaard's earlier thought, as a
•stage' from which a 'leap' leads to the religious, a leap by
hich a level is reached that is quite different and has a different meaning; here it dwells in the religious, in faith and se
ce. This ethical can no longer mean a morality belonging to a
ealm ot relativity, time and again overtaken and invalidated by
he religious; it means essential acting and suttering in relaion to men, coordinated w!tli ~he essential relation to God," !!!he
Works ot Martin Buber, p. ?8. But it this were so, it would
ecessltate a reversal ot virtually everything Kierkegaard said
about Abraham. which is difficult to believe. Kierkegaard otten
closely identities the ethical and the religious particularly
hen he is contrasting them with the aesthetic. But since he
oes not anywhere clearly repudiate the sharp distinctions beween the ethical and the religious made in Fear and Trembling,
it seems best to interpret these other isola~stiiements tfia:t
seem to identify the ethical and the religious in view ot the
lear distinction he does make between them and nowhere clearly
epudiates. See Soren Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, p. 78,
here he wrote, "fhe ethical is the universal, ana as such it is
again the divine. One has therefore a right to say that tundaentally every duty is a duty toward God; but it one cannot say
ore, then one affirms at the same time that properly I have no
duty toward God. Duty becomes duty by being reterred to God,
ut in duty itself I do not come into relation with God. Thus it.
is a duty to love one's neighbor. but in performing this duty I
do not come into relation with God but with the neighbor whom I
love."
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expresses one's universal duty but the religious says that " • • •
he individual as the particular is higher than the universal."
This can also be expressed by saying that "• •• there is an absolute duty toward God for in this relationship of duty the indi-

as an individual stands related absolutely to the absoOr, to summarize Kierkegaard, an ethical experience reto the moral law; a religious experience responds to the
Hi•selt.

The moral law says, "Thou shalt not

ill"; God told Abraham: sacrifice your son Isaac.

In this case

hen, either the religious is above the ethical or Abraham, tar
rom being the great hero ot faith, is a down-right murderer.
hus, we are "• •• wrong in not protesting loudly and clearly
gainst the tact that Abraham. enjoys honor and glory as the
ather ot taith, whereas he ought to be prosecuted and convicted
t murder."

In Abraham's case he had to transcend the ethical in
the religious.

'l'bis does not mean the ethical is

rather, it is merely dethroned b.1 it.
necessary prerequisite to the religious; one
unless he is first ethical.

However, the

eligious is a higher relationship of duty to God in View of
hich even the ethical must give way.

"Abraham, by a religious

ct of faith, overstepped the e•hical entirely and possessed a
outside of it, in relation to which he suspended the
In this state of absolute duty to God, "• •• the ethireduced to a position ot relativity" to the point that

"•

• • Love to God may cause the knight of faith to give his love

105
to his neighbor the opposite expression to that which, ethically
speaking, is required by duty."

The religious is higher than the

ethical as the individual is higher than the universal, or as the
concrete is over the abstract, or as the response to the person

or

God takes precedence over response to mere propositions about

God.

Tb.at is to say, morality is man's responsibility in this

world; religion is his response to revelation from beyond this

The former calla for duty, the latter for worship.69

world.

JUrthermore. it may be added that religion differs trom
~orality

because the latter can point out man's weaknesses or

sin but only the former can help him transcend them.

Th.at is,

religion is higher than ethics because a feeling ot grace is
higher than a sense ot guilt.

Morality tells a man he ought to

do; religion can help him do it.

~e

former provides the norm

for transcending; the latter can give the motivation tor transeending.
In brief, a religious experience differs from an ethical

experience in several ways: (l) Its commitment is broader in
scope; (2) Its commitment is different in kind; (3) Its object
is

or

a higher order; (4) Its object a.lone has the power to over-

come and unify.

First. a religious commitment is broader than a

moral one since the former is a whole commitment of the whole man
to the whole universe.

1'hat is, it is a commitment of man as a

whole including his non-moral aspects of being, such as thinking,
69All ot the above quotes appear in Kierkegaard, Fear ~
Trembling, pp. 66, 90, 78, 65, 69, 80.

',

\'
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and acting such as knowing, art, and play.

Second, even it one

defines the moral more broadly so as to include the whole man, a
moral commitment would still ditfer from a religious commitment
in that the former is what one should do; the latter is what one
wants to do.
of desire.

Morality is a matter of duty; religion is also one
Further, a religious experience has a higher object

than a moral experience.
~en;

For morality is man's commitment to

religion is his commitment to what goes beyond men, to the

transcendent.

Finally, only a religious experience can bring

complete unity into one's lite.

Tb.at is, morality can produce

guilt; only religion can provide grace.
call tor a religious overcoming.

The moral shortcomings

The duality within man calls

tor a unity beyond him.
There is no need to be long concerned with whether morality
flows from religion or religion flows from morality, or whether
they are separate streams.?O Their close historical and logical
connections would seem to preclude the latter.

As to the form.er

question, Sohleiermacher's suggestion is helpful:
Specific actions follow only from specific impulses.
Religion is not a specific impulse, so no specific actions can follow from it. Religion produces action onl7
as a sum of activity flows from a sum of feeling, viz.,
as that which reflects the inner unity of the spirit.
?OTillich writes in thi.s regard: "The question of moral motivation can be answered only transmorall7. For the law demands,
but cannot forgive; it judges, but cannot accept. Therefore,
forgiveness and acceptance, the conditions of the fulfillment ot
the law, must come trom something above the law, or more precisely, from something in which the split between our essential bein.e
and our existence is overcome and healing power has appeared,"
Moralit:v ~d Beyond, p. 64.

10?

"But," he continues, "while a man does nothing from religion, he
should do everything with religion.

Uninterruptedly, like a

sacred music, the religious feelings should accompany his active
life.u?l
As Tillich indicated, "If the moral imperative were derived
from religion in the traditional sense of the word, secular ethics would have to sever any ties with religion, for it rejects
direct dependence on any particular religion. 11 72 There is certainly a danger in tying ethics to specific religious beliefs,
as Freud rightly noted.

For if, as men are prone to do, these

religious beliefs are rejected, then one has lost his basis for
morality.?3

However, if one means that morality flows from the

far more extensive, if not universal, attitude of men called religious, then Freud's objection loses its force.

First one must

determine more precisely what is meant by religion before this
question can be answered satisfactorily.
Religious Experience in Contrast to Aesthetic E?Cperience
There is also a close connection between religion and art.
Whitehead contends that religion and play have the same origin in
ritual.

"This is because ritual is the stimulus to emotion, and

an habitual ritual may diverge into religion or into play, according to the quality o:f the emotion excited • • • • "
?lsehleiermacher, .Qn. Religion, pp. 57-59·
72Tillich, Morality ~ Beyond, p. 300
?3Freud, ~ Future

£!. 2

Illusion, pp. 62-64.

He also
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observed, "• •• in the modern world. a holy day and a holiday
are kindred notions.•74 Otto noted that the sacred and the sublime are similar in two ways: both are inexplicable and both have
the dual character ot humbling yet exalting the beholder.75

In

tact the two experiences are so similar that an aesthetic experience may be used to evoke a religious one, as otto observed.76
Tillich noted that the religious may even appear in a painting
which has no religious content in the traditional sense.77

How, then, can we differentiate these two closel7 associated
experiences?

Schleieraacher put bis distinction this W87: all

science is the existence ot things in man; art and culture is
the existence ot man in things.

But both art and science are

dependent on the universal existence
1te. 78

or

all things in the Intin-

Or, to say it another way, science is speculative, art

is practical, and religion is intuitive.79

!he problem with this distinction is that an aesthetic experience can be intuitive too, as Plotinus points out.

74 Whitehead, Religion

75otto, l!l!. Idea

!a !h!

2! !!!!, Holz•

!hat is,

riaking 1 p. 21.
pp.

44, 45.

76 For example darkness (as in temples) can evoke a mystical
effect; silence can provoke a spontaneous reaction to a numinous
presence; ana emptiness. b;r doing away with the "thia" and "here"
~an draw attention to the "wholly other" (otto, ~ IS!! .2! ~
~OlY, PP• 72, 73.
77Tillich, Ultimate Concern, p. 6.
78 Schleiermacher • .Q!! Religion, p. 39.

79.n!S.•t PP• 275-284.
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art as a practice, (e.g., man making something beautiful) is no
doubt distinguishable from2ligion as a feeling or awareness of
the absolute.

But what

~bout

one'sawareness ot absolute beauty;

is this kind of aesthetic experience distinguishable from a reli-

gious awareness of the absolute?

For example, in Plotinus there

1s that absolute beauty (the "One" or "Good") which is experieln!C!
as ultimate and is identified with "God."

It is beyond all sen-

sible and even intellectual beauty and can be known only in a
imYStical union with it.

If by an aesthetic experience one refers

to this kind of ultimate intuition, then it would seem that
Schleierm.acher's distinction between aesthetics and religion
rwould not hold.
Kierkegaard, in a more radical distinction, views the aesthetic, moral, and religious dimensions as three ascending levels
or stages of lite. 80 fhe aesthetic level is that of feeling, the
ethical one ot deciding, and the religious level is one ot existing.

!he aesthetic stage represents the routines ot life; the

ethical gives rules tor lite, and the religious gives a revelation to lite.

Whereas the first is self-centered, the second

law-centered, the last is God-centered.

Aesthetics represents a

lite without choosing; morality a choosing of lite; religion is
the choosing ot God. From the aesthetic to the moral is a leap81
80These three levels are represented respectively by three
of his works, Repetitions (the aesthetic), Either/Or (the ethical), and ~ear and Trembiitf (the religious,, aii'.dstfie overall in
a work entrtrid-niages .2!l
fe's ~·
81.Eaoh stage is separated by a crisis of despair and is
spanned only by a "leap of faith." Lower levels are not

11'
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trom being spectator to being participator in lite; a leap trom
personal whims to universal norms; from mere deliberatian to decision; from being controlled by lite to being in control ot
life.

The further leap from the ethical stage to the religious

is a leap from the objective realm of abstract, universal moral

code, to the subjective realm ot concrete, particular conduct;
from the essential order to the existential; tram propositions
about God to the person of God.
something one

.!!!!.; religion

Brietly, then, aesthetics is

is something one

impersonal; the latter is personal.

!!•

file former is

Aesthetics is something one

knows; religion is something one lives.

One grips the aestheti-

cal dimension ot lite, but the religious grips him.
But even Kierkegaard's radical distinction would not do to
differentiate what Plotinus meant by an experience of absolute
beauty trom what Schleierm.acher meant by a religious experience.
Both are ultimate; both are absolute.

to resolve the problem is to

Perhaps the simplest way

say that tor Plotinus there is no

distinction between a religious and an aesthetic experience ot
"Absolute Beauty;" in tact they are identicai. 82 However, there
remains the question ot whether this is the normal and customary
meaning of an aesthetic experience.

At least on the lower level1

destroyed, only dethroned, by higher levels, and attainment is n<
guarantee of permanence. See Walter Lowrie, Kierke~aard (New Yark:
Harper and Row Publishers, 1962),pp. 150-167; 230-2 O; 391-449.
82However, there is certainly a distinction in Plotinus between an aesthetic experience on either a sensual or intellectual level and this highest intuitive experience. Cf. Enneads I,

6, 6-9;

v,

5, 12.

I
I
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{sensual, intellectual) of aesthetic experience there is a marked
difference between the religious and the aesthetic experiences;
the form.er is ultimate the latter is not.

Aesthetic experience

may lead to religious experience, but they are not identical.
Following this line of thought Otto contends that an aesthetic experience can be used to evoke a religious experience,
even though the two experiences differ in kind.

For Otto an aes-

thetic experience is a sense of the sublime; a religious experience is an awareness of the sacred or holy--a numinous

experiemc~

And even though there is a hidden relation between the sacred and
the sublime, 8 3 these two experiences differ in kind and not merely in degree. 84

Although Otto does not clearly draw out his dis-

tinctions, he seems to imply that the difference between them is
that between a sense ot grandeur on the one hand and a vision of
God on the other; like the difference between Viewing the Grand
Canyon and that ot seeing a Hol.7 God (as Isaiah's vision in the
Old Testament). 8 5 As A. E. Taylor put it, if William Shakespeare
walked into the room we should stand, but it Jesus Christ walked
into the room we should knee1. 86 !he tor.mer could occasion an
aesthetic experience; the latter could provide a religious encounter.

Aesthetics involves a sense of wonder and amazement;

8 3otto, ~ Idea 21,. !!'!! Holz, p. 65.
84Ibid., p. 106.

8 5Isaiah, chapter 6.
86A. E. !aylor, "!'b.e Argument from Religious Experience,"
P• 159.
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religion involves a sense or worship and adoration.

But how can one say they differ in kind unless he can show
what the difference is?
ences: (1) The object

or

In answer we would suggest two differan aesthetic experience, at least in the

ordinary sensual or intellectual senses, is not ultimate whereas
the object of a religious experience is ultimate.

And in the

Plotinian sense of an intuitive experience or absolute beauty
one really has a religious experience described in aesthetic
terms or in its aesthetic dimension.

(2) The nature ot an aes-

thetic experience (even in the Plotinian sense of absolute beaut,.

is different from a religious experience.

or

Even it the object

both is considered to be one and the same absolute, nevertheless
the attitude
artist.

or

the religious toward it differs from that

or

the

The latter merely has an attitude of wonder and admira-

tion toward the absolute; the former has a spirit of worship and
adoration toward it.

The artist is drawn by it, but the reli-

gious is also repelled by it.

As Otto observed, there is a sense

of tear as well as fascination.

!rhat is, the religious person

is not only devoted to but also senses his dependence on the ultimate.

Furthermore, the artist has an attitude ot contempla-

tion; the religious has an attitude of complete commitment.
That is, the artist as such remains detached from ultimate beautJ

whereas the religious is aware of his dependence on the ultimate.
Relisiou~

Experience

.!!!

Contrast !2, .! Purelz Secular EKI>er-

ience.--An experience need not be secular or non-religious simply because it is humanistic.

Both Fromm's and Dewey's views
:'I
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are humanistic and yet qualify as religious.
In Fromm's case what he calls a "humanistic" religion in
contrast to an "authoritarian" religion qualifies (under our
definition) as religious.

For the higher human self, which he

calls "God," does indeed transcend the individual and it is considered ultimate, i.e., he is ultimately committed to it. 8?
Likewise, Dewey's form

or

humanism is essentially religious.

He

said, "Any activity pursued in behalf of an ideal end and against
obstacles and in spite of threats

or

personal loss because

or

conviction or its general and enduring value is religious in
quality."88 The ideal goal is transcendent and the type or conviction or it and commitment to it is total.

It this be so, then one may ask just what type of humanistic experience would not quality as a religious experience.
Basically, a non-religious or purely secular experience would be
one where either (1) no transcendent other exists beyond the individual, or (2) which if there were an other he would not be
totally committed to it because it would not be considered ultimate.

The tact that such are difficult to find is testimony to

just how incurably religious man is atter all.

Even Sigmund

Freud's god or hum.an reason. which he calls Logos, is not identified with the 1nd1vidual•s8 9 rational powers and thus qualifies
8 ?Fromm, Psychoanal1sis ~ Religion, PP• 3?~ 49, 60.
88 newey, ! Common Faith, P• 27•

891.Preud, Future ot an Illusion, p. 88.

---------
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as transcendent.

Likewise, the projected human "self'" which

Feuerbach says men consider (falsely) to be God is not the individual human being but human nature in general, 1.e., universal
or generic man.90

Ot course he does not consider it to be real,

nor does Dewey hold his ideal goal to be real.

Nevertheless, it

is beyond the individual and it is considered ultimate by the
religious person.

Therefore, it qualities as an object of reli-

gious experience.
1'b.e

first way in which one may be irreligious is by a retus-

al to recognize any kind of transcendence whatsoever.

w. c.

'!his, said

Smith, is what characterizes contemporary secularity.91

That is, a completely immanent, this-worldly outlook which is unable (or unwilling) to transcend in any direction is essentially
non-religious.

As Martin Marty put it, "Secularism permits no

transcendent • • • • It is self-contained, self-explanatory,
selr-enclosed."92 Or as Altizer wrote, "It there is one clear
portal to the twentieth century, it is • • • the collapse or a117
~eaning

or reality being beyond the newly discovered radical 1•-

•anence of modern man, an immanence dissolving even the memory
or the shadow of transcendence."93
90Yeuerbach, The Essence ot pb.ristianity, P• 7.
9lv. c. Smith, .T1!!. ~eanins !!!!4 ~ ,2! Religion, P• 127.
92 Kartin Marty, ....._........,
Varieties
Unbelief,
................ of ................
......._..... P• 138 •

_

93Altizer, The Gospel ot Christian Atheism (Philadelphia:
The Westminster Press, I9ge;jj ~· 2~. !here are several reasons
for this radical immanence: \1) The inability to set at the transcendent because it is "dead" (,! l.! Altizer), or (2) Because our
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But not only is there a radically immanent, irreligious
tance by some contemporary men because of the inability to disover the transcendent but also because of an unwillingness to
ake a total commitment (or even a partial one) to it.

Th.is un-

illingness is the second characteristic of a non-religious exerience.

There are many reasons some men would refuse to com-

it themselves to the transcendent, even if it were there: (1)
ecause it is deemed unworthy of their devotion,94 or (2) because
an considers himself mature enough to get along without the t
cendent,95 or (3) because the individual desires to honor him.elf as ultimate.96
In brief, a man may be irreligious or purely humanistic in

ways.

First, because he is unable to see a transcendent, or

second, because he is unwilling to submit to!;.

In either event

is experience falls short of being religious.

language about it is "dead" or meaningless (van Buren), or (3)
eoause it is "eclipsed" by conceptualizations about it (as Buber
said), or (4) Because it is "silent" or hiding.
94Ivan in Dostoevsky's The Brothers Karamazov reflects this
attitude, for even if God exiiied Ivan leaves tKe impression that
e would never surrender to Him because or the injustice He has
one to man.
95Fromm states this well: "It mankind is able to produce
enough to reed all men, it does not need to pray tor daily bread.
Man can provide that by his own effort," Psychoanalzsis !!!S !!!!ion, p. 104.
96 Ayn Rand's philosophy of selfishness is as clear an example of this as one can find. "By the grace of reality and the
nature or life, man--every man--is an end in himself, he exists
for his own sake, and the achievement of his own 4~ppiness is his
highest moral purpose," For the New Intellectual (The New American Library: A Signet BoOlt; ~lr;-p. !23.

I
I
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Various Dimensions !l!, Religious Transcendence
Now that religious experience has been defined and distinguished from other experiences, it remains to discuss the various
irections or dimensions that this transcendence may take.

For

the transcendent can be the object of religious awareness and
aspiration in many different directions.

Failure to see these

imensions may be cause tor misunderstanding the essentially religious character of these experiences.
The following is offered as a typology of the major dimensions ot transcendence: (1) Retrospective transcendence; (2) Vertical transcendence; (3) Eschatological transcendence, and (4)
Introspective transcendence.

This division suggests, respective-

ly, that men have attempted to transcend backward to origins,
pward to the top, forward to the end, and inward to the depth of
all things.
The Retrospective Dimension of Transcendence
Retrospective transcendence means that the direction in
hich the religious man transcends toward the transcendent is a
backward one.

That is, he seeks to go back to a beginning or

point or origin to discover the source of religious awareness.
According to Mircea Eliade, this is the characteristic feature
of the primitive religious experience.

The discussion will begi

with Eliade's analysis.
Eliade's

~

£.! Ori3ins.--For Eliade the transcendent is

11?

the "Sacred" and this world the "profane."9?
opposite of the profane.

The Sacred

Manifestations of the Sacred he

alls a "hierophany" which is always something "Wholly Othertt
the profane world.

The "hierophany" is a fixed point (such

temple or holy spot) where the "absolute reality" is reIt is a kind ot "doorway" or "gateway" to God.

Where

he nsacred" manifests itself there is a "center" which serves as
ocal point for a "cosmos. ''98

The organizing of one's life

ound. places where the Sacred "breaks through" is called "cososizing," i.e., a microoosmiccreation.

It is the consecration

f a place by the repetition of the primitive cosmogony.

That

s, to organize or cosmosize one's life is to repeat the para-

igaatic work of the gods in the beginning.99
El.iade called the "opening" to the sacred or transcendent
"Center of the World."

A Sacred place is always a center

round which man orders his life.

The religious man resists

haos and seeks to stay as close as possible to the center of the
The gods created the world from its center in the beginng and so this is the model after which the religious man paterns his life by a repetition of their paradigmatic act.

In

short, religious man seeks to situate himself at the "center" of
97A term he confessedly takes from Rudolf otto's analysis
of religious experience in The Idea of the Holy. See Eliade,
The Sacred ~ !!:.!. Profane, P.

nr.- - -

-

--------

9SEliade, The Sacred and the Profane, pp. 10-30.
99Ibid., pp. 45, 52, 65.

-

118

the world where he is closest to the holy so he can experience in
principle the mythical moment of creation. 100
Time is continuous tor the pre-literate.
in ritual.

It is recoverable

Tb.at is, mythical time can be made present by repeti-

tion in ritual ot the original act ot the gods.

Religious time,

then, is cyclical and periodically present by means of rites.
It was Christianity, however, which radically changed the nature
of religious time by asserting that it unfolds (via the Incarnation ot Christ) in history, but the pre-literate "mythical time"
is not so.

For them no time existed before the reality narrated

in their myth and it is recoverable through the ritualistic reenactment of the same. 101

By

this ritual the participant becomes

contemporaneous with the time of origin which is a kind of eternal present.

Tb.at is, "• •• the man of archaic societies is

not only obligated to remember JSTthieal history but also to £!,enact a large part of it periodically." 102

In this way, the re-

ligious man reveals that his desire for transcendence is really
in the direction of the original paradise.

This "JD7th of the

eternal return," said Eliade, "did not paralyze ancient reli•
gious man.

It is not a retreat from responsibility but an assum-

ing of it in the creation or the cosmos.

-

lOOibid., PP• 45, 52, 65.
101 Ibid., pp. 70, ?2.

-

102 Eliade, ~

!ill! Real1t:, P• 13.

It is not a return to

i
11
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the dream world but a desire for the real world by a return to
the original world.
transcendence." 103

It is what we will call a "retrospective

"The myth," said Eliade, "relates a sacred history, that is,
a primordial event that took place at the beginning of time,

initio." 104

.!!a

It is the revelation of a mystery, a recital of what

the gods did at the beginning.

The function of myth is to fix

the paradigmatic model for all significant human activity.

Liv-

ing a myth, then, implies a genuinely religious experience.

The

religiousness

or

this experience is due to the tact that one reenacts the creative deeds ot the supernaturai. 105 By repeating

the myth man remains in the "sacred" or "real," and by- continual
reactivation of the original gestures
his world.

or

the gods man sanctifies

To forget to re-enact the myth is "sin," for it is

through ritual and myth that man is in contact with the transcendent.

Only by reactualizing the myth does man have hope.

Th.at

is, by eternal repetition there is eternal recovery. 106

So the religious lite for Eliade assumes the following basic
form: The belief that 1) there is an absolute reality which transcends the world but is·manitest in the world; 2) life has a
sacred origin and that man realizes his potential in the degree

-

------

l03El.iade, The Sacred and the Profane, pp. 92-94.
104Ibid., P• 95.

Ct.~ !!ll!, Realit~, PP• 5, 6.

l05Eliade, ~ ~ Reality, p. 19.
l06Eliade, The Sacred and the Profane, PP• 98, 99, 101.
Reality:-i)p. 144. 145'.-

M.vth and

Cf.
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to which he participates in it; 3) that gods created the world,
the history of which is preserved in myths; 4) by imitation of
the gods man reactualizes sacred history and man keeps close to

the gods.

Non-religious man, on the other hand, is characterized

by 1) his refusal ot transcendence and, 2) his acceptance of the

relativity of reality or even doubt of its meaning.

No such men,

said Eliade, are known in archaic cultures; only in modern Western society has "profane" man fully developed. 10?
Eliade's view may be summed up this way: Religion is the
paradigmatic solution for every existential crisis not only because it can be indefinitely repeated, but also because it is believed to have a transcendental origin, thus enabling man to
transcend personal situations and, finally, gain access to the
world of spirit. 108

Unlike the "profane" man, the symbols of

the religious man are able to "open up" the universe to him.

To

be sure secular man has many symbols, but none of them are any
more than private and partial
enced by the whole man.

:mytho~ogies

which are not experi-

None of them are paradigmatic provisions

for retrospective transcendence; they do not take the "profane"
man back to the transcendent origin of all things. 109 For the
primitive man, the meaning of the world was gained through the
myth o! origin or cosmogony.
lO?El.iade, ~ Sacred

-

l08Ibid., p. 210.
109 Ibid., p. 211.

Its function is to reveal models

!!!2. ~

Profane, PP• 202, 203.

nd, thereby, to give meaning to the world and to human life.
rough myth, the world can be apprehended as an intelligible
significant cosmos. 110

.!h! Limitations .2! Retrospective Transcendence.--What Eliade
ascribes is certainly one form of religious transcendence, viz.,
retrospective kind.

The mistake comes, however, in considering

his the onlz way one may have a religious experience.

If retro-

pective transcendence via myths of origin were the only way to
ranscend, then few men but pre-literates have been religious.
thermore, were transcendence possible only via a backward
the mythical origin, then Greek philosophy would have
pelled the end to all religion.

But in fact Greek philosophy

pened up the way tor a new dimension of transcendence, for they
oo were interested in origins but they replaced cosmogony with
cosmology. 111
Both are answers to the question of origins.

But the latter

is an attempt to go beyond the myth and find an arclii'or absolute
oint of beginning by reason.

Eliade said that the Greeks atte

ed to go beyond mythology as divine history and to reach a prial source, to identify the womb ot Being.

"It was in seeking

the source, the principle, the arche, that philosophical speculation for a short time coincided with cosmogony; but it was no
llOEliade, ~ ~ Reality, pp. 144, 145.
111 As El.iade points out, this type of mental attitude is not
exclusive to archaic societies; "The desire to know the origin o
things is also characteristic of Western culture," ..............
ibid., p. ?6 •
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onger the cosmogonic myth, it was an ontological problem."

That

s, "The 'essential' is reached, then, by a prodigious 'going
accomplished by an effort of thought.

In this sense it

be said that the earliest philosophical speculations derive
rom mythologies • • • • "

In this way "• •• sy-stematic thought

to identify and understand the 'absolute beginning' of
cosmogonies tell, to unveil the mystery of the Creation
world, in short, the mystery of the appearance of Being."
earliest philosophic speculations are derived from my-tholthat the !lthos and the logos find their common source in
attitude which is religious, viz., the desire to know the anto the question of origins.
However, the Greek philosophers effected a radical change
the religious myths they inherited.

For one thing, instead of

iewing them in an emotional or involved way, they looked on them
detached and spec'l.lative manner.
A representation of the world-order which had once been
a mystery, trought, in its earlier day-a, with awful emotion and serious practical consequences, is now put forward as a rational theory, which anyone who can understand it is free to take or leave.113
ut the rationalization was not complete; there were not only
emnants of religious thought in Greek thought but there was also
breaking out in a new dimension of transcendence.

This can be

seen most clearly in the way Greek rationalism culminated in

-

112 Ibid., PP• 111-112.
11 3corntord, ~ Religion ~ Philosophy, P• 50.
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Plotinian mysticism.
The Vertical Dimension

or

Transcendence

The tendency to transcend upward by leaving the lower

~orld

shadows and images and ascending to the world of pure forms
~bove is present already in Plato. 114 However, the tendency for
~r

~ertieal

transcendence is both more explicit and more clearly
in Plotinus.

~eligious

Plotinus: Reachins

~~'!!I?

There.'--For Plotinus all

things proceed from the "One" and all things return to it, for
all plurality presupposes a prior unity. 11 5 "Anything existing
a.rter the First must necessarily arise trom that First • • • "
ne wrote. 116 Since the "One" is an absolute unity, all emanations that flow trom it must be something less than pure s1mplie1ty.117

In fact they form with the "One" a triplicity or unity

in a descending order toward greater multiplicity.

After the

primary unity (the One) there is a secondary unity (One-Many)
called

"~"

or "Intellect .. and a tertiary unity (One-and-Many)
!Called "World Soul." 118
The tirat movement in Plotinian thought is that from unity
to multiplicity.

At the bottom of the chain of emanation is

114see particularly Plato's famous Cave Analogy in Republic
VII.

11 5Plotinus, Enneads III, 8, 9; V, 3, 15.
116Ibid., v, 4, 1.

-

ll7Ibid., V, 3, 15.
118Ibid., V, i, 8.
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the most multiple or all.
and has the least unity.
last stand against chaos.

Matter is most multi-

It is the place where unity takes
Matter is the place the whole

rocess of emanation from absolute simplicity (the One) peters
"For as necessarily as there is Something af'ter the First,
o necessarily there is a Last: this Last is Matter, the thing
hich has no residue of good in it: here is the necessity of
1."

Furthermore, the farther something is trom unity the less

eality it has, for divergence from unity involves a corresponddivergence from reality.

In other words, the farther down

emanation extends the greater is the multiplicity and
ess is the reality.

~he

And at the very bottom one finds the evil

of almost total multiplicity and an almost complete lack.of reality, which he calls "Matter" or "Non-Being.n

It is by contact

this matter that the lower phase of the individual soul of a

an is contaminated and, therefore, must purify itself of th.is
roliferation and begin to ascend toward higher and higher
ity.119

The second great movement in Plotinian philosophy is the

upward away trom1111ltiplicity to a higher unity.

Men must

e careful lest by continually drenching themselves in the multiplicity of matter, they can become irretrievably fragmented and
absolutely evil.

But fortunately as men wander in this foreign

land of evil they have a natural homesickness for the "Fatherland"
ll9Ibid., II, 4, 11; I, 8, ?; VI, 2, 5; I, 8, 3; I, 8, 5;
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"The appetite tor the divine Intellect urges them to
their source."

That is, being unsatisfied in the mul-

iplicity of evil they are pulled together by a higher unity.
the move from unity to multiplicity is outward and downard, the move up toward greater unity again will be inward and
pward.120
The first step in the move upward toward higher unity is

____ !h!, sensible 12

~

intellectual.

It begins in the realm of

ense, where one is "busy about many things," where the soul is
its housing. made fragmentary by corporeal extenHere it is in sensation that noting the flux of things it
ows at once that from elsewhere comes that higher unity that
loats on things below.

Looking at the multiple images of sensa-

man recognizes in them a unity which as a fugitive has enthe realm of matter.

So as one beholds the unity below he

s impelled to pursue them to their higher source.

Tb.at is to

a:y, the sign of the sensible point upward from their own multi-

to a higher unity; the roads of the many lead to the one.
road that leads upward first leads inward.
unity which is greater than sensation.

Man has an
The inner

ty of his intellect is greater than the outward multiplicity
vailable through his bodily senses. 121

The next step in the ascent toward greater unity moves ...............
from
120Ibid •• I,
121

a,

13; IV,

a.

4; I. 6, 7.

~ •• I, 3, 4; I, 6, 2-8; VI, 9, 11; I, 3, 6.

he intellectual !g,

~

intuitional.

Since every particular

hing has a unity of its own to which it may be traced, as one
ounts upward from sensation, he must come first to the immediate
ity for soul, which is found in the intellectual realm called
upward movement one takes with him only that beter (higherJ part of the Soul which alone is winged for the Inellectual act."

To know the intellect joins in a higher unity
identical with the known. 122

However, even

n the intellectual realm there is this basic duality of knower
known and the multiplicity of Forms or Ideas by which things
known.

Hence, it is necessary for the one seeking absolute

ity to press upward, beyond intellectual knowledge to an intuiof absolute Simplicity.
In this final stage in one's "vertical 11 transcendence he
For "• •• the Supreme is
-------------ot known intellectually." Hence, one wishing to contemplate

inds himself alone with the Alone.

hat transcends the Intellectual attains by putting away all that
is of the intellect.

Por

~ •• knowledge of the One comes to us neither by science
nor by pure thought • • • but by a presence which is
superior to science • • • for science implies discursive
reason and discursive reason implies manifoldness. He
then misses the One and falls into number and multiplicity.

o know the rtSUpreme" one must merge with the "Supremett and beone with it, center coinciding with center.

Just as one

become godlike and beautiful i ! he cares to see "God" and
122Ibid.,

-

v,

3, 4.
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"Beauty," so one must become one with the "One" if he is to know
The soul must put away all multiplicity, sensible and
ntellectual so that "alone it may receive the Alone." 12 3 It is
this point that one's vertical transcendence is realized, when
e has reached the top of the pyramid in which the many lives
in an absolute simplicity.
So in Plotinus the Greek rationalization went beyond itself,
eyond reason, and returned to its religious roots.

As Emile Bre

ier said, the Greek yearning for philosophical unity bad fulilled itself in the mystical unity; mysticism had completed raionalism.124

But the religious transcendence involved in this

ystical union is not the same as for pre-philosophical man.
ere are no myths for Plotinus.

It is not a question or origin

ut unity; not a search for what is at the beginning but what is
top.

That is, transcendence is not retrospective but ver-

And furthermore, transcendence is no longer super-natural
ut natural for Plotinus, a fact which the neo-platonic Christians
ould find some difficulty in reconciling with grace.
Reaction!£~

God "Up-There."--Some thinkers have not been

12 3Ibid., VI, 7, 35; V, 5, 6; VI, 9, 4; (Katz' translation);
VI, 9, l<J;!, 6, 9; VI, 7, 34.
124.Emile Brehier, The Philosopht of Plotinus, trans. Joseph
omas (Chicago: The University of ~icago Press, 1958), p. 162.
12 5Even Augustine was still sorting out the Neo-platonic inompa ti bi li ties with his Christian philosophy at the end of his
life as the many modifications and revisions of his "platonism"
ade in his Retractions reveal.
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with vertical transcendence since they feel that it too

~ontent
~nvolves

a mythological view of the universe.

Contrary to what

the Greek philosophers did in seeking the reality of the logos
~n

the mythos they have denied any reality ,!B the mythos whatso-

ever.

Rather, these contemporary thinkers have sought a reality

oehind the myth, by stripping the myth of its historical trappings to get at its ontological truth.

Rudolf Bultmann is a good

example of this reaction to vertical transcendence, to the God
ttup there" or "out there."
Bultmann contended, for example, "The whole conception ot
the world which ia presupposed in the preaching of Jesus as in
the New Testament generally is mythological ...

By this he means

the conception of the world as being structured in three stories,
neaven, earth, and hell; the conception of the intervention of
supernatural powers in the course of evento; and the conception

of miracles.

According to Bultmann, "These myt)lological concep-

tions of heaven a.nd hell are no longer acceptable for modern men,
since for scientific thinking to speak of 'above' and 'below' in
the universe has lost all meaning • • • • u 126
In this mythological structure it would be necessary to
speak of God as "up there" or "out there." 12? It is in this
sense that Bultmann's "demythology" would oppose even the con~ept

of vertical transcendence.

"To de-mythologize," said

126Rudolf Bultmann, Jesus Christ and rtrtholog;y (New York:
Charles Scribner's Sons, !958), PP• 15~0.
l2?Robinson, Honest to ~d, PP• 11 t.
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ultmann, "is to reject not Scripture or the Christian message as
whole, but the world-view o! Scripture. • • • tt It is tt• • • to
eny that the message o! Scripture and ot the Church is bound to
ancient world-view which is obsolete." "Therefore," he contined, "it is mere wishful thinking to suppose that the ancient
orld-view of the Bible can be renewed." 128
However, de-mythologizing does not mean a rationalizing of
Christian message, Bultmann assured us.

"Not at all!

On the

de-mythologizing makes clear the true meaning of God's
stery."

It is to seek the "• •• deeper meaning which is oonealed under the cover of mythology." 129 He held that "!he purose of demythologization is not to make religion more acceptable
o modern man by trimming the trad.itional Biblical texts, but to
clearer to modern man what the Christian tai th is.••

What

I am fighting against is just th.is fixation of God as an
objective entity • • • • Therefore my attempt to demythologize begins, true enough, by clearing away the false
stumbling blocks created tor modern man by the tact that
his world view is determined by science.130
at Bultmann is against is the objectification that mythology
In this sense, modern science can be as guilty as an-

plies.

ient mythology. 1 31

In brief, de-mythologize means to de-objec-

128Bultaann, Jesus Christ ~ !:'!.Ythology, pp.
129Ibid., PP• 43, 18.

;5, 36, 38.

-

l30Bultmann, "The Case for Demythologization,"~ and
Christianit , ed. Karl Jaspers and Rudolf Bultmann (~York: The
oon ay ress, 1958), PP• 59, 50.
l3l"Mythioal thinking is just as objectifying as scientific
thinking, for instance, when the tormer represents the transcen,'I
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It is in this respect somewhat the reverse of the Greek
ationalization.
What does one discover in de-mythologizing the biblical conof the_ God "up there"?

According to Bultmann one discovers
• the transcendence and hiddenness of God as acting.u 1 32

is is because "The invisibility of God excludes every myth
hich tries to make God and His action visible; God withholds Him
elf from view and observation. 1 33 That is to say, "Man's life
by the search tor God because it is always moved, conor unconsciously, by the question about his own personal
xistence."

Of course, "The question of God and the question ot

yself are identical," wrote Bultmann.

But, "Jrom the statement

to speak of God is to speak of myself, it by no means tollo
God is not outside the believer," he reminds us.

"Thus, the

that God cannot be seen or apprehended apart from faith does
ot mean that He does not exist apart from faith."

What this
show, said Bultmann, is that God cannot be objectitied. 1 34

Jrom this it is clear that Bultmann's de!D.J'thologization of
ertical transcendence, of the God "up there" is by no means to
e construed as a negation of all transcendence.

To be sure,

ence Of God in terms Of remoteness in space rway "up there"] .:. •
•• " "For all human world-views objectivize lhe world and ignore
r eliminate the signifieanee of the encounters in our personal
xistence, 11 Bultmann, Jesus Christ~ MY;thology;, p. 61, n. l;
• 83, er. p. 62.
l3 2 Ib1d., p. 83.

-

l33rb1d., PP• 83-84.
134Ibid., pp. 53, 70

72.
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"· •• for scientific thinking to speak of 'above' and 'below' in
he universe has lost all meaning, but the idea of the transcenence of God • • • is still significant,"l35 he wrote.
"God" or "transcendent."
experience.

There is

He is active in man's personal, exis-

He does in some sense exist apart from man,

He doesn't exist "up there."

If God doesn't exist "up there," then where is he to be
In which direction does man transcend in a religious exerience for Bultmann1

In brief, the answers are respectively

and "forward."

Bultmann, as a Christian, believes

revealed in Christ and that "• •• it has become more
clear that the esehatological expectation and hope is
of the New Testament preaching throughout."

"Today,"

"nobody doubts that Jesus' conception ot the Kingdom of
d is an eschatologieal one--at least in European theology and,
as I can see, also among American New 'l'estament scholars."
at Bultmann finds, then, in New Testament eschatology "• •• is
ot simply the idea of transcendence as such, but of the imporance of the transcendence of God, of God who is never present
s a familiar phenomenon but who is always the coming God, who is

eiled by the unknown future."

In brief, "This, then, is the

eeper meaning of the mythological preaching of Jesus--to be open
o God's future which is really imminent for every one of us • •
•• ; to be prepared, because this future will be a judgment on

135Ibid., p. 20.

-
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all men who have bound themselves to this world and are not tree,
ot open to God's tuture."136
J'rom Bultmann's de-mythological rejection ot vertical transendence, then, one is led naturally to consider more seriously
he view of eschatological transcendence.

As the Greek rational-

zation made retrospective transcendence obsol:!te, so also demythlogization makes vertical transcendence untenable tor some
odern men.

Hence, there is a turn in a new direction, that ot

schatological transcendence.
Eschatological Dimension ot Transcendence
Only on the view that history is going somewhere is the poescha tological transcendence possible.

It there is no

orizontal history with an end or goal, then man cannot transend in that direction.

Such a linear view ot history is un-

own to ancient and Eastern ways of thinking.

For the archaic

pointed out, time is mythical and not historiHowever, with the Hebrew prophets appears the first
lear indication that there is an end or goal tor time, 1.e., a
ulmination or climax towards which human events are moving. 1 38
l3Gibid., PP• 13, 22-23, 31-32.

-

l3?El.1ade, The Sacred and the Profane, pp. 72, 112.

--

l38A recent historian wrote, "'!he Hebrews broke sharply with
11 these prevailing conceptions ot time and history. Instead ot
eeurring events, they saw a series of distinct episodes, each
nvolving a unique intervention by Yahweh, unrepeatable and irreersible. Instead ot circular patterns, they saw history moving
n a straight line toward the fulfillment ot divine purpose,"
Trygve R. Tholtsen, Historical Thinking (New York: Harper and Row
blishers inc. 1
•
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more decidedly clear is this point in the New Testament.

As

iade observed, Christianity radically changed the nature of
ime by sanctifying it through the Incarnation of Christ. 1 39

!!.29. !!!, ~---Hegel wrote that God is dead140 and Nietzsche
seriously. 141

And Altizer drew out the religious impli-

for this in a kind of eschatological transcendence.

In

act Altizer contends that Nietzsche was the first radical Chrisian.142
When Altizer says God is dead he does not mean that God has
always been dead (i.e •• that there never was a living God) or
hat the idea or word "God" has ceased to be effective today (as
an Buren said), 143 or that God is merely hidden from man's view
(as Buber held).

For "• •• every man today," Altizer wrote,

"who is open to experience knows that God is absent, but only the
ristian knows that God is dead, that the death of God is a
l39:El.iade, ~ Sacred ~ :5h! _Pr_o.._f_a....n....,e, pp. ?2, 112.
14-0itegel, The Phenomenolo~ of Spirit, near the beginning of
he section on "'levea!ed Rel!gCin,,...wrote, unhappy consciousness
"• •• is the bitter pain which finds expression in the cruel
ords, 'God is dead,'"~ Philosop!tr £!.Hegel, p. 506.
141Henry D. Aiken wrote, "Hegel said but Nietzsche believed
hat 'God is dead,'" The~ of Idealog;r ~New York: A Mentor Book
956), p. 206. Nietzsche s famous passage comes from his ~
Science, No. 125, where the Madman cries out, "Do we not hear the
o se or the grave-diggers who are burying God? Do we not smell
he divine putretaction?--for even gods putrefy! God is dead!
God remains dead! And we have killed him!"
142 Thomas Altizer, ~ Gospel S!!. Christian Atheism, p. 25.
143Altizer lists ten different senses of 'God is dead' on
pp. x-xi, Radical Theology.

I
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inal and irrevocable event. • • •

He

feels that too many

hinkers have been attracted by Martin Buber's idea
"eclipse" of God.

or

the

"God is not simply hidden from view, nor is he

urking in the depths of our unconscious or on the boundaries of
ur infinite space • • • • 11145 We must confess, he adds, that
"• •• the death

or

God is so to speak an actual and real event,

ot perhaps an event oacuring in a single moment or time or his-

ory, but notwithstanding this reservation an event that has acually happened both in a cosmic and in a historical sense." 146
When did God die?

God died in the Incarnation or Christ.

-

"To know that God is Jesus," Altizer remarked, "is to know that
himself has become flesh: no longer does God exist as transend ent Sp 1r it or sovere i gn Lord • • • • ul4? Why? Because as
pirit becomes the word this empties the speaker of himself and
he whole reality of spirit becomes incarnate in its opposite.
is, "If Spirit truly empties itself in entering the world,

its own essential or original Being must be left behind in
n empty and lifeless form."

Or, to put it another way, if

1st is identical with God, then heaven was emptied of its God
Christ came to eartb. 148
144Altizer, ~ Gospel .2! Christia...~ Atheism, p. 111.
145Altizer, Radical Theology-, pp. 125-126.
146Altizer, ~ Gospel ,2! Christian Atheism, p. 103.
14?Ibid., pp. 67, 68. Altizer admits to a Hegelian interretatio'ii""liire. See pp. 62-69, 80.
148 Ibid., PP• 69, 92.
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J'urther, God not only died in a general sense by becoming
Incarnate, i.e., by entering the realm or flesh (and t!1us leaving
the realm of Spirit), but God also died in a specific sense when

Christ died on the cross.

"Yes, God dies in the Crucifixion:

therein he fulfills the movement of the Incarnation by totally
emptying himself' of his primordial sacrality."

In fact, "Only in

the Crucifixion, in the death of the word on the Cross, does the
Word actually and wholly become flesh."

And, "linally, the In-

carnation is only truly actually real if it effects the death of
the original sa.cred, the death of God himself. "l4 9
How does the Incarnation effect the "death" of God?

!re

!Understand this, said Altizer, one must speak or God as a dialecltical process rather than a.s an existent Being.

That is, "Pro-

gressively but decisively God abandons or negates his original
passivity • • • becoming incarnate both
of world and history."

!!!

and !.! the actuality

In fact, to the extent that the Christian

Word fails to negate its original form it cannot be a forward
moving process or a progressive descent into the concrete.

That

is to say, "Only a sacred that negates its own unfallen or primordial form can become incarnate in the reality of the profane."
To cling to a. transcendent and wholly other God is a denial of
the historical reality of the Incarnation.

J'or "Dialectically,

everything depends upon recognizing the meaning of God's total
identification with Jesus and of the understanding that it is

149Ibid., pp. 113, 54.

-
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God who becomes Jesus and not Jesus who becomes God."l50

In

rie! then, God must die in the Incarnation tor God is a historial and dialectical process which can come to realization only by
egation.
Is transcendence totally lost, then, in the immanence of the
Incarnation and death or God?

Certainly what we have called

etrospeciive and vertical transcendence are eliminated by Altier.

For "• •• as a result of a total movement from transcen-

ence to immanence, we must be freed from every attachment to
ranscendence, and detached from all yearning tor a primordial
That is, "• •• the Crucifixion embodies and makes
inally real a divine movement from transcendence to immanence

" So then "• •• the Christian who wagers upon a totally
Christ must negate every form and image ot transcenence, regardless ot what area ot consciousness or experience in
hich it may appear."

In !act, it is suicidal tor the contempor-

ry Christian to cling to transcendence tor both guilt and re-

ression result from clinging to a transcendent God.

Above all,

aid Altizer, theology must abandon a religious form, wholl7 and
onsistently repudiating the religious quest tor the primordial
for unless it does theology will remain bound to a prior transcendent Word and thereby it will remain closed
o the present and human actuality of history.

In brief, "'l'he

eath or God abolishes transcendence, theology making possible a

150Ibid., PP• 90t 86, 153, 149, 82, 83 •
...............
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ew and absolute immanence, an immanence treed of every sign of
ranscendence."l5l
Regardless of the very categorical sound of Altizer's stateents, he does not eliminate !!!, dimensions of religious transendence.

He

does repudiate retrospective and vertical trans-

endence but he does not eliminate eschatological transcendence;
n fact his own view involves a kind of eschatological transcenence.

Be wrote, "An incarnate Word embodying a real transfigur-

tion of Spirit into flesh cannot be sought in a heavenly beyond,
or can it be reached by a backward movement to primordial time;

•t is only in the actual

and contingent processes of history that

pirit becomes flesh. 1 52

What Altizer is saying is that man can-

ot transcend backward or upward; he must transcend in the forard movement of history- •
Like Bultmann, Altizer argued that the New Testament concept

of the "Kingdom of God" is decidedly eschatological, that the
eliever must remain open to the future.

Said Altizer, "• ••

adical faith is a total response to the actual presence and the
orward movement ot God in history."
ian form

or

faith it

ft

As a distinctively Chris-

• • • must ever be open to new epiphanies

or Spirit or God, epiphanies that will not simply be
epetitions of the original manifestation of God • • • truly new
epiphanies whose very occurenee either effects or records a new

l5l~., PP• 136, 139, 143, 145, 77, 154.
l52 Ibid., pp. 45, 46, 156.

p. 150. -

See also his Radical Theology,
-

,i!

·I
".I
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ctualization or movement of the divine process." 1 53

It is this

orward movement of Christianity whioh distinguishes it from
ther movements of transcendence.

"Yet such a forward movement

annot culminate in an abolition of the opposites by returning to
primordial Beginning.

Like its analogue in the prophetic faith

Old Testament, it must be grounded in an eschatological
d • • • • If

That is, man "• •• must move forward beyond the

a primordial or original sacred to an eschatological

oincidentia oppositorum that reconciles and unites the sacred
d the profane."

So any

authentically kenotic movement of in-

arnation must be a continual process of Spirit becoming flesh,
f eternity becoming time, or of the sacred becoming profane.
owever, this does not mean that the sacred becomes and remains
the profane, thus ending the forward transcendence.

For the move

ent of the sacred into the profane is inseparable from a paralel movement

or

the profane into the sacred.

"Consequently, a

onsistently Christian dialectical understanding of the sacred
ust finally look forward to the resurrection of the profane in
transfigured and thus finally sacred form. ,,l54

Just what this

"transfigured" form or "new epiphany" will be is not known nor
is it important for present purposes.

What is significant is to

observe that the radical Christian has an eschatological hope;
l53Altizer, ~ Gospel ,2! Christian Atheism, pp. 105, 84.
l54Altizer, Radical Theola~, PP• 150, 151, 152, 155. Of
ourse this does not mean that ~e whole Christian life is merely anticipat~~. While h$ is waiting for the new epiphany, the
Christian must go out into the world in seeking Jesus.

'I
'l'I'I
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that when the transcendent could no longer be discovered in the
realm up there but rather came down here in human history, it
keeps moving forward.

In brief, transcendence is not dead tor

Altizer, only the traditional backward and upward forms of it
are dead.
!!'!!, Secularization

£.!

Religion.--While contemporary man

awaits the future epiphany of transcendence, he must live within
a secularized world.

And even granting that radical atheism of

Altizer with its Hegelian dialectic anddemise ot God is not the
only form of esohatological transcendence, one must nevertheless
come to grips with the problem of relating transcendence (of whatever dimension) to an immanent-oriented world.

That is, there

are semantical problems with transcendence even if there were no
dialectical problems with it.
addresses in

~

!his is the issue that van Buren

Secular Meaning

£.!

lh,! Gospel.

Van Buren stated his position as over against Bultmann, Ogden and the demythologization school which, while rejecting mythological expressions or transcendence, nevertheless maintain
there is some meaningful usages or words like "transcendent."
He argued that the demythological position "• •• does not do
justice to the thinking of modern man when it speaks of •experienced nonobjective reality'; it does not see that modern man cannot even speak analogically about 'God.t"l55 Van Buren offers
the following reasons tor his position: 1 56 First, the expresl55van Buren, l!!! Secular Meanins

£.! !!!,!

Gospel, p. 64.

l56He offers three more reasons which are not applicable to

11
11'1

I
I
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sions like "nonobjective reality" and "transcendence" are meaning
less because they are not verifiable in experience; that is,

there are no conceivable experiences that could count either for
or against something being ultimately transcendent.

Second,

analogous language about transcendence or God is no more useful
to modern, empirically oriented man than is objectifying language
of mythology or science.

That is, nThe empiricist in us finds

the heart of the difficulty not in what is said about God, but
in the very talking about God at all.

We do not know 'what•

God is, and we cannot understand how the word 'God' is being
• • • " That is, the demythologizers reject any ~ective
meaning tor the word God and the nonobjective or symbolic meaning
~sed.

allows for no verification and, therefore, has no meaning at all.
Today, wrote van Buren, "we cannot even understand the Nietzsohian cry that 'God is dead!' tor it it were so, how could we know?
No, the problem now is that the word 'God' is dead.nl5?
Van Buren admitted that "• •• the heart or the method o.f'
~inguistic

analysis [which he uses) lies in the use of the veri-

fication principle--that the meaning of a word is its use in its
icontext.n

That is, the meaning of a statement is to be found in,
and is identical with, the function or use of that statement. 1 58

apeaking ot transcendence but apply to the historicity of the New
i'estament ke£YS!a about Christ, ibid., pp. 68-?3.
15?Ibid., PP• 64-68, 84, 83, 103.

-

l58Ibid., P• 104.
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is is, ot course, a more flexible variation of the principle
its earlier form as empirical veritication. 1 59

"There are a variety

or

That is to

'language-games• activities with

heir appropriate language, and a modified verification principle
s now used to ask what sort of things would count for an asser-

and what sort of things would count against it."l60
As a result ot the need to verity these statements about
ranscendence somewhere in human experience, van Buren argues
hat all God~statements must be translated into man-statements;61
this way he !eels that the apparently transempirical aspects
religious language oan be understood in terms with an empirial tooting.

For example, "Whatever can be known concerning
'God' bas been answered by the knowledge of Jesus • • • • "162
himself said 1 "He who has seen me has seen the Father!i

3

statements about transcendence must be translated or
derstood in terms of immanence; statements about God must be
ranslated into statements about man.

In this way religion can

e secularized by being humanized, i.e., by being understood in

But if one is limited to the human tor an
derstanding of the transcendent, it is only natural that men
l59For a statement or the earlier principle see A. J. Ayer's
rinciple of empirical verification in ~angyage, Truth ~ Logic,
hapter 1.
160van Buren, 1!!!, Secular Meaning £.! !!!!. Gospel, p. 15.
161 Ibid., P• 103 •
...............
162Ibid., PP• 196, 14?.
163Accordin to the Gos el of John 14: •
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ould explore the depth of human experience.

In fact it is this

epth which becomes a new way to transcend--an introspective kind
of transcendence, a transcending inwardly.
Introspective Dimension of Transcendence
If, as has been contended, religious experience always inolves transcendence, then it is only natural that different ways
o transcend will be discovered when traditional ways are shut
In fact, inward or introspective transcendence is by no
new.

The mystics have long sought the Divine in the

"dept~

However, there is a definite connection bethis modern transcendence in depth and the rejection

or

the

dimensions of transcendence just discussed.

---

Robinson's God "Vithin."--Various influences in the contem_........,_..____
orary world have converged to direct the religious man inward
n search for the transcendent.

First, the stress on immanence

bvious in all the secular theologians.

Then, the inapplieabil-

ty of objective or empirical language about God leads naturally
search for a more subjective approach.

Also, the very tact

the two traditional forms of transcendence (retrospective
d vertical) have been so emphatically rejected, there has been
1ttle option for those not connected with a distinctly Christian
r eschatological transcendence.

In brief, the religious man

transcend, and it he cannot transcend backward or upward,
he may try transcending in an inward direction.
Bishop Robinson led a reluctant revolution in the direction
of what has been called introspective transcendence.

Eehoi
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Bultmann he argued that God can no longer be conceived as being
"up-there" at the top of a three-story universe.

He can no long-

er be thought of as the "Most High" who on occasion ncomes down"
to man or the one to whom some men are "caught up."

Robinson

said men must drop the primitive conoept of a "Sky god" or "High
god" as well as the equally false mental image many moderns have
of "an Old Man in the sky." 164 Nor can the out-moded, pre-scientific conception of a God "up there'' be replaced with the Ek}Ually
unacceptable one of a God "out there."
yond outer space.

That is, God is not be-

Such a crude projection of God has been des-

troyed with the coming of the space age, Robinson argues.

Hence,

this spatial way of picturing God is more of a stumbling block
than an aid to belief in God today, wrote Robinson~ 16 5
However, Robinson makes it clear that his intent is not to
~eplace

a transcendent God with a pantheistic and immanent one.

"On the contrary, the task is to validate the idea of transcenkl.ence for modern man."

What Robinson proposes, following Til-

lich, is to reverse the symbolism from a God of "height" to one
of "depth" in order to make religious language more relevant.
For the word "deep" means more than the opposite of ''highn; it
•'

also means the opposite

or

shallow.

This is why "height" so of-

ten signifies unconcern while "depth" denotes concern, for a
remote God cannot really be involved.

__

It should be further noted

164Robinson, .........................
Honest to God, PP• 11-13 •
165Ibid., PP• 13-17.

-
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that "This is not just the old system in reverse, with a God
'down under' for a God •up there.'"

God is not another being but

is the "depth and ground of all being" (as Tillich said).

Or, to

borrow Dietrich Bonhoeffer's words, God is the "'beyond' in the
midst of our life," a depth of reality reached not on the borders
of lite but at its 'center.•

Likewise, wrote Robinson, Buber was

right when he said that whoever "• •• gives his whole being to
addressing the Thou of his lite, as a
by another, he addresses God." 166

~

that cannot be limited

So then, "• •• theological statements are not a description
of 'the highest Being' but an analysis of the depths of personal
relationships • • • it is saying that

~.

the final truth and

And furthermore, Robinson
"It statements about God are statements about 'ultimacy'

reality 'deep down things,• is love."
rwrote,

of personal relationships, then we must agree that in a real
~ense

Peuerbach was right in wanting to translate 'theology' into

'anthropology.'"

This does not mean, ot course, that God is

nothing but man, as reuerbach would have it, for this would lead

to the deification ot man.
particular~

But rather, as Buber said, "Every

is a glimpse through to the eternal

!hS!J!•" !'hat

is, it is between man and man that we meet God, but not as Feuerbach said that man is God. 16?

For Robinson the necessity ot the Transcendent within human
166 Ibid., pp. 44, 54, 130, 45-48.
167 Ibid., pp. 49-53.

-
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experience "• •• lies in the tact that our being has depths
~hich

naturalism, whether evolutionary, mechanistic, dialectical

or humanistic, cannot or will not recognize."

That is, "The man

-

who acknowledges the transcendence of God is the man who in the
conditioned relationships of life recognizes the unconditional
and responds to it in unconditional personal relationship."

In

other words, "God, the unconditional, is to be found only in,

-

and under the conditioned relationships ot lite: tor he is
their depth and ultimate signiticanoe."168 And as Tillich ob-

~ith

served, to speak ot the transcendent in this sense means that
~ithin itself the finite world points beyond itselt. 169
In brief, Robinson is suggesting that in view of the obsolescence of a transcendence in "height" that men may profitably
speak of a transcendence in "depth.''

That is, if it is not pos-

sible to speak of the transcendent "up there" men may speak of
the transcendent "in here"; we may speak of an introspective

transcendence where •vertical' transcendence is not possible.
~

!!!£

~

Subconscious.--Speaking of the God within the

"depth"ot human experience is neither new nor without problems.
It was a natural way to describe God even before the Freudian

elaboration of a subconscious 'depth' to human experience.

How-

ever, Since Freud, there has been the temptation to consider the
subconscious either identical with or closely associated with the
168 Ibid., pp. 54, 55 60.
1
169Tillich, Systematic Theology, Vol. II (195?), p. 8 •

-

....
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transcendent because it is beyond, mysterious, and a realm over
which men have no conscious control.

Rather. in some way it con-

trols them.
Eliade, for example, said that the unconscious displays the
structure of a private mythology.

He goes even further and con-

tends
• • • not only that the unconscious is "mythological"
but also that some of its contents carry cosmic values
• • • • It can even be said that Modern man's only real
contact with cosmic sacrality is effected by the unconscious, whether in his dreams and his imaginative life
or in the creations that arise out of the unconscious. 170
James also closely associates the sublimal and the supreme.
He contends that the spontaneous source of religious conversation
is the subconscious.

For James it is not the source or root of

a religious experience that is im.portant; "If the fruits !2£

llli

ot the state of conversion are good, we ought to idealize and
!Venerate it, even though it be a piece of natural psychology."
James does not say that the source of conversions is Rurelz naturadmits that "• •• the reference of a phenomenon to a sublimal self does not exclude the

al, that the subconscious is God.

He

notion of the Deity altogether," for
ceivable that

"•

• • it is logically con-

!! there }?! higher spiritual agencies that can

directly touch us, the psychological condition of their doing so
mi~ht

}?! our possession of a subconscious region which alone

should yield access to them."

That is, James does not deny that

there is more than the subconseious to what is meant by God; what
l?OEliade, ~ ~ Reality, p. ??.
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ne

did say is that the transcendent is

~least

"• •• the sub-

conscious continuation of our conscious life. 111 71
But it is precisely this cloae aosociation of the transcenient with man•s subconsciousness that raises anew the question of
the reality basis for religious transcendence.
~lth
~

For it one admits

James that sudden religious conversions can be explained on

purely natural basis and that there are no unmistakably unique

characteristics of so-called supernatural conversions; it one adthat there is in the subconscious a transcendent realm of
spontaneous power capable of transforming lives, 17 2 then one can~its

not help but wonder whether or not the subconscious is ............
all that
is meant by the transcendent. Indeed. this is precisely the position taken by Carl Jung who identifies God with the collective
subconscious of men.

And even those who do not make this identi-

rication are sometimes haunted with the possibility that there
might be no more to the transcendent than what transcends the

eon~

sciousnesa of individual men, viz., in the subconsciousness of
~he

race.

But since we have taken tor the meaning ot reality

pnly that which is more than and independent of the subconsciousness of men, whether individual or collective, this raises afresh
the question of how to teat the reality of the transcendent.
Summary and Conclusion of the Chapter

The purpose of this chapter has been to discover the essen~32,

l7lwilliam James, The Varieties ~ Religious £t!Perience, pp.

237, ct. 265, 508.---

1?2 Ibid., pp. 233-237·
...............
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tial character and basic dimensions of religious experience.
irsli, it was discovered that a religious experience always inolves a transcendent dimension, i.e., soraething which goes beond and is more than the empirical conditions ot fini·te man.

Secondly, the transcendent must be considered as ultimate, i.e.,
something about which one is ultimately concerned or to which he
ives a total commitment.
After distinguishing religious experience from moral, aesthetic, and secular experiences the various dimensiom of transendence were explored.

These were found to be four: 1?3 1) re

apective transcendence to the origin, 2) vertical transcendence
to the top, 3) eschatological transcendence to the end, and 4)
introspective transcendence to the depth of all things.

From

this we conclude that there are many directions or dimensions of
the transcendent, but religious experience always involves an
ltimate commitment to the transcendent, 1 74 of one dimension or
another.

l?3There may be other directions or ways to transcend.
Teilehard De Chardin suggests transcending toward a divine "Cener" in his work~ The Divine Milieu (New York: Harper and Row,
Publishers, 1957;.--1?4No attempt has been made here to analyze Ea.stern religions but there is no reason why these types of transcendence
would not include them. Most Oriental religions seem to be eith

r
CHAPTER IV

THE ROLE OF PROOFS IN DETERMINING
THE REALITY OF THE TRANSCENDENT
It has been argued to this point that a religious experience
is a total commitment to the tran.scendent, 1. e., to that which
one feels to be beyond himself.

This transcendent dimension is

conceived in different directions (backward, upward, forward,
and inward), but religious experience always involves transcendence in one direction or another.

That is, it always involves

a commitment to a beyond which it considers to be ultimate.

The

question is this: is there any way to determine whether or not
the transcendent is really beyond the persons who are experiencing it?

Is the beyond really beyond religious experience

with an independent reality of its own?
This raises the question of proving or disproving the existence or reality of the transcendent.

Traditionally, religious

thinkers have offered several arguments or 'proofs' in defense
of the reality of the transcendent or "God."

We will only at-

tempt to sketch them here because they are well known to most
readers.
Attempts ;!!2 Prove

!!!.! Existence £!

~

Since the theistic arguments have assumed many forms and
148
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have been classified in different ways we will simply organize
and restate them in what seems to us their basic logical structure.

Talting them topically they are the Cosmological, Teleolog·

ical, Ontological, and Moral pra:ts tor the existence of God.
i'he Cosmological Argument1
Basically this is the argument from ettect to cause or from
contingency to necenaity or from creation to Creator.

ot the argument may be stated something like this.

The logic

The being or

existence of the world must be either uncaused, self-caused, or
caused by aDother tor there a.re no other alternatives.

But the

existence ot the world can not be uncaused tor it's existence is
contingent, i.e., the world exists but need not exist; it does
not account for its own existence; the world doesn't explain why

-

-

it is when it need not be.
be salt-caused.

Nor on the other hand can the world

For to ha.ve its existence caused the world woulc

first have to be non-existent, and. to cause existence it would

have to be existent.

Theretore, to cause its own existence the

world would have to be non-existent and existent at the same tim4
and in the same sense which is impossible.

But if the world is

1 A good list or readings on the Cosmological argument may be
found in Part I of The Coamolo~ical Argp.ments! ed. Donald R. Bur·
rill (New York: Dou'6!iday anct o., Inc., 1~ J, A very good sum·
mary or the essence ot the Cosmological argument, not in the above, is Francis H. Parker's article, "The Realistic Position in
Religion" found in Reli~ion in Philosoihioal and Cultural Per-

SRective, PP• ?8-113.ore comprenens ve treatments ol the-irgument are given by E. L. Mascall in He Who Is (London: Longmans,
Green and Co., 1943). Austin FarrerTS
and Infinite and R.
Garrigou-Lagrange, God: His Existence an !tls-witlire (St. Louis:

'3jiti

Herder Book Co., 2

VOI's.-;-!934 end 193'gj'; ---
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neither uncaused nor self-caused, then it must be caused by
another cause.
Now this cause of the world cannot be caused by another
cause which is caused by another cause and so on infinitely,
since an infinite series of exiatentially dependent causes is
impossible.

For in every infinite series of causes where one

depends on another for its existence at least one cause must 12,!.
causing, otherwise there would be no causality in the series.
But in an infinite series of causes every causes is being caused,
for that is what is meant by saying that it is an infinite seriei •
But if every cause is being caused and at least one cause is
causing, then at least one cause must be both causing its own
existence and having its existence caused at the same time and
in the same sense which is a contradiction.

Therefore, if there

cannot be an infinite series of existentially dependent causes
for the world, then there must be a First, Uncaused Cause of the
existence of the world.
The Teleological Argument 2
This is basically the argument from design to Designer or
from purpose to a Purposer, that is, the argument from final
causality.

Its logical structure is simply this: every design

2Read1ngs on the Teleological argument may be found in Part
II of Donald R. Burrill, .Q.12• cit. Complete works on it are not
so plentiful but A. E. TaYiori-s-Does God Exist? (Toronto: Macmillan Company, 1945) contains a goodC!etense of it as does the
more recent work by Robert E. D. Clark, The Universe: Plan or
Accident? (Philadelphia: Muhlenburg Press;-1961).
---- --
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has a designer; the world has great design; therefore, the world
has a Great Designer.

That the world is a great design is re-

vealed in Nature where one can see a delicate balance

or

plant

and animal life; in the organs of the human body such as the eye
and ear which are clearly structured for the purpose of seeing
and hearing; in the very division of the sexes into male and female which is for the obvious purpose of propagating, etc.

In

brief, the ordered relation and adaptation ot means to ends reveals clearly that there must be an Orderer or Adaptor; their
design shows that there must be a Designer.

And since the de-

sign and order of nature goes tar beyond anything the intelligence ot man has contrived, then nature's Designer must be an
intelligence far beyond man's.

or

course the more sophisticated forms of the Teleological

argument must handle the possibility that what appears to be a
great design might be no more than a 'happy accident.•

That is,

the so-called order of nature could be no more than a chance combination of the parts with which it is composed.

In view of

this possibility the Teleological argument takes the following
logical form.

Either the world with all its adaptation of means

to ends, etc. is the result of design or else it happened by
chance.

It is highly improbable that the world happened by

chance.

Therefore, it is highly probable that the world was de-

signed by an Intelligent Mind.

The reason that it is highly un-

likely that the world results from a fortuitous combination of
events is that the known number of narts at the known rate of

r
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development occasions a possibility so remote that believing the
world happened by pure chance would be like believing that Webater' s unabridged dictionary resulted from an explosion in a
printing shop.

It is possible but highly improbable.

~he Ontological Argu:ment3
This is the argument for the necessity of being (or ontos).
It argues that if a Necessary Being is conceivable then it must

exist.

That is, a Necessary Being must necessarily

J!!. (i.e.,

exist), for if it doesn't have to exist necessarily then it is
not (a) necessapY Being but only a

conting~nt

being, i.e., one

that exists but need not exist.
The classical .formulation of the Ontological argument took
the following shape.

God by definition is that than which no-

thing greater can be conceived, for if one could conceive a grea
ter then it by definition would be God.

But it is greater to

exist than not to exist, for existence is a better state than
non-existence.

Therefore, God (or that than which nothing grea-

ter can be conceived) must exist, for if be did not exist then
we could conceive of one greater, viz., one that did exist.
God is by definition that than which there is no greater.

But
There·•

fore, he must exist or else he is not really that than which
3Readings on the Ontological argumentma.y be found in The
Ontological Ar~ument, ed. Alvin Platinga (?few York: Doublea:ay
liichor Books, 96;), or in John Hick's The Mant-~aeed Argument
(New York: Macmillan Company, 196?). ~comp e~e statement of
the ontological argument by Anselm including his dialogue with
Guanilo may be found in St. Anselm: Basic Writings, trans. S. N.
Deane (Open Court Pub. CO., !96:2 J.
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nothing greater can be conceived.
Although it is not obvious in this classical way of stating
the argument that there is a hidden implication in the minor
premise, nevertheless this can be made clear by restating the
argument as follows.
tions.

God by definition must possess all perfec-

Existence is a perfection.

must exist.

Therefore, God by definition

That is to say, if God can be defined as a being

which must possess all perfections then he must exist for if he
didn-' t then he would lack one perfection, viz., existence and
therefore he would not qualify under the definition to be God.
The problem with the argument in this form is in showing that
existence is a perfection.
tic or

~eature

That is, is existence a characteris-

which some things may or may not have?

Is exis-

tence a predicate or attribute which can be attributed to something the way other characteristics can such as "red" or "tall"
can be said of things?
In order to answer this question the Ontological argument
must contend that if existence is not a perfection at least
necessary existence is a perfection of a Necessary Being.

For

if a Necessary Being doesn't have to necessarily exist, then it
is not a Necessary Being.

In other words, a Necessary Being

must necessarily have being; it couldn't just happen to be,
for then it would not be a Necess!bf Being.
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The Moral Argument4
This is the argument from a moral law to a Moral Law-Giver.
Originally it was not conceived as a proof which was rationally
necessary but only as a postulate which was morally or practi~ally

necessary.

Eventually, however, it came to have the form

of a rational argument which goes something like this.
~oral

law has a moral law-giver (or legislator).

~oral

law which is independent of men.

Moral Law-Giver who is independent of

Every

There is a

Therefore. there is a
me~.

The first premise is

taken to be self-evident, for how could something be legislated
without a legislator?

How could it be ruled without a ruler?

How can there be prescriptions without a prescriber?

It is the

minor premise that needs more explanation.
How is it known that there is an objective moral law, independent of individual men and of the race in general?

It must

be independent of individual men. it is argued, otherwise there
would be no standard to judge between them.

Indeed, there could

not ever be any real discussion or difference between them on
moral questions unless there were a moral law beyond them to
which they could make common appeal.

Furthermore, individual

men feel themselves under the compulsion to do what is right
4 on the Moral argument one can trace the essence of its development in the following articles: Immanuel Kant, "God as a
Postulate of Practical Reason" in The Existence of God, ed. John
Hick (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1964); Hastings Rashdall,
"The Moral Argument, tt The Existence of God; w. R. Sorley, !'The
Moral Ar~ent" in Phi!oso~~ ot Rel'Iiii'Oil; ed. George L. Abernethy; C. o. Lewis, MUre Ch; 13.lri u.v, ..: " I, chapters 1-5, and
Elton Trueblood, PliI!Osonhv or Rel~aion, chapter 8.
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~ven

though this urging from beyond them is sometimes contrary

to their wishes and instincts.

Now unless they are totally de-

ceived at the most serious level of what they consider to be
their duty (even to the point of paying the supreme sacrifice),

then there must be beyond thP.m a moral law which is in some sense
binding on them.

And what is true of the individual ls true of

the race as a. whole.

That is, not only individuals but the race

as a whole experiences a moral prescription from beyond them to
which standard their desires and. conduct does r.ot always eon.form.
Indeed, there could be no such thing as progress of the race

~s

a whole unless there were an objective moral law which is beyond
the race as a whole aud by which the race could be judged to be
d.oing "better" or "worse."

But if there is an objective moral

law beyond all men, then there must be a

~oral

Law-Giver beyond

mankind.

Of course not all theists hold to the validity of all of
these arguments nor do they all feel that the arguments really
logically and demonstrably prove the existence of God.

Some the-

ists, however, have held that at lea-st one or more of these arguments do indeed prove the existence of God, and most theists
Bive at lea.st some weight to the arguments.

But in any event thE

modern response to theistic proofs has been less optimistic and
less enthusiastic.

It will be necessary to examine the reactions

to proofs for the reality of any kind of transcendent object of
religious experience and even some attempted disproofs of the
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same before we can properly address the question as to whether or
1not there :Ls any wo,..7 to test the alleged reality of the object of
~eligious

experience.

r1odern Attitude

!.2!!~

Proofs

!2£

Religious Realit;y

The prevailing modern attitude toward proving the existence
of God or the transcendent has been uniformly sc&ptical if not

negative.

There are a number of reasons for

thi~.

Peter Koes-

tenbaum succinctly SUllllllarized some of the basic reasons when he
wrote,

11

•••

the arguments &.re logically invalid, epistemologi-

cally defective, and axiologically niisplaced."5

To these we may

add a few more reactions that have come from modern thought in
response to proofs for God.
Proof a are Psychologically Unconvincing
Rational proofs for God or the transcendent are generally
unpersuasive to outsiders.

As Martin Marty noted, "Apologists

know ·that proof is convincing only when people are already predisposed to believe." 6 Novak points out that the most persuasive force for religion "• • • is not rational theology but mys-

tical theology, not the principle of objectivity but of subjectivity, not the clear • • • arguments of Aquinas but the record

of the tormEmted inner experience of Augustine, Pascal, Kierkegaard, which a.re found most appea.ling."7

'file reason for this,

5Peter Koestenbau.m, "Religion in the Tradition of Phenomenologyn in Religion ,!E; Philosophical 3!llii Cultural Perspee~, 178
6ttartin Harty, Varieties E.!_ Unbelief, p. 209.
?Michael Novak, Belief !!!'!!!Unbelief, p. 105.
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William James suggested, is that human needs go deeper than the
rational.

In tact, the rational nature or man is impressed with

arguments only arter his feelings have been impressed.

That is,

experience is more convincing than logic because the rational
nature of man is at best secondary as compared to his private,
inner lite. 8

In other words, a man often finds reasons for some·

thing because he already believed it; he doesn't usually believe
it because he already has reasons for it.

Psychological persua-

sion precedes rational demonstration.
One of the reasons proofs are psychologically unconvincing
is that they tend to be academic and formal; they often do not

touch men where they live.

As John Dewey observed, "The cause

of the dissatisfaction is • • • that they are too formal to otter any support to religion in action."9

Tb.at is, a rational

proof does not meet man's existential needs.

Rational proofs

like the mathematic proofs are •cold' and do not call for a commitment of the whole man.

As !an Ramsey pointed out "There are

no placard-bearers in mathematical departments with legends like
'There'll always be a Euclid,' or 'Prepare to meet they Riemann
today.'"lO

Likewise, there is little tendency tor most moderns

to join the cause to an "Uncaused Cause" or to be deeply moved
by an "Unmoved Mover."
8 william James.

?2, ?3.

In brief, even it rational ttproots" tor

la! Varieties

g!_ Religious Experience, pp.

9John Dewey, ! Common Faith, p. 11.
101an Ramsey, Religious Language, P• 37.
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the transcendent were valid, they seem not to be vital; they
seem too speculative to mean much for man's practical life.

And

to contend that theistic arguments can prove God but not persuade men of it does not seem to impress many moderns.

For what

value is it to have been rationally driven to the theistic water
from which one does not desire to drink?
Proots are Logically Invalid
But not only are theistic proof a psychologically unpersuasive to the modern mind, they are also widely considered to be
logically invalid.

As Kaufmann argued, "Can we prove God's ex-

istence with a valid argument in which God does not appear in
any of the premises?"

For "Clearly, it God does not appear in

any of the premises, he will not appear in the conclusion either
if he did, the argument would have to be invalid." 11 That is,
logically, the conclusion can be no broader than the premises.
If one begins with God in the premises, he has already begged
the question.

And if one does not begin with God in the pre-

mises, there is no logically valid way to come up with God in
the conclusion, Kaufmann urges.
Tb.is same objection may be put in another way.

It is some-

times argued that: Every finite thing is caused; The world is
finite; Therefore, the world has a oause. 12 But in this form ot

169.

11 walter Kaufmann, Critique g! Religion ~ ~losoph;y, p.

12Allan B. Wolter, The Transcendentals and Their Function
in the Metaphysics of Dun-S-Scotus (New !ork:-pr'ano!scan Institute--gt. Boniventure; !9~~), p. 44.
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the argument the word

0

cause" in the conclusion seems to have a

different (broader) meaning than it has in the premise.

For in

the premise it means finite cause and in the conclusion it is
supposed to mean an infinite Cause (viz., God).

From a logical

standpoint this seems to be a "Four-term" fallacy.
Another way o! saying that the arguments for God are invalid
is to follow David Hume who contended that "Whatever we conceive

as existent, we can also conceive as nonexistent.

There is no

being, therefore, whose nonexistence implies a contradiction.
Consequently there is no being whose existence is demonstrable."l'·~
That is, to conclude the existence of God is not rationally ines~apable
~f

since it is also logically possible to posit theq>posite

whatever is said to exist.

This argument is directed particu-

larly at the Ontological argument which Kant found to be at the
basis of all the other proofs for God.
For no argument, Kant argued, can conclude that God neces~arily

~eing.

exists, unless it demonstrates that God is a Necessary
"But experience oan only show us that one state of things

often or at most commonly follows another, and therefore affords
neither universality nor neoeasity.n 14 So the only non-experiential argument which could possibly show that the existence of God

is necessary is the argument for a Necessary Being, i.e., the
l3David Hume, Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, part IX.
14Kant, Prolegomena to !BZ Future Metaphzsics (New York:
The Bobbs-Merrill o., !nC:, 1950), p. 62.
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tological argument.

This argument, however, is not rationally

since it is not contradictory to reject it.

For, as

t stated itt "fo posit a triangle, and to reject its three
ngles. is self-contradictory; but there is no contradiction in
ejecting the triangle together with its three angles. 01 5
Proofs are Epistemologically Defective
Closely associated with the criticism that the proofs for
are logically invalid is another criticism which has been
idely echoed since Kant's time.

It is the charge that the prcof's

re epistemologically detective.

In Kant's words, "Through con-

epts alone, it is quite impossible to advance to the discovery
t new objects and supernatural beings [as in the ontological

rgum.entJ; and it is useless to appeal to experience, which in
11 cases yields only appearanoes. 1116

That is, all that one can

ow is the Rhenomena (thing-for-me) and not the noumenon (thingKant did not deny that there is a reality behind
ppearanee but he is saying that "• •• we know not this thing
in itself but only know its appearances, namely, the way
our senses are affected by this unknown something."l?
e of the arguments Kant used to support this position is that

the objects of the world of sense are taken for things in
hemselves • • • contradiction would be unavoidable. 018
1 5Ka.nt, ~ Critigue .2! E.!!!! Reason, p. 502.
16Ibid., p. 530.

-

l?Kant, Prolegomena, pp. 60, 62.
18Ibid., P•

91.

!hat is,

160
~n

the assumption that we know the noumenon and not merely the

'henomena the human reason eventuates in inexorable contradic-

~ions or antinomies. 1 9
There are other very basic reasons why Kant concludes that
knowledge is limited to appearances which may be summarized

~ur

~a

follows: all knowledge be5ins with experience but does not

arise from experience.

ai tions

There are certain necessary a priori eon-

for experience which make experience possible.

These

•:rorms"of sensation (like Time and Space) and "categories" of unlerstanding (like Unity, Causality, Necessity) provide the struc~re

of sensation and knowledge while experience provides the
or "stuff"; experience provides the data and the mind the

~ontent

letermination of our knowledge.

Therefore, all that one knows

Ls what the thing is to him (phenomena) as the mind has formed
pr determined it and not what it is in itself (noumenon) indepeniently of this. 20
In brief, Kant is arguing that knowledge is constructive of
reality and not intuitive. 21 He is saying that one can not know
~he

way things really are but only the way the mind constructs

~hem.

If this be the case, then all attempts to prove the exis-

tence of God would find themselves incapable of building any
~ational

bridge across the chasm that separates the way things

l9see Kant, 1!1£ Critigue .2! ~ Reason, pp. 396 f.
20
see ~·•pp. 65, 175, and Prolegomena, PP• 42-?4.

21 0n this point see F. II. Parker, "Traditional Rea.son and
~odern Reason" in Paith ~ Philosopgy, pp. 40, 41.
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ppear and the way they really are.
Proofs Are Axiologically Misplaced
Even though Kant gave up any rational proof a for the exisot God he did say that it is morally necessary to posit

This shift from what is rationally necessary to what is
....,...-.-........ required signals another shift in the modern attitude
rational proofs for the existence of God.

.g.,

Kant argued,

that moral duty demands that men seek the highest good (the

ummum bonum) which is the union of virtue and happiness.

But

his is not possible in this life since doing one's duty does not
lways bring him the maximum or happiness.

"Thus God and a fut

are two postulates which, according to the principles of
reason, are inseparable from the obligations which that same
imposes upon us." 22

Kant felt that by connecting God

man's concrete moral values rather than his abstract reaon that a man would have a more valuable orientation for his
eligious convictions.

This is why Kant could say, "I inevitably

the existence of God and I am certain that nothing can
belief, since my moral principles would thereby be
hemselves overthrown, and I cannot disclaim them without becomabhorent in my own eyes." 2 3
Not all modern religious thinkers agree with Kant about the
to posit God in order to secure the fulfillment of man's
22

Kant, ~ Critigue

23 Ibid., p. 650.

£!. ~ Reason,

p.

639.
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duty.

However many have followed Kant's basic axiological

~rientation

by relating their religion to man's basic moral val-

~oral

ues.
be

And in view of this the value of rational proofs is seen to

secondary at best.

James, e.g., contended that modern man

wants to know what will be the "cash value" of religion in their
lives and world. 24 s;ren Kierkegaard took a more radical position arguing that it is folly even to attempt to prove the existence of God. 2 5 Michael Novak's view is not quite so extreme but
Lt too reflects this same axiological reorientation toward proofs.
"A .formal argument for the existence of God is not of much use
Ln the life of one who is trying to decide between belief and unoelief."

For "• •• there are many layers ot point of view, in-

and new horizons to come through before one can understand the formal argument. 1126 That is, there may be a secondary
~uiry,

~or

tertiary) role or value for a formal rationalization o! one's

experience of God.

But to consider a rational proof to be the

prime basis for one's religious experience is a misplacement of
!Values.
Proofs Are Ontologically Inadequate
There is another more sophisticated critique of theistic
proofs which grows out of most of the previous criticisms.

It

argues that even if one could devise a rational proof tor God it
24James, 1h! Varieties 21. Religious Experience, pp. 433,435.
2 5x:1erkegaard, Philosophical Fra~ents, trans. David F.
Swenson (Princeton: Princeton Unlvers y Press, 1936), p. 31.
26Novak, Belief and Unbelief, p. 130.

-
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would not necessarily follow that he really existed.

It argues

that even if it were rationally necessary to conclude that there

is a God it does not follow from this that God really exists.
For there is always the possibility that the rationally inescapable is not real.

Perhaps the way men must think is not in the

final analysis the way things really .!!!:!•
The basis 0£ this reaction to theistic proofs is traceable

--

to Kant's contention that men must act and think as if there is
a God.

On one interpretation of thia it could be argued that Goe

does not really exist but it is necessary to think that he does
in order to have unity in one's thoughts. 27 Whether or not

Kant actually took this position is not our purpose to determine
here.

It ia at least a Rrima facie possibility that a theistic

proof could be logically valid even if there were no God.

Norman

Malcolm offered an Ontological proof' for God but said, "I can
imagine an atheist going through the argument becoming convinced
of its validity, acutely defending it against objections, yet remaining an atheist. • • •
But just how can something be rationally inescapable without

27Kant never denied that there was a noumenal reality; he
denied only that one coul<r1.0iow what it was, Critigue 0£ Pure
Reason, pp. 264-275. He even asserted that "'11'.e categoriear-imperatlve leads directly to God, yes, serves as a pledge of His
reality," from Kant's~ Postwnum quoted by'?. M. Greene in
"Introduction" to Religion '\J'ithin the Limits of Reason Alone,
trans. Theodore Greene and Hoyt H.-iriidson (NeW-York: Harper and
Row, Publishers, 1934), p. lxvi.
28 Norman Malcolm, "Anselm's Ontological Argument•• in ~
Existence of God, p. 6?.

--
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being ontologically so, one may ask.

Those who object that the

theistic arguments do not really prove God exists could argue in
the following way.

In order to defend that the rationally ines-

capable is real the theist would have to :prove that the principle
of non-contradiction, which is at the basis ot all rational argu~ents,

is necessarily true of reality.

But the traditional de-

fense of this principle is that it cannot be denied without affirming it, therefore, it must be so. 29 For one must assume that
the very statement (or thought) by which he denies the principle
of non-contradiction is itself non-contradictory, otherwise the
very denial is meaningless.

But all this really proves is that

the principle of non-contradiction is inescapable; it does not
prove that it is true of reality.

That is, for one to say that

it is unavoidable is not the same as affirming that it is ontologically so.

For even though one cannot affirm it to be false,

he can believe it to be false.

Furthermore, the argument goes,

even though it cannot be demonstrated to be false, it might still
be false.30
Arguing in this same vein,

a.

I. Lewis suggests "• •• if

we should be forced to realize that nothing in our experience
possesses any stability • • • that denouncement would rock our
world to its foundations," and "• • • yet such a world-shaking
29see Aristotle, Metap11ysics IV, c. 4, 1006a, Basic Works £1,
Aristotle, ed. Richard Mckeon (New Yori: Random House, 1941).
gion

30F. H. Parker, "The Realistic Postion in Religion" in
~ Cultural Perspective, pp. 86 t.

!a Philosophical

!!!!!-
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event is still quite possible • • • simply because, on this view,
not even the law of non-contradiction is necessarily true of the
real world."3l
Now in like manner one could argue that a proof for God
could be rationally inescapable without necessitating the conclusion that God truly exists.

That is, one could contend that

all that the proof does at best is to show that one can not thinl!
consistently without logically implying that there is a God, but
it does not follow from this that God really exists.

All that

would follow necessarily is that one can not think in an;y rational way which would not logically imply positing God.

That is,

-consistent way to think, but this does not mean that there really
one must think as if there were a God because there is no other

-is

a God.

Attempts

!2

Disprove

~

Realitz

.2f

~

However, not all modern reactions to religious proofs are
content to point out the inadequacies of these proofs, some have

gone so far as to suggest that they can disprove the reality of
God or the transcendent.

If they can establish their case then

it will be unnecessary to

~o

any further in an attempt to discov-

er criteria for testing the alleged reality of the transcendent.
Hence, it is necessary to examine these disproofs first.

3lc. I. Lawis, Mind and the World Order (New York: Charles
Scribner's, 1929), p:-;t}6;-- ---

l

The Difference between 'Disbelief' and Disproof
Actually there have not been many disproofs for the exisGod offered in the history of thought.

Most serious

have been content to disbelieve (on probability grounds)
ather than attempting to disprove (•'on logfo&lly c ertaHt bases) tha
God.

Bertrand Russell, for example, said,

0

I'm not

ontending in a dogmatic way that there is not a God. What I'm
ontending is that we don't k.ilow that there is.u3 2 Likewise SigFreud's Future

.2! !!! Illusion is not an attempt to disprove

d, however much doubt he succeeds in casting on God's existence
eud clearly admits that there may be a God and that his posiion against religion may be wrong.33

And even those who tend to

isbelieve in God because of the problem of evil do not usually
ormulate it as a disproof of God's existence but of his infinite
ower or love.34
Several Disproofs Discussed.
However, those who wish to contend seriously on behalf of
reality of God can take little consolation in the fact that
any

unbelievers don't try to disprove God until they have first
the other unbelievers who

ll!!!

attempted to demonstrate

no God.

32Bertrand Russell, "A Debate on the Existence of God,"~
istenoe of God, p. 180.

----- --3 John Stuart Mill,
Problem of Evil,"~ Existence ,2!
33:rreud, The Future of an Illusion, P• 87.
4

pp. 119-120.

----~~
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Feuerbach's Epistemological Disproof

.2f

~.--Ludwig

Feuer-

bach is an example of someone who seems to attempt a disproof of
God.

For him God was "nothing but" a projection of human imagin-

ation.

The reason God can be "nothing morett than man, said

Fauerbach, is that a man's understanding can go no farther than
his nature.
finite.

If man understands the infinite then he must be in-

In Feuerbach's own words, "• •• in the consciousness

of the infinite, the conscious subject has tor his object the
infinity of his own nature."

A man's understanding is limited to

is nature, for "• •• so far as thy

nature extends, so far rea-

hes thy unlimited self-consciousness, so far art thou God."
or

example~

if a man can feel the infinite, then he must be in-

ini te, for ''How coulds • t thou perceive the di vine by feeling, if
eeling were not divine in its nature?"

And if a man can think

he infinite, his thought must be infinite, for "The object of
intellect is the intellect objective to itself."

In brief,

reason there is no God beyond man is that "Man cannot get beond his true nature"; he can never get loose from his own spelt "The object of any subject is nothing else than the
ubject's own nature taken objectively,'' then it would follow
there is no reality beyond man.35
35Jeuerbach, The Essence of Christianity, PP• 3, 8, 9, 11,
Feuerbach app!iis £fie same-logic to every other faculty of
an saying, "But feeling has here been adduced only as an example
t is the same with every other power, faculty, potentiality,
eality, activity--the name is indifferent--which is defined as
he essential organ of any object. Whatever is a subjective exression of a nature is simultaneously also its objective expresion," Ibid., p. 11.
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The crux of Feuerbach's argument seems to rest on the following affirmation:

11

! cannot know whether God is something else in

himself or for himself than he is tor me; what he is to me is
to me all that he is."

Man cannot take "• • • a point of view

above himself, i.e., above his nature, the absolute measure of
his being."

For "I can make the distinction between the object

as it is in itself, and the object aa it is for me, only where
an object can really appear otherwise to me • • • • "

That is,

"The measure of the species is the absolute measure, law, and criterion of man."36
Now whatever this argument does it certainly does not prove

-

that there cannot be a God beyond man but only (at best) that
one cannot get at any thing apart from his thoughts about it.
But it; certainly is not an unintelligible position to hold as
Kant did that there really was a noumenal "thing-in-itself" even
if one could only think the phenomenal "thing-for-me. 0 3?

That

is, all Feuerbach's argument shows (at best) is that one can't
think about God apart from his thoughts; it does not show that
God cam1ot exist apart from one's thoughts.
Furthermore, Feuerbach's disproof of God rests on the premise that one cannot !!12:! an infinito without being an infinite,
etc.

But surely he does not prove this point.

That is, he does

not show that it is absolutely impossible that a finite could

36 Feuerbach, Essence £! Christianitl, p. 16.
3?Kant, Critigue

.2! ~ Reason, PP• 265-2?0.

169

know the infinite.

Indeed, he admits a distinction between the

finite individual man and his infinite species, holding only the
latter to be God.3 8 And if there is a difference between man in
particular and man in general (i.e., mankind), then there is no
reason why one could not make a similar distinction between finite man and an infinite God.

And if individual man can know man

in general (i.e., mankind) which goes beyond his individual,
finite limits, then there seems to be no reason why a finite man
can't know an infinite God which goes beyond the limits of the
individual finite man.

But in any event, it does not follow to

argue that all that God is

1£ me is all that God really .!.:!•

There is also the possibility that God exists beyond my thoughts;
he

could~

even apart from being thought by men.

is to say, the possibility exists that there can

In brief, this
~

a God beyond

his being thought by us, even if we could not think of him apart
from our thought.

!a Attempted Ontological .Q!sproof £1,

~.--Now

when the

problem is stated in this form, it becomes clear that the attempt
to disprove God, as Kant said of the attempt to prove God, has an
ontological premise in it.

It is a kind of ontological disproof

of God.

J. N. Findlay attempted to defend such an ontological disproof of God.

He argued, e.g., that (1) "• •• the Divine :Exis-

tence can only be conceived, in a religiously satisfactory manner

38 Feuerbach, Essence of Christianity, p. 7.

l?O
if we also conceive it as something inescapable and necessary,
whether for thought or reality. 0

And (2) from this "• •• it

follows that our modern denial of necessity or rational evidence
for such an existence amounts to a demonstration that there cannot be a God."39

That is to say, if God must be a Necessary

Existence and if no necessity is possible with regard to existence, then it would follow that God cannot exist at all.

For

God cannot exist in a non-necessary (i.e., contingent) way and
still be God.

And nothing can have a necessary existence, for

no existential propositions are necessary.
In support of the first premise he argues that "The true object of religious reverence must not be, merely, that to which
no actual independent realities stand opposed: it must be one to
which such opposition is totally inconceivable."

Furthermore,

"• •• not only must the existence of other things be unthinkable
~ithout

him, but his own non-existence must be wholly unthinkable

in any circumstances.ti

It is not possible to view God as one who

just happened to exist (but not necessarily) or to be wise,
f'ul, etc.

power~

"An object of this sort would doubtless deserve re-

spect and admiration, and other quasi-religious attitudes, but
it would not deserve the utter self-abandonment peculiar to the
religious frame of mind."

That is to say, such a being would de-

serve a quasi-religious respect but not full religious reverence.

39J. N. Findlay, "Can God's Existence be Disproved'!" New Essays in Philosophical Theolof!', ed. Antony Plew and Alasdatr'9Macintyre-(tonaon: scM Press L~ ., 1955), p. 48.
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In fact, said Findlay, "• •• it would be idolatrous to worship
it ... 40

Now in support of the second premise Findlay argues "Plainly.
(for all who share a contemporary outlook) they entail not only
that there isn't a God, but that the Divine Existence is either
senseless or impossible."

This is so, he argues, because on a

"• •• modern view ot the matter, necessity in propositions merely reflects our use of words, the arbitrary convention of language."

such a view, ". • • the Divine Existence could only
be a necessary matter if we had made up our minds to speak theisOn

tically whatever

~. 1141

~

empirical circumstances might

~

.2!!! !2,

But this would be no more than a predisposition to view

things in a given way or what R. M. Hare called a "blik. 1142
~

Tb.is

be sufficient for a purely theoretical view of God, "But it

wouldn't suffice for the full-blooded worshiper • • • " who desires the Divine Existence both to have that inescapable character which can, on modern views, "• •• only be found where truth
reflects an arbitrary convention, and also the character of "making a real difference' which is only possible where truth doesn't
have this merely linguistic basis." 4 3 But if God must be con40

~·• PP• 52-53.
1
"- Ibid •• pp. 48, 52,
42

53, 54.

a. M.Hare, "i'b.eology and Falsi.f'ication," New Essys, pp.
99-102. A 'blik' is an unverifiable, pre-cognitive disposition
to view things from a certain chosen perspective.
4 3.rindlay, "Can God's Existence be Disproved?" PP• 54, 55.
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ceived us necessarily existing and if necessary existence is impossible, then God cannot exist, for the only way he can exist is
necessarily.

And on a contemporary view of language no

statement~

which have to do with existence can be necessary.
Now as Malcolm pointed out, this ontological disproof of
God seems to stand or fall on the premise that every existential
proposition must be contingent.

But, replied Malcolm, "••• the

view that logical necessity merely reflects the use of words cannot possibly have the implication that every existential proposition must be contingent ...

All that view requires of us is

"• •• to !.2.2k ,!1 the use of words and not manufacture a priori
theses about them." 44 Tb.at is, we must not legislate the meaning of language but listen to it; we must not dictate what all

propositions
As

~

mean but try to discover what they

~

Wittgenstein said, "This language game!! playedtu 4 5

mean.
In fact,

it seems possible to offer an example of necessary existential
propositions.

"I am I" is both necessarily and existentially

true, argued Ramsey. 4 6
But even if no necessary existential propositions could be
produced from the level of contingent beings it does not follow
that this also applies to a Necessary Being.

Indeed, it is pre-

cisely the point ot the Ontological argument that a Necessary
44Malcolm, "Anselm's Ontological Argument," PP• 61, 62.
4 5wittgenstein, Philosophical Investi5ations, sect. 654.

46Ramsey, Religious Langqage, p. 46.

1?3
Being iR a special case or even the unique case where existence
mu.qt be attributed to it necessarily, otherwise it would not be
a Necessary Being.
Or to put it another way, is one able to deny absolutely the

pqssibility of Necessary Existence without making an existentially necessary assertion?
"It is impossible that

For it would seem that the proposition
~

Necessary Being exists" is meant to be

more than an arbitrary use of. symbols; it is meant reallz (not
just arbitrarily or symbolical1.y) to deny the existence of God.

If it is meant as an actual demonstrative denial of God's existence, then it would have to be both necessary and existential

itself.

But if it is an existentially necessary proposition it-

self, then can it be used to prove that there are no existentially necessary propositions?

And if it is not meant to be either

an existential or a necessary proposition, then it either doesn't

actually deny the possibility of God's existence or it doesn't
really prove its position demonstratively.

In brief, the onto-

logical disproof is subject to the same criticisms to which the
ontological proof is subject.

If one can't move from thought to

existence to demonstrate God, then neither can one do it to deny
God.

Sartre's Existential Disproofs .2!. Q2g.--There are two basic
grounds on which Sartre rejects the reality of God: 4 ? One, that
religious phenomena can be explained non-supernaturally the way
4 ?see Hazel E. Barnes in "Translator's Introduction" to
Sartre's Being !B!! Nothingness, p. x:xxv.

1?4
Freud does, and, two, that there are absurdities involved in believing in God. 48 We are concerned here with the latter because
only these

wo~ld

amount to a disproof of God if valid.

Sartre's

latter arguments against God focus on three areas: 1) the idea

ot God as self-caused is contradictory; 2) The idea of God as
creator is incompatible with human freedom; 3) God can't transcend the totality of things. 4 9

(1) Let us begin with the idea of God as contradictory.
is the concept of God as causa

Why

.fil!!. (self-caused) absurd? Because

tor God to cause himself he would have to stand at a distance
from himself.

But if God can do this, then his existence is con-

tingent or dependent.
cannot be God.

But if he is contingent or dependent, he

Therefore, there is no God.

Or to put the argu-

ment in classical terminology, God can't be self-caused, for to
cause being one must be, and to be caused one must not be.
Therefore, a self-caused being would both be and not be at the
same time and in the same sense which is contradictory.

- In reply-to this

So God

as ens causa sui is impossible.50
alleged disproof of God it should be poin-

-

-

ted out that God as a self-caused Being is contradictory, but God

-

as an un-caused Being is not.
~

Sartre doesn't consider.

That is, there is another

or

Dossibil~

course a Necessary Being can not

48 Ibid.

50sartre, Being !!!.9. Nothingness,

4 9Ibid.

pp. 694, ?54, ?62, ?66.
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be caused or else it would not be absolutely necessary.

And a

Iiecessal."'y Being can not be self-ca.used for thi;:; is a cor..tradietion.

But Sartre does not consider the possibility that a Neces-

sary Being may be ,Y!lCaused.

Indeed had he borrowed a premise

from one of his own objections to the Cosmological argument he
could have seen that the notion of an uncaused being is not contradictory.

For Sartre argued that finite being does not need an

explanation; it is "given" or "gratuitous."

finite being is just

"there" and, hence, it does not need God to explain why it is
there.

He wrote, "Being is without reason, without cause, and

And he admitted that "This is equivalent to
saying that being is uncreated ... 51

without necei:;sity."

Now if bAing can just be there without any explanation, then
this amounts to saying that it is uncaused.

And if it is not im-

possible for finite being to be uncaused, then surely there is no
reason why an infinite Being can not be uncaused.

At least

Sartre has not given here any demonstrable proof that God can not
be conceived without contradiction to be an uncaused being.

At

best, Sartre• s argument would. eliminate the pos3ibility of God
being a self-caused being.52

-

5l!bid., p. 758· Barnes, "'l'ranslator•s Introduction," Beipg
~ Notliiiiin.ess, p. ixxv11.
52 0ne of the problems here is semantical. Philosophers like
Spinoza and Descartes have spoken or God as self-caused but have
really meant uncaused. That is, they do not take self-caused in
the sense of causing one's own existence but in the sense of being completely self-sufficient and not dependent on another.
What Sartre does with this way of conceiving God shows how nnfortunate it is for theists to describe God as a self-caused Being.

1?6
(2) Another disproof c£ God offered by Sartre is that human
freedom is incompatible with God.

summarizing Sartre's argument,

either a man is free and does not derive his meaning from God,
or he is dependent on God and not tree.53

That is, either man

creates his own meaning or else God creates man•s meaning.
man is either self-determined or determined by God.

A

Both are im-

possible.
In direct opposition to Freud who contended that man is subconsciously determined Sartre argued that man is consciously determined. 54

Man is always free to say "no. ,.55

choose is, in tact, to choose not to choose."56

And even "Not to
Freedom for

Sartre did not mean what it meant for Leibniz, viz., that God
made man's essence and left the man to act freely within this
structure.

According to Sartre, if God had given an essence to

man this would predetermine all his future acts.5?

.Even if God

has determined the end of a man's life man is not free, accordins
to Sartre.

For if God has determined the time a man's life will

end, then the man can not be responsible for making his life what
it will have been.58
53:earnes, "Translator's Introduction," Being~ Nothinsmess

p. xxxv.

54Tb.is is the main thrust of Sartre's Existential Psychoanalysis, trans. Hazel E. Barnes (Chicago: Henry Regnery Oo., 1953),
e?. pp. 46-59.
55cf. Sartre, Beins ~ Nothingness, p. 529 t.
56sartre, Being ~ Nothinggess, p. 589.

-

57Ibid., pp. 5?3 t.
58Ibid., p. 659.
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In brief, man is fundamentally and radically free.
ates his own meaning.

He cre-

He is responsilJle for his own life,

is condemned to freedom; he cannot escape it.

.Man

And since ma.n is

fundamentally responsible for his own meaning and life, then
there cannot be a God who gives meaning to man's life.

Either

God gives meaning to man's life or man gives meaning to his own
life.

Me.n gives meaning to his own life.

Therefore, there is

no God.
Whatever else Sartre's argument does, it obviously does not
disprove God.

If human freedom were absolute in a positive sense,

this would disprove God.

But if a man's freedom were absolute in

a positive sense it would also disprove that there were any other
~en.

For it is not possible for any more than one being to have

freedom in a positive and absolute sense.
negation is possible for many beings.

However, freedom as

That is, one can have the

ability to say "no" even though one is forced to
he wishes to do.

~

the opposite

A good example of this is Sartre's contention

that the French were never so free as when the Germans occupied
!'ranee.

Obviously he doesn't mean that this was the positive de-

sire or choice of the French, but that the French were free not
to "accept 0 the Germans whose forceable occupation was nevertheless "there."

In fact, for Sartre "'To be free• does not mean

'to obtain what one has wished' but rather 'by oneself to deter•
mine oneself to wish.'"59

If this is so, then however morally or

59Hazel E. Barnes, "Key to Special Terminology," Sartre's
Nothingn.ess, p. 3?0.

Bein~ ~

178
existontially distasteful it may be to think that God has in some
way limited one's freedom or independence, it certainly is not
logically contradictory.
Furthermore, Sartre by no means Rroves that man ia as free
au he thinks.

It is philosophically possible that man is not

free at all in the sense of doing other than what is predetermined.

For it is not philosophically contradictory to hold that

events are both determined and freely chosen, i.e., that the free
choice was part of the predetermination.

It may be existentially

disconcerting for one to discover that his creative powers are
not

a~solutely

original, that he is willing only as God wills,

but it is certainly not logically impossible.

That is, it is

possible that there is a God who in some way is the ultimate
source and circumscription of our freedom, whether this is the
way we desire it to be or not.

No amount of existential or ex-

periential reaction to divine intrusion into one's life can rule
out the logical possibility that there just may be a God anyway.
It is just as much an illusion to conclude that there is no God

ecause one doesn't want an invasion of his independence and
creativity as to conclude that there is a God because one wishes
to have a cosmic comforter.
(3) Sartre's third disproof of God is really more serious.

He contends that it is impossible !or God to transcend the totality of consciousness.

..For if God is consciousness, he is inte-

grated in the totality .. and does not really transcend it.

..And

1?9
if by his nature, he is a being beyond

~nsciO'!!!!,._f!...SJ!

(that is, an

"in-itself" which would be its own foundation) still the totality
can appear to him only as object or as subject," neither of which
is possible.

That is, if God has no consciousness, then he can

not be conscious of any totality either as a subject or as an object.

"Thus no point or view on the totality is conceivable;

the totality has no 'outside,' and the very question of the meaning of the 'underside' is stripped of meaninp;." 60
Since we have already spoken to the issue of how it is meaningful to speak about a beyond or transcendent, 61 we will speak
only directly to Sartre's problem here.

Of course it is meaning-

less to speak of God as being beyond the whole in any strictly
literal sense of the word.

But it is not meaningless to speak or

God as more th.an the whole the way unity is more than the parts
of a thing or the way depth of experience is beyond the factors
~hich

comprise it.

In like manner it is possible that God may be

beyond or more than our limited consciousness in the sense that
he!! consciousness while we only .h!!! consciousness. 62
60 aartre, Being ~ Nothingness, P• 370.
61 see the last p~rt of Chapter One.
62Koestenbaum distinguishes the "empirical ego" (the one per~eived) trom the "transcendental ego" (the one perceiving).
And
he argue£ that the "transcendental ego" should be identified 'VV'ith
God because l) It is experienced as the source of all consciousiness; 2) As always the came; 3) As unthinkable 138 to its non-existence; 4) As existing of its own necessity; 5) As external to
the time-space world; 6) As the Unity in the nexus of intersubjectivity; ?) As the subjective center of all consciousness; 8)
As contentless consciousness or the pure subject; and 9) As complete freedom. Now in view of this, said Koestenbaum, even
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In other words, i·t is l?ossible for God to be consciousness
and yet be beyond

OlL"'."

consciousness

1'11 thout

contradiction.

For

the very theoretical or ideal existence of a transcendental ego
reveals that it is not im;eossible to speak of a transcondcnt consciousness.

In brief, Sartre's disproof of God does not .follow,

for it is possible that there is an ultimate subject or center of
consciousness which goes beyond our limited conscious:mess.

It is

tpossible that there a.re different levels of consciousness.

That

is, there is no reason why man can not he conscious of something

w:i:Ii.le at the

sru~e

time be conscious that this something trans-

cends his consciousness of it.

This seems to be the case of

one's consciousness of his own self.
seem.a to be aware

~hat

That is, an individual

there is more to himself than he is con-

scious of in any given state of

consciou~ness.

Likewise, when

one is conscious of another person he seems to be aware that his
!Consciousness of that person does not exhaust the porsonality of
!that person.
~onscious

So, there seems to be no reason why one can not bA

of' a being like God which transcends his consciousness.
'l'he Status

of Disproofs ot God

To summarize, we have found no valid disproofs of the reality of' God or the transcendent.

All admit of some possible al-

ternative; none show that it is logically inpossible that there
is a transcendent reality.

Indeed, it would appear to be an

though Kant and Husserl did not identify the transcendental ego
with God, its characteristics lend themselves naturally to this
identification. See Peter Koestenbaum, "Religion in the Tradition of Phenomenology," pp. 1R5, 186.
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impossible task to absolutely disprove the reality of God.

One

would have to possess absolute knowledge in order to be absolutely certain there was no possibility of a God.

In brief, he would

nave to be God in order to disprove God.
But it must be remembered that for many modern thinkers neither is it possible to prove the reality of the transcendent.
Does this mean that we have reached a stalemate of proof and disproof?

Is this the best that one can conclude, viz., that the

reality of the transcendent is possible but not provable or disprovable?

Are there no ways to test the reality basis tor reli-

sious experience?

This situation calls for a reassessment of the

role of argumentation in religion.
I!!,!

!!21! .2! Reason !!! Determining
the .......................................
!ranscendent
--ot --.......

~

Realitl

From the position that proofs are not possible it by no·
•eans follows that reason has no role nor that adequate criteria
are not available nor necessary.
error and illusion.

Religion, too, is subject to

As even ardent defenders of the reality of

the transcendent will sometimes admit, "It is hard to rid our
)uinds completely of the haunting suspicion that the entire religious structure may be nothing more than a grand and beautiful
castle in the air." 6 3 As Novak observed, "The believer often
fails to recognize that he needs a criterion for distinguishing
6 3Trueblood, Philosop;9l .2.! Religion, p. l?.
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in himself true belief as opposed to false; he needs a way of
guarding against illusion. 1164
Despite this fact, there are some who contend that the
transcendent needs no verification but is self-authenticating.
Robinson, e.g., argues that "God is, by definition, ultimate real·
ity.

And one cannot argue whether ultimate reality exists.

can only ask what ultimate reality is like. • • • u65

One

Here he is

following Tillich who contended that the question ian•t whether
God exists but rather which of the many
expresses him.

symbols most adequately

"This is the problem, and not the so-called •exis"

tence of God'--which is in itself an impossible combination or
words.

God as the ultimate in man's ultimate concern is more

certain than any other certainty, even that of oneself."

Indeed,

the very .fact that one forms the question "Does God exist?" reveals that the symbol nGod" has lost its meaning for him. said
Tillich.

In other words, "It is meaningless to question the ul-

timacy of an ultimate concern ...
.for Tillich.

Atheism is actually impossible

For "• •• he who denies God as a matter of ulti-

mate concern affirms God, because he affirms ultimacy in his concern. "66

This does not mean that man is conscious of his ultimate concern (i.e., of "God"), but he has one nonetheless. 6 7
64Nova.k, Belie! and Unbelief, p. 21.

-

65Robinson, Honest ,!2 ~' P• 29.
66Tillich, I?.ynamics or Faith, pp. 46, 4?, 63, 88.
6 7Tillich, Ultimate Concern, p. 50.

-
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Tillich is not alone in his contention that God's existence
cannot really be questioned.

S'ren Kierkegaard said: "Thus I al-

ways reason from existence, not toward existence • • • • "6B In
a similar way, Bultmann argues that the revelation of God is self·
vindicating and to ask for a criterion for questioning the direct
revelation of God is ''• •• to presuppose that we can ascertain
the truth of the revelation be.fore recognizing it as revelation. 0
God doesn't have to justify himself to man.

ENery demand for

criteria must be dropped as soon as the face of God appears, he
arguea. 6 9
Now there is something deceptively oversimplified about this
position that must be clarified before we can fully appreciate
the need for criteria to determine the reality basis for the
transcendent.

Jaspers spoke to the heart or the issue when he

wrote, .. It is not God who must justify himself, but every manifestation in the world that pretends to be the word of God, the
act of God, the revelation of God...

In other words, "It is not

God who is to be tested, but whether what a man says is true ••
n?O Or to restate it, if we know that it was a transcendent
• •
reality that one is aware of in religions experience, then there
~ould

be no need to verify it.

But that is precisely the problem,

b

68Kierkegaard, Philosophical Fragments. p. 32.

6 9Bultmann in ~ ~ Christianitl by Jaspers and Bult-

mann, p. 68.

?OJaspers, M;rth ~ Christianitz, pp. 80, 81.
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viz., we do not know that it is a transcendent reality.
reality of the transcendGnt is what is undar question.

The
That is,

since our experience itself is not God or the transcendent, it
is necessary to have some means of determining whether or not our
experience has a reality behind it.
Certainly, we cannot identity the experience itself with the
ultimate tor thenit becomes redundant to ask if there is any real•
ity behind it.

For we have already contended that by the trans-

eendent object of religious experience we mean more than a subjective condition of human experience; more than a projection of
human imagination; more than an illusion of human wishes, and
~ore than a subconscious continuation of human experience.71 If
the basis for religious experience is actually no more than a
projection of the experience, it is meaningless to call it

"real~'

And if it is meaningful to ask about the reality basis for religious experience, then it is needful to find some adequate criteria for deciding on the question.
The search for adequate criteria for determining the reality
of anything is not easy but it is necessary, particularly in
gion.

reli~

As Novak said, "If by intelligence we cannot know whether

there is a God: if, that is, a man has no way of defending himself with critical intelligence against illusory beliefs, then
the edifice of revealed religion is--for us, at least--on shaky
grounds."?2 Certainly if a man is ultimately concerned about
?lsee Chapter One for further elaboration of this point.
72 Novak, Belief ..........
and Unbelief, p. 40 •
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what isn't even real, he ought to know about it.

For the reli-

gious person o.f. n.11 rr1'7n :-;hould be concerned with ma.turi ty and

.fidelity to the truth whatever .i.t may be, even if' it is the discovery that ·the object of his ul tima.te concern is not real.

Eli-

ade said that the religious man by nature is one who thirsts for
reality with all his heart.73

If not, at least he ought to be.

For as Froud remarked, anyone with a sense for reality will not
be satisfied to worship a God who is no more than an illusory
proj c':lction of his own wishes. ?LtThe Logical Criteria
Two logical criteria may be suggested for testing the reality of the transcendent, one negative and one positive.

Nega-

tively, whatever is logically contradictory cannot be real.

Pos-

itively, whatever is rationally inescapable :munt be real.
~

Negative Oriterion.--This will be used in determining

the possibility of the reality of the transcendent.

For certain-

ly a logically contradictory position is not to be held as true.
Contrary to

c.

I. Lewis and those who hold that the principle of

non-contradiction might not apply to reality we would argue that
this assertion itsel!. makes no sense unless the law of contradic-

tion does apply to the real world.
~arked,

As Francis H. Parker re-

the justification for holding that the law of non-contra-

diction must apply to the real world is that no one can assert
?3.Eliade, ~ Sacred ~ ~ l'roi'ane, P• 80.
?4Freud, ~ Future £!. !!! Illusion, pp. 49, 50.
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or even believe that it does not apply without implying that it
does.75

Furthermore. no meanin~ful statement can be made which

denies the principle of non-contradiction.
literally undeniable.

The principle is

And to say that the principle is undeni-

able is not to argue in a circle; it is not using the principle
of non-contradiction to defend the principle of non-contradiction.

That is. we are .........
not affirming that it must be true because

we could not even make the statement that it is true unless it
were true, thus enabling us to make the statement that it is true
in a non-contradictory way.

What we are contending is that the

law of non-contradiction must be true since there is no way to
deny it without affirming it in the same breath.

That is. it is

not the fact that the law of non-contradiction is affirmable
which necessitates its truth but the fact that it is undeniable.
The principle of non-contradiction is such that one must assume
its truth to affirm it and one must even assume its truth to deny
it.

In either ease there is no way to even think without assum-

ing that the principle of non-contradiction is true.
one affirms it or denies it. he really affirms it.

So whether
The law of

?5:rrancis Parker, "The Realistic Position in Religion" in
ion in Philosophical and Cultural Perspective. p. 88. He
~c·o·n~e~n..,...s tnat "• •• the opponent of the realist thesis of cognitive independence is. at bottom. in the self-defeating position
of denying his thesis in the same breath with which he affirms it
of implying that the principle of non-contradiction is true indeendently of our knowledge of it just in order consistently to
eny it. But this is, on the one hand, exactly not to maintain
any consistent position at all and also, on the other hand to
grant the independent truth of the principle of non-contradiction
d hen e also of the demonst~ation of the realist thesis of cogt ve nd p ndence which is based upon the independent truth or

18?
non-contradiction is not non-a!firmable, which means it must be
affirmed to be true.

Hence, no position about the reality of the

transcendent can be held to be true if it is contradictory.
~

Positive Criterion £! Reason.--Not only is it impossible

for the contradictory to be real, but it is necessary for the
rationally inescapable to be real.

By rationally inescapable is

meant a non-contradictory position the only possible alternatives
to which are contradictory.

If it were not so that the only al-

ternative to contradiction were true, then it would follow that
nothing could be true.

For if the only logically possible view

there can be can not be true, then nothing can be true tor there
are no other possibilities.

But to say that nothing can be true

is contradictory by the negative criterion of reason, the law of

non-contradiction, since the statement that nothing is true would
have to be a true statement in order for it to make any sense.
But if it is a true statement, then something is true, viz., the
statement that nothing is true.

However, to say that it is true

that nothing is true is to utter a contradiction.
it is

~

Therefore, if

true that nothing is true, then it must follow that

something is true.

And if something must be true, then it must

follow that the only possible thing that can be true really is
true.

It, then, the rationally inescapable (viz., the only logical
possibility) must be real, then tr1is would invalidate the earlier
objection to theistic proofs, viz., that they could be rationally
inesca able without bein

so

For that ve

e-

188
ment about what is ontologically so could not be true unless the
rational

~

apply to the real.

Therefore, if any proof can be

shown to be rationally inescapable then it would settle the question of the reality

or

the transcendent.

The question, then, is

this: are any of the proofs for the existence of God rationally
inescapable?
Applying the Logical Criteria
Since we have already discussed the application of the negative criterion under the alleged disproofs for God and concluded
that noDe of them show that it is logically impossible that the
transcendent is real, then it remains only to ask if any of the
alleged proofs are rationally inescapable.

For granting, as we

have argued, that the rationally inescapable is also real, then
if any of the proofs are without logical defect it will follow
that God is real.
Alternative

!2 !,h!

Teleological 4rgument.--It was admitted

in the formulation of the Teleological proof that the conclusion
is not rationally inescapable.

Tb.at is, there is a

non-contradic~

tory alternative, viz., that the world happened by chance.76

And

even if this alternative is not probable, nevertheless it is possible.

And if it is possible, then it is not irrational to hold

this position.

Furthermore. if it is possible that the world

happened by chance then maybe it

lli happen that way.

that only have "one chance in a million" sometimes

~

For things
happen.

76This alternative is developed by Hume's Philo in his Dialogues. See Donald Burrill, The Cosmological Arguments, pp.-rB°5-

1qa.

-

-
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Th.at is, just because the possibility of getting three sixes in
one throw is only l in 216, it doesn't follow that it will take
216 throws to get it.

It may come on the first throw.

At any

rate, whether the world did or did not happen by chance, it is
not logically contradictory to hold that it happened by chance.
Hence, the Teleological argument is not rationally inescapable.
Alternatives

12 !!!!

Moral Argument.--Neither is the Moral

argument rationally inescapable.

For it is always possible that

what appears to be independent of man, what appears to come from
beyond him is no more than a vague undefined ideal existing only
in individual human minds and nowhere outside of them.

Or it is

possible that what men think is a moral law independent of themselves is no more than their own sub-conscious, i.e., it exists
only beyond their own consciousness but not beyond their subconsciousness.??

Then, too, the moral law could be nothing more

than the collective sub-consciousness of men, which would_explain
both its apparent beyondness and also why no one individual completely understands it, viz., because it doesn't exist in any one
man in a complete form.
J'urthermore, it is not irrational to hold that there could
be an objective moral law, independent of mankind without holding
that there is a Moral Law-Giver.

For it is not contradictory to

hold that the moral law is a structure which exists on its own
or as the binding force of interrelationships among
??This is the position of Carl Jung.
Religion, Chapter Two.

See Psychology ~
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men.78
~ore

Nor is it contradictory to hold that th~ moral law is no

than an accidental order resulting from chance arrangement

in the universe.

That is, it is

~

impossible that mind, idea,

and law could be the result of matter, however unlikely this may
be.
Alternatives

~

!!'!! Cosmolottica1: !_rggment.--Rational ;:,.lter-

natives to the Cosmological argument

ar~

not as easy to come by,

at least not in the form ot the Cosmological argument stated
above.

One could deny that the world exists but it is di.f:f'icu.l t

to see how he could consistently 11eny that he axists, .for he woul
have to exist in order to deny that he exists.

And if he cann.ot

deny that he exists, then the argument could start from his contingent existence and move on from there with the

RA.me

logic.

Of course one could deny that it is rationally n.eeessa.ry for

contingent things to ba caused.

Tha.t

i~

to say, he could deny

that it is not rationally necessary to conclude that there muRt

be a reason or explanation as to why a being exists when it
lnot exist.

This denial would amount to an attack on the princi-

ple of sufficient reason.
~oes

n~ed

It would be saying that everything

not have to have a sufficient reason, that some things just

~and

don't need a reason, explanation, or cause.

In other

!Words, the world is uncaused; its being is gratuitous or just
!there without any explanation.?9

That is, one could deny that

? 8 1'h.is criticis~ is mentioned by M. Rader in &ldurinf Questions (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1966), P• 34 •
?9This position is suggested by Sartre's analysis. See n.
68 above.
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everything needs a sufficient reason either inside or outside itself by simply holding that only some things have sufficient reasons, and the world is not one of them.

This would avoid the

trap of having to say that nothing has a sufficient reason while
one has a sufficient reason for saying that, thus contradicting
one's self.

What this position could say is that there is a suf-

ficient reason (whatever it may be, evil, absurdity, etc.) for
holding that the world does not need to have a sufficient reason.
And even if one didn't have a sufficient reason for saying that
the world does not need to have a sufficient reason, still this
position would be rationally possible (even though it would not
be rationally compelling since it has no reason for its conclusion), for it has not been shown why the world

~

have a cause.

That is, it has not been shown why the world can't simply be
there.
The other alleged alternatives to the cosmological argument
don't seem to be rationally possible alternatives once one grants
the need for a sufficient reason or cause.

An infinite regress,

e.g., is not rationally possible, tor if an explanation is necessary then putting it off forever is not sufficient.

That is, by

adding up an infinite number of non-explanations one does not get
an explanation.

If each individual cause is inadequate to ex-

plain the effect and an explanation is necessary, then an infinite number of inadequate causes will not add up to an adequate
explanation; all an infinite series provides is one infinitely
inadeauate explanation.

That is. an infinite

re~ress

doesn't
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really give an explanation; it is an attempt to explain away the
need for any explanation. 80
Nor does the Cosmological argument necessarily commit a
"Four-term" fallacy, for the conclusion or an "Infinitett cause
is not necessarily a different term from the "finite" cause of
the premise.

-

For all that need be meant by "Infinite" is in-

-

finite or not finite.

Or to put it another way, the word "cause"

can have the same meaning in the premise and in the conclusion,
but it must be remembered that the conclusion is that there is a
a.2!-eaused (i.e., l!!!,-Caused) kind of ttcause" which accounts for
the existence of the world.

Tb.at is, the word "cause" itself

has the same meaning in the premise and in the conclusion; only
in the conclusion the "cause" is said to be a not-caused kind of
"cause" which makes it a very special kind of ttcause."
Alternatives !2,

~

Ontological Argµment.--Since Kant it has

been widely held that the Ontological argument (which involves
existence as a predicate) is not valid.

But since Malcolm's re-

statement of the argument argued that existence is not a predicate but that necessary existence is a necessary predicate for a
81
Necessary Being. this form.er objection does not necessarily hold.
800n the impossibility of an infinite regress of dependent
causes see John Duns Scotus, Philosophical Writings, pp. 44-46.
81 Norman Malcolm in "Anselm's Ontological Argument," wrote,
"Previously I rejected existence as a perfection. • • • but [now
hold, that the logical Iliiposs!bllity of non-existence is a pertection. Inotfier words, neeessar:y enstence is a per?iction,"

~·

ill·.

p. 142.

-
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Does this mean, then, that the argument is rationally inescapable?

Not even Malcolm claims that.

He holds merely that "The

only intelligible way of rejecting Anselm's claim that God's
existence is necessary is to maintain that the concept of God,
as a being a greater than which cannot be conceived, is selfcontradictory or nonsensical."

He con.fesses, however, "I do not

know how to demonstrate that the concept of God--that is of a
being greater than which cannot be conceived--is not self-contradictory. "82

He felt, of course, that no one has yet shown that

it was contradictory and that it was not likely that anyone would,

but he did admit that it was possible that someone could.

And if

it is possible that the concept of God as a being possessing all

possible perfections is contradictory, then Malcolm's form of the
Ontological argument is not rationally inescapable.
Furthermore, other thinkers have attempted to show that
there are other rational alternatives to Malcolm's argument.
Alvin Platinga, e.g., argued that Malcolm's restatement of the
Ontological argument is not rationally inescapable since (1) Malcolm has a hidden conditional, viz.,!! God exists then he must
exist always and necessarily and since (2) Malcolm overlooks the
alternatives that (a) it might have just happened that God has
always existed and always will exist or (b) that God never has
existed and never will-exist. 8 3 And if any one of these is
82

M.alcolm, .2R.•

ill•,

P• 15? •

8 3Alvin Plantinga, ~ Ontological Argument, PP• 165-166.
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shown to be a possible alternative to Malcolm's argument, then
argument is not logically inescapable.

th~

And since neither Mal-

colm nor his opponents hold the argument to be 'air-tight,• admitting of no possible alternatives, then it is not rationally

inescapable.
The :Function ot Reason
It the reality ot God or the Transcendent is neither rationally impossible nor rationally inescapable, then it can neither
be proven nor disproven in the strongest sense of the term
••proof."

However, it does not follow trom this that reason has

no role in determining the question of the reality of the transcendent object of religious experience.

On the contrary, reason

plays an essential role in the resolution of this problem, for
without the critical function of reason one would have no way to
examine and evaluate his experience.

And in this case one would

never be able to get beyond the bare possibility of there being

a transcendent reality.

He would never be able to speak even

the probability or improbability ot its reality.
possibility

or

or

And the sheer

there being a transcendent reality is scarcely

enough to warrant a total commitment to its reality, at least
not tor a critical thinker.
In order to avoid this rational impasse and thereby warrant
a religious commitment to the reality of the transcendent it is
necessary to spell out more precisely the role of reason in determining this question.
{l) In view

or

'?he following guidelines are suggested:

the inability of reason to decide the issue

in

a
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rationally inescapable way it should be recognized that there are
certain options available to the rational man and that there is a
significant role for "decision" in determining "lihis question;

(2) However, so that the conclusion as to the reality or unreal-

ity of the transcendent is not left to purely "subjective" choice
there must be adequate criteria established by which one can determine the probability or improbability of the reality of the
(3) But in order that the criteria are more than

transcendent.

purely abstract and arbitrary norms there must be a relationship
established between the criteria and religious experience which
they are testing.

It will be necessary to explain this in more

detail.

-

- -

The Need for Decision.--Actually the inability to prove ab-

solutely whether or not there is a real object of religious experience turns out to be a definite advantage, for it leaves room
for the involvement of the whole person (including his will) in
determining this basic question.

Th.at is, if as Aquinas argued

that once something is proven demonstrably there is no longer any
need to believe in it, then this basic dimension of religion
would be simply a matter of the mind with no room for faith or
decision. 84

For once something is proven the mind cannot escape

assent to it; there is no need for the will to venture out in
faith to believe it. 8 5

84Aquinas, Summa Theologica, II-II, 1, 5, body.

8 5Aquinas, On Truth, XIV, 9, reply.
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But the problem with proofs in this sense, were they possible, is that they sacrifice personal commitment for rational eertainty--they leave no room for the person to make a decision of
his own.

In this sense they destroy responsibility.

As Tillich

correctly noted, "This element of uncertainty in faith cannot be
removed, it must be accepted. And the element in faith which accepts this is courage." 86 But this doubt is not the academic
doubt of the sceptic but the doubt of one who is ultimately concerned.

For where there is no doubt of this kind there is no indication that one's attitude is a religious one. 8 ? J1or ". • •
serious doubt is confirmation of faith. It indicates the seriousness of the concern, its unconditional character."88
Furthermore, as Jaspers observed, "It is only when there is
no such objective guarantee that faith acquires meaning and
strength, for only then is it authentic decision."8 9 Kant seemed
to be getting at this same point when he wrote, "I have therefore
found it necessary to deny knowledge [of God] in order to make
room for faith."90

In brief, a strict rational proof' would elim-

inate the personal, responsible, and volitional involvement of
the total man in his total commitment, which is incongruous with
86Tillich, Pynamics .2! Faith, p. 16.
8 ?Ibid., p. 20.

-

88 Ibid., p. 22.
8 9Xarl Jaspers and Rudolf Bultmann, l1yth ~ Christianity,

-

p.

69

90Kant, The Critiaue o:t Pure Reason, p. 29.
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the very nature of the religious commitment.

Rationally inescap-

able arguments, if there are such, would be a hindrance to religious experience; there must always be room for decision if
there is to be a personal or responsible commitment made about
the transcendent.

John E. Smith summarized this point very well

when he wrote, .. When the reality of God is made into a necessary
logical outcome, to be acknowledged merely as something required
by thought, there seems to be room neither for love nor for that
voluntary movement toward God which is essential to religious
faith."9l
~ ~

!:£!: _c_r_1_t_e_r_1_a.--It goes without saying that a deci-

sion will not be meaningful or reasonable unless there are adequate criteria by which it can be judged.

For religious exper-

ience no less than other kinds of experience is subject to misinterpretation and illusion.

At least for the philosopher of reli-

gion, the unexamined religious experience is not worth having.
Here it is not a matter of a strict proof or disproof of the object of religious experience but of establishing its reasonableness or unreasonableness.

For unless there is some significant

role for reason we are left in the clutches of subjectivism.
Even the appeal to some kind of special religious revelation will
not avoid the problem for it too is part of religious experience
and is therefore subject to interpretation and verification like
other experiences.9 2
9 1 John E. Smith, Ex2erience ~ ~' p. 110.
92see Chapter Five for further elaboration of this point.
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So, then, neither strict proof nor uncritical experience ic
a sufficient basis for a religious commitment to the reality of
For as John E. Smith said, "If the assertion

the transcendent.

of God•s reality cannot survive critical questioning then we must
fall into unintelligibility and succumb to doubt • • • • n93
is, the appeal to experience is not naive.

That

The reflective person

must have a set of principles for analyzing experience.

And in

view of this it will be our task (in the next chapter) to elaborate a set of criteria which one can apply to religious experience
in

or~er

to determine whether or not the transcendent object

thereof is real.

1h!

~ ~ ~

Basis

!.!! :§xPerience.--In order to

ensure,

however, that the criteria are more than abstract unrelated
ideas arbitrarily imposed on experience there must be a clear
relationship established between these criteria and the experience which they purport to test.

Otherwise one can easily back

out of the snare of subjectivism where there are no tests for experience into

~he

trap

or

a rationalism where there is no basis

in experience for the ideas which are to evaluate it.

In other

words, it must be remembered that rational analysis is a secondary operation based on the primary data of experience.

That is,

even though reason is essential, experience is basic to it.

Ex-

perience is tl:e 'stuff' out of which reason builds the structure.
Experience gives content and meaning to ideas.
93John E. Smith, £?cperience ~ ~. p. 111.
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Especially is it appropriate, if not necessary, in asking
the question about the realitl of the transcendent that there be
strong ties established with experience.

For if humans are to

have any contact with the real it will have to be through human
experience.
Summary

~

Conclusion

The classical attempts to prove the existence of God, which
apply also to the broader designation of the transcendent reality, have not received an enthusiastic response among most modern
thinkers.

Most thinkers have found them to be either psycholo-

gically unconvincing, logically invalid, epistemologically defective, axiologically misplaced, or ontologically inadequate.
The most radical response to the attempts to prove the reality of the transcendent have been the counter attempts to disprove it.

However, upon analysis of Feuerbach's epistemological

disproof, Findlay's ontological disproof and Sartre's existential
disproofs it was discovered

tha~

were not rationally inescapable.

like the

proof~

these disproofs

There is always the possibility

that there is a transcendent reality.
Concluding, then, that the reality of the transcendent was
neither rationally impossible nor logically inescapable, we are
left with the task of finding some meaningful criteria for testing the reality basis for religious experience.

It was further

suggested that these criteria must be both closely related to
experience and also leave room for decision or the responsible
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involvement of the whole person.

Otherwise, the process would

not be a truly religious involvement.
Finally, it should be pointed out that in view of the conclusions of this chapter and the proposed criteria for evaluating
reli.gious experience, the force of the reaction to "proofs" may
be obviated.

For it is granted that the proofs are not logically

inescapable.

Further, it we can establish adequate criteria for

determining the reality question this will answer the problem
about the epistemological defects and the

ontol~gieal

inadequacy.

Finally, if the criteria are based in one's personal experience,
there should be no problem as to these criteria being either psychologically convincing or axiologically relevant.

If t on the

other hand, adequate criteria cannot be developed, then some ot
the force of the reaction to proofs could also be leveled against
the criteria as well.

CHAPTER V
FORMULATING TESTS FOR DETERMINING THE
REALITY OF THE TRANSCENDENT
The plan of this chapter is

~

to establish the probability

or improbability of the reality of the transcendent object of
religious experience.

Rather, the purpose is to lay down tests

by which one may determine for himself whether or not there is a
reality beyond religious experience.

Besides being a more modest

task than most theistic endeavors, this procedure has several
advantages.

First, it is more in accord with the spirit of our

endeavor to base a philosophy of religion in experience.

Second,

it encourages each man to exercise his own responsible judgment
in deciding on this question about ultimate reality.

Pinally,

it avoids coming to any categorical approval or disapproval of
given or special religious experiences and brings the criteria
to bear on religious experience in general so that one may see
which (if any) of the various kinds of religious experience are
reality based and which are not.

That is, if each kind of reli-

gious experience is tested on its own merits, then one is not
forced to the hasty conclusion that either all religious experience is based in reality or that it is all an illusion.
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Summarizing ~ Nature

.2f

Religious Experience1

Before suggesting some tests f orreligious experience perhaps
it would be well to review precisely what we mean by religious
experience.

In this way one will be in a better position to know

exactly what it is to which the tests are being applied.
First, it should be pointed out that religious experience is
taken here in the broad sense of an awareness of the transcendent
and not in the narrow sense of specific religious experiences

like mystical experiences.

Not that special religious experiences

are illegitimately religious, for there is a sBnse in which they
may be even more religious than the other kind. , Namely, they may
be a heightening or more highly concentrated awareness of what is
sensed in the religious experience in general.

Among other th:ings

the value of limiting our analysis to religious experience in the
broad sense is that the tests will be available to a much broader
group of persons who have not had these special religious experiences.
The Awareness of the Transcendent
One of the fundamental factors in a religious experience is
an awareness of something which goes beyond the limits of the
consciousness of individuals, that is, a transcendent.

Ye have

seen that there is always a more or beyond which the individual
religious man senses to be other than himself.

That is, he al-

ways !eels that there is something beyond himself which is more
1 This is a summary of Chapter Three.
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ltimate than himself.

He is convinced that there is an all or

hole of which he is only a 'part' and on which he is dependent.
Now this transcendent takes on various dimensions and desriptiona in different reli.gious experiences.

In some religious

experiences it is viewed as the transcendent origin which can be
eached only retrospectively by going back via myths of origin
Others view it as the transcendent top or point of
unity which can be approached only by going upward in a
ertical transcendence (ct. Plotinus).

Still others consider the

ranscendent to be the ultimate end of a forward or eschatologial transcendence (ct. Altizer).

And finally, there is the reli-

ious experience which moves inward in a kind of introspective
ranseendenee toward the ultimate depth (et. Robinson).

But

hatever the direction taken by religious experience or whatever
he description given to the transcendent, religious experience
lways involves an object which transcends the individual.

A Total Commitment to the Transcendent
Not only does religious experience always involve a conciousness of a transcendent object but it also involves a total
ommitment to that object as ultimate.

Simply to be aware of the

ranscendent is not sufficient; commitment is necessary.

For as

he ultimate it demands an ultimate commitment; a partial commit-

ent will not suffice.

To

qualify as a religious commitment it

ust be a total commitment.

Mere concern is not enough; reli-

ious concern is an ultimate concern.

Of course if one is com
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ltimate it is because he sees worth in it--ultimate worth.

And

it is in this sense that a religious experience is one of worship, because of what the religious person feels to be the worthship of the object.

That is, he worships it because he finds it

ompletely worthy of his complete adoration.
Implied also in a total commitment is a sense of absolute
ependence on the object of religious experience.

For one would

ot need to be totally committed to it if he felt that he could
ive independently of it.

It is the very essence of religious

experience that one feels a sense of utter dependence on what he
onsiders to be the ultimate.

The religious person feels that

e cannot transcend without depending on the transcendent to enale him to transcend.
S~gestinf Criteria for Testin~
y
'.lTaiiscenden

t e Reali

of the

Now that the basic structure of religious experience has
een summarized we are in a better position to suggest criteria
or testing its reality basis.

But first we should review what

e mean by the term "reality.n
Meaning of Reality
First, by "reality" is meant more than a subjective condiion of human experience, for in this sense of the word the trancendent would be real as long as someone felt he were experiencng it.
f

Then too, we mean more by reality than a mere projection

human imagination, for in this sense of the word one would

ave to unfairly conclude that even atheists like Feuerbach hold
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to the reality of the transcendent.

Nor do we take reality to

mean the object of human wish-fulfillment, tor on that ground
even the Freudian religious illusion would be a reality.

Further~

more, reality means more than human subconsciousness whether individual or collective, for in that sense the transcendent would
be no more than the part of human consciousness ot which individuals are no longer conscious.

That is, God would be no more

than what man does not recall about himself.
On the positive side we suggested that by reality is meant
what has an independent existence of its own beyond that existence it has in the consciousness or subconsciousness of men.
That is, the transcendent must exist outside of subjective human
experience before we considered it real.
~hat

Also, by real is meant

has an objective existence outside the subjective existence

in human experience.

That is, the real is something which exists

outside of other subjects and is not merely an objectification
(i.e., an idea) of a subject or mind.
Some Tests for the Reality of the Transcendent
Now that a review has been made of what is meant by religious experience and what is meant by reality we are in a position to suggest ways of determining whether or not there is a
basis in reality for the transcendent object of religious experience.

We offer only "tests" since it was concluded in the pre-

vious chapter that there are no "proofs 11 or "disproofs" available
at least none which are logically inescapable.

Therefore, we are

2see Chanter lour for a fuller discussion of this noint.

206

n search only of principles which can yield reasonable or probaconcl usions which are sufficient to determine whether or not
is justified in concluding that the transcendent is real.
of course, that it is always EOssible for one to be
ong about the reality of the transcendent.

But this is part

risk involved in a religious decision.

In fact, this is

the reasons that a religious commitment necessitates the
esponsible and critical involvement of not only one's mind but
lso his will and the whole person.

Three tests for the reality

f the transcendent may be offered.

The first test is that of

eed, ultimate need; the second is the ultimacy of the object;
the third is fulfillment.
Ultimate

~ .!!_ ~

l!.!! !2£ Reality .2!

~

Transcendent.--

was argued forcefully by Freud that the human .............
wish for a Coswas not a sufficient ground for concluding that
here really is such a being.

With this we completely agree.

no matter how sincerely or even earnestly one wishes for a
of gold at the end of his religious rainbow his wish can in
be taken as a guarantee of the reality of its object.
Indeed, Freud was certainly right in being suspect of the reality
f

things whieh are merely objects of human wishes.

More speci-

ically we may agree with him when he wrote, nwe say to ourselves
"t

would indeed be very nice if there were a God who was both

and benevolent providence • • • , but at the same time it
is very odd that this is all just as we should wish it our-

20?
selves."3

That is, we agree with Freud that one has the right to

oubt the reality basis for religious beliefs whose sole support
is that humans hope that they a.re true.

Such is surely wishful

thinking or what Freud called an "illusion ...

That is, it could

ossibly be true that there is a Heavenly Helper just as men wish
here to be, but this belief remains suspect because its basis
is so wishful.
However, while subjective human wishes are no firm basis
for determining the reality of something, nevertheless an objeoive human

~

may be a good reality criteria.

It may be a.r-

ed, for example, that nature manifests a general teleology or
which it is unreasonable to assume that nature
ould produce a need tor which it does not intend a fulfillment.
nature has produced thirsty creatures, then it is reasonable
that nature has also provided water somewhere to fill
his thirst.

It nature has produced hungry creatures, then it is

ot unreasonable to conclude that nature has also provided food
omewhere to satisfy them.

And if nature has created males, then

t makes sense to believe that there are females somewhere to
ate with them.

In brief, wherever the world has produced a need

assume that it has also provided an object to till that
Wherever there is really an objective need tor something,
e may reason that its object really exists (or existed) someFor all ot nature seems to abhor vacuuas and rushes to
3:rreud, Future .2! .!!'! Illusion, pp. 5?-58.
4
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fill them.

Nature fills its own voids.

And even if it could be shown that there are some exceptions
to this general principle that wherever there are objective needs

(i.e., needs produced by nature) there really are objects to fulfill them, nevertheless one could argue that wherever there is an
~ltimate

need there must be an ultimate object to fulfill it.

For even if one could explain the failure of the universe to care
~or

some minor and immediate needs, it would surely be unreason-

able to conclude that there is really no ultimate object to satisfy an ultimate need.

Or, in other words, if men really need

a

r:;ranscendent, then there probably is a transcendent reality to
fill this need.

If men really need the ultimate then it is rea-

sonable to conclude that there is an ultimate reality.
Of course it is nossible that objective human needs, even an
~ltimate

one, are not fulfillable.

It is just possible that the

Lmiverse is mocking man, saying, "I made you so that you really
~eed

love. but love is not a reality.

You really need friend-

ship but there are no friends anywhere, etc. 1•

That is, it is at

possible that life is absurd and meaningless.

~east

It is possi-

Ple that man has a God-sized vacuum in his heart !or which there

~s no God to fill it.5

Or, in the broader terms we have adopted

~o say that wherever there are needs that they will be fulfilled.
Jertainly there have been many hungry and thirstY'People who have
riever received f'ood or water. But would the world produce hungry
llld thirsty people if it had no food or water anywhere to provide
~or them?
It seems reasonable to assume that it would not.

r.:

/Th.is is the position of Sartre, and it is discussed above
.. n Chapter Four.
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n this study, it is possible that man really needs a transoenent but there is no

tra~scendent

reality anywhere.

Tb.is is no

possible, but on the other hand it does not seem very proba
It seems much more reasonable to believe that if men have
objective need for a transcendent that the transcendent is
bjeetively real.

Objectivity of a need, especially an ultimate

indication of the reality of the object of that need.
or it an object really must be (in order to fulfill a real need)
it is reasonable to assume that this object must be real.
There are other kinds ot need which do not argue tor the
their objects the way that objective needs do.
be called subjective needs.

These

For example, there are personal

social needs which are by no means a guarantee of the reality
t their objects.

Society can create its own needs.

A competi-

ive society, e.g., can create the need tor success.

Television

an create the need for children to see television.
need for more luxury.
ore drugs, etc.

Luxury can

Drugs can create the need tor

But none ot these needs is objective and cer-

ainly none is ultimate.

None ot these is created by nature and

is basic to the nature of man.
An objective need, as opposed to a mere subjective one, is

.!!!!.!. gua

!!2!! for actualizing full human potentiality.

An objec

a real need and not a mere wish, however strong the
ish may be.

Men may wi9h to have honey, but they really need

The real problem is to establish that "Man cannot live by
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eeds the transcendent?
To establish that man's religious need is not merely subjecis not an easy task.

rif~ht

For ;>•:?rhaps Freud was

lo not really need. God but only wish to have ono.

that men

If the need

or the transcendent is to be used as a test for 1 ts rea.11 ty,

hen the burden of proof is to show tha.t I!len really n<:ftd the tran
cendent.

There are several ways one re.ight ai;tempt to demonstrat

man needs the transce11den.t.

First, he might attempt the

difficult task of isolating the social and personal condi-

ions which. might have created an artificial or subjective need
transcendent.

In this way one might be

~ble

to discover

or not men reared without religion in their environment
ould still have a basic objective need for the transcendent.

. is task, of course, would be very difficult both bee a.use o.f the
of such totally religions-free environments and because
the coilplexi·ty of factors invol vea..

Another approach whieh

less sociclogical and more philosophical is as follows.
xample, one could analyze the nature of human

exp<~rience

For
as

escribed by both religious and non-religious nien to see if, des-

ite obvious

dif.ferenc~s

in the way bel.ievers and non-believera

express thei.r experiences, there might not be some common cosmic
ranscendent of which both find themselves in need in an objecway.

Since we have already detailed the multi-dimensional need
for the transcendent expressed by religious aen earlier, we need
only to remember here that at the very heart of the religious
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xperience is the need for the transcendent.

Even some religious

theists (like Altizer) who deny all traditional torms of transendence see a new direction for man to transcend, viz., a torard one in the eschatological dialectic ot history.

'rb.ere seems

o be little doubt that religious men both theist and non-theist
eel a real need tor the transcendent.

1'b.e question is whether

telt need has a real objective basis ot whether it is just

a peculiarity of the religious temperament.

Although an examina-

ion ot the experiences ot non-religious men would not be detinii ve as to whether or not there is an objective need tor the
ranscendent, nonetheless such a study is quite illuminating.

As

matter of tact, some of the strongest testimony to man's need
or God has come from some contemporary non-believers.
In his autobiography, Jean Paul Sartre confessed, "I needed
God, He was given to me, I received Him without realizing that I
as seeking Him."

rtirther, he said, "I reached out tor religion,

I longed tor it, it was the remedy.

ould have invented it myself."
iven a Big Boss." 6
God.

Had it been denied ae, I

But "I needed a Creator, I was

Nor is Sartre alone in expressing man's need

Walter Kaufmann said, "Han is the ape that wants to be

• • • • Religion is rooted in man's aspiration to transcend
self • • • • Whether he worships idols or strives to perfect
imselt, man is the God-intoxicated ape."? Others have expressed
6sartrei The Words, trans. Bernard Frechtman (New York:
George Brazi l'ir; 1964), PP• 102, 97.
?waiter Kaufmann, Oritigue .2! Religion ~ Philosophz, pp.

354, 355, 359.
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an's need to transcend as a serious search tor God.

Franz Kaf-

novels express lonely man's unsuccessful attempt to communiwith some important otherness beyond his own self.
play, Waiting
God.

!2.£

Samuel

Godot, reflects a similar craving to

As William Barrett noted, "Surely the audience

at Beckett's play recognized • • • some echo, however veiled, of
emptiness, in Heidegger's phrase, it's 'waiting tor
Of course it may be argued that whether biographical or

uthobiographical these are no more than expressions ot what we
ave called subjective needs for the transcendent, in which case
hey can not be used as evidence tor the reality of the transcenHowever valid this objection may be with regard to others,
certainly does not apply to all of what Sartre said.
Sartre saw man's need tor God to be so great and so basic to
very nature as man that God is said to be man's fundamental
Sartre wrote, "to be man means to reach toward being
d.

Or if you prefer, man fundamentally is the desire to be

d."9' Ot course, Sartre felt that the whole project was absurd
d vain because it is logically impossible tor there to be a
However, it has already been pointed out that his logical
ejection ot God was based on the faulty conception ot God as a
elf-caused rather than an !l,Bcaused being.

And as to the existen

absurdity of man needing the transcendent, it the need tor

8 william Barrett, Irrational !'.!!!!• p. 63.
9aartre, Being ~ Nothingness, pp. ?62, 766.
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great in each man, then we are cruelly dishonest with
when we give up in despair.

That is, it men really

transcendent the way they seem to need it, then there is
least a prim.a tacie reason for continuing the search.
other atheists admit that man does have an objective cosmic
for the transcendent, but they are not willing to identify
with a religious experience.

In a key passage Freud agreed

Sohleiermacher that men do have a sense of dependence on the
iverse or all.

J':reud, however, was not willing to call this
It is not the feeling of cosmic dependence

n the transcendent whole which is religious for J'reud.

On the

ontra.ry, religion is round in the response man gives to this
eeling in seeking a remedy for it. 10 But it Freud is willing
c admit that there is a basic sense in which men are dependent
the transcendent--even though he is unwilling to call this
eligious--then at least on the level of experience there seems
o be a basis tor arguing that men may have an objective need for
he transcendent.

Whether or not all men are willing to recog-

ize this need tor the transcendent or even should recognize it
the point here.

Por the issue here is not whether men

subjective awareness of an objective need for the transendent but whether or not there really is an objective need.
or if there is really an objective need tor the transcendent, we
argued that the transcendent is probably objectively real.

10:rreud, Future of an Illusion, P• 52.

------ -- -- ---------
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Or, in other words, if there is really an ultiaate need tor the

transcendent, then no dcubt the transcendent is ultimately real.
The objectivity of the need favors the reality of the object of
that need, especially when the need is ultimate.
As to whether a man feels that it is necessary to affirm

In the final analy-

this need subjectively is another question.

sis each man will have to decide this question tor him.self.
But

!! it can be shown that there is an objective and ultillate

need for the transcendent, then whether or not one decides to
ake an ultimate commitment to it we may assume that it is real.
Ultimacy gt_ !!'!!, Object .!!.

~ ~

!.9.£. !!!! Reality .!!.! !!!!

Transcendent.--Mot only does the ultimacy ot the need argue for
the reality of the objeot of that need but the ultimaoy of the
object itself can be used as an indication

or

its reality.

Ot

course not all religious experience involves an ultimate object.
Some men make an ultimate commitment to what is less than ultite.

Idolatry happens.

Some men make a kind of ultimate coa-

tment to their country, as appears from the patriot's "My counOther men make an ultimate colllllitment to
ocial causes and still others to a human lover.

But the problem

th any such ultimate commitment to objects which are less than
ltimate is that the object is not adequate tor the commitment.
errs, the cause fails, and the lover dies.

Nothing

an ultimate object is capable of full7 satisfying an
commitment.

The reason for this is that the thirst for

limited satisfaction can not be full

satisfied b
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As it is put in the Wisdom Literature ot the Old Testaent, there is nowhere "under the sun" that a man can find ultiate aatisfaotion. 11

Everything in this world is temporal, and

tor the eternal.

Or, as Augustine said it, the heart

s restless until it finds its rest in God.

Ot course some objects which are not ultimate are capable
satisfying an ultimate commitment, at least in part and tor a
But even it a limited object were capable ot tull7 satisan ultimate commitment indefinitely, it would still be

that nothing short of what is actually ultimate would be
apable of justifying an ul. timate comm.i tment.

Por nothing short

t an ultimate object is worthy of an ultimate commitment.

But

n either event, no religious experience is adequate unless its
bject is ultimate.

Probably onl7 an ultimate object is adequate

o satisfy an ultimate commitment, and certainly only an ultimate
bject is adequate to justify it.

Therefore, even it one agreed

ith Tillich that all men are religious in that they have an ulimate commitment to some object, 12 it would not follow that all
en were adeguately religious.

There are many objects ot ulti-

concern--weal th, fame, country.

However, as Smith said,

11 Eeclesiastes Chapters 1 and 2.
12oertainly all persons have a center of their personnlity,
, a unifying core or concern (cf. Tillich, Ultimate Concern, p.
106 and ~a.mies ot Faith, p. 105), but whether or not this conern is C>a! or Uitl:mate is the question. At least some men dethat they have any kind of ultimate concern about anything
(Jean Paul Sartre, e.g.). Furthermore, even if one can't be a
person without some kind of ultimate concern, then it might be
said that some individuals lack personhood tor this very reason.
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"But the final question is whether our ultimate concern is fixed
on the really ultimate or upon some lesser object which, being
inite, must be regarded in the end as an idol.•1 3 So we may
onolude that all men are not adeguatelz religious; not all have
object which is really ultimate, even though they Jla1' have
iven an ultimate commitment to it.
But trom this we may also draw a further conclusion, viz.,

.....

hat it a religious person does have an object of his ultimate
ommitment which is really ultimate, then he has no reason to beieve that it is not ultimately real.

'!hat is, ultimacy is a

est tor reality in religious experience.

Yor if the ultimacy

t the object of religious experience is not a test tor its realty, then it would follow that what is really ultimate is not
timately real.

And it we are willing to use the word "real" ot
ot human experience and concern such as things

d persons, then there seems to be no reason not to use it of
ultimate object which is really ultimate.
ediate be real but the ultimate not be real?

Why

should the !m-

If on the other

and, one is willing to say that whatever is reall7 ultimate is
timately real, then in order to test the reality ot the object

t one's religious experience he need only find a way ot deterining whether or not this object is really ultimate.

Ot course it is not an easy task to show that the object of
ne's ultimate commitment is really ultimate.

It certainly is

13John E. Smith, "Ultimate Concern and the Really Ultimate,"
n Religious Experience !!!S Truth, p. 67.
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sufficient merely to say that it is ultimate.
only in many forms but in subtle forms.
some are mental.

Idolatry comes

Some idols are metal

Some men may consciously worship something

inite; others would only unconsciously worship a limited object.
ow, then, is a religious man to be sure that he is neliher con-

sciously nor unconsciously committed to what is less than the
timate?

The answer is not easy nor is it necessarily hopeless.

One way to assure oneself of the ultimaoy of the object of
religious commitment is for him to make a conscious and delieffort to purge himself or all idolatry.

!hat is, he

never permit his religious devotion to focus on or settle
n any finite object or image through which the ultimate is maniest to him.

It is at this point that the religious person may

rofitably use what Ramsey called disclosure models, that is,
etaphorical ways to manifest what is beyond the empirical but
hich will leave its transcendent 1D7stery intact.

Ramsey's de-

ice for assuring that the religious person did not toeus on the
aspects of the conceptual models was what he called qualthat is, words which qualify the model or conceptual
transcendent in such a way as to force it to go on
d on until it reaches a disclosure of what is beyond it.

For

xample, when God is spoken ot as an ":Everlasting Yather" the
of a father is qualified by the word everlastng in such a way as to force the mind to think on and on until,
f orsa.king the empirical anchorage of the meaning of
earth!

father

it will receive a diaclosure of the trans
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What Ramsey attempts to do with qualified models Tillich
with religious symbols which, he saidt point beyond them
In like manner both Jaspers' cipher language and Bult-

ann's demythologized language are attempts to de-objectify exressions of the ultimate so as to avoid verbal idolatry.

!rhis

as been the basic motivation behind the mystic's negative lanage and even the metaphysioian's analogous language.

In each

ase the aim has been to find an adequate way to focus the

~ind

n that which is being revealed in the religious experience (viz.,

he transcendent) rather than focusing on the instrument through
hich it is being revealed (viz., language, etc.). 14
However, it is not sufficient merely to be able to

!!!!£

the transcendent or ultimate; one must be assured that
is a transcendent there abput which he is talking.

!hat is

o say, the disclosure language must disclose something; the
odel must manifest something.

Since

~he

.f'unction ot religious

anguage is to reveal the transcendent, the final test ot its
dequac7 will be whether or not it opens up a meaningful experince ot the ultimate.

For an adequate language about an ultimate

a no guarantee that there is an ultimate.

It is possible that

ne could devise an adequate language about an ultimate or transendent that does not really exist.

The ability to speak mean-

ngtully about something is no guarantee of the reality of that
bject, else one would be forced to conclude that all persons and
14oompare Chapter Two for a discussion of the adequacy of
eligious language.
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events in novels are actual.
The acid test of religious language is twofold: does it

eaningfully express the ultimate, and does it evoke a religious
esponse?

That is, does the language about the ultimate bring
face with an ultimate which can evoke an ultimate

ommitment?

Ma?17 men are willing to make an ultimate commitment

o what is less than ultimate; this is idolatry.

But when a man

s willing to give an ultimate commitment to what is really ultithere is no reason to believe that it is not ultimatereal. Can man be mocked as to the reality of so serious an act?

Of course it does not necessarilz follow that the transcenis real on the grounds that it can be shown to be ultimate.
ere is no logical necessity here.

We have already set aside

he position that one can show the reality of the ultimate in a

ationally inescapable way.

But just because something is not

ationally inescapable does not mean that it is not reasonable.

one is unwilling to consider what is adequately reliious (viz., what involves an ultimate commitment to what is real
y

ultimate) to be real, then it is difficult to see what, if

~~· .....hing,

he would consider real.

The refusal to acknowledge the

is both worthy of and the recipient of an ulti-

te commitment could be tantamount to having a "blik" against
ultimate reality of what is really ultimate.

Julfillment .!!.

~

!!!!]. !.2E. Realit1.--0ne more test for the

eality of the object of religious experience may be suggested,
Not just any kind of fulfillment but ulti-
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ate fulfillment.

Por if the object of one's religious experien

s completely adequate to satisfy his ultimate need, then we may
ssume that its complete adequacy in this regard is an indication
f

its reality.

That is, if a man finds ultimate satisfaction

the ultimate object ot his devotion, then we may conclude that
he object is really ultimate.

And, as has already been argued,

if it is really ultimate then it is probably ultimately real.
The ascumption of course is that nothing but an ultimate can sat-

isfy ultimately.

And so we may argue conversely that whatever

satisfies ultimately must probably be ultimate.
short of finality will satisfy finally.
it man has a

God-si~ed

~at

is, nothing

Or, in theistic terms,

vacuum in his soul, then fiothing short of

God will be able to fill it completely.

If man has a capacity

or unlimited happiness, then nothing short of unlimited happiess will fill it.

If man needs to transcend ultimately, then

othing short of ultimate transcendence will fulfill this need.
Another way or stating this test for the reality of the
ranscendent is that whatever really enables man to transcend
imselt is really transcendent, and whatever is really transcenent is transcendently real.

For it seems reasonable enough to

onclude that if an object of religious ex:perienee enables a man
o transcend his own subjectivity, then this object must be objective to man.

And since we have already decided that what is

objective is real, then it would follow that that ultimate object wbich enables a man to transcend himself is real.

That is
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way and

if he finds a way to do this, then we may assume that the

transcendent by which he transcended himself is real.
If, for example, to transcend ultimately be taken to mean
the ability to overcome man's feeling of alienation, then the
transcendent object which can bring this unity into one's life
ill be considered real.

Or, if by transcending ultimately one

eans the forgiveness of sins, then that object which provides a
of ultimate forgiveness will be considered real.

And if

y transcendence one means a self-transcending love which enables
one to overcome his own egocentricity, then that object which is
itself transcending love will be considered real.

That object of

experience which does not fulfill the very drive of
eligious experience will not be counted as adequate, and whatreally adequate to enable a man to transcend ultiately will not be counted as the ultimate reality.

It may be

eal, of course, but it will not be the ultimately real.

Only

hat is really ultimate, ultimately needed, and/or ultimately
atisfying will be considered to be a real object of religious
xperience.
The meaning of ultimate fulfillment or ultimate transcenence often has two sides in one's religious experience.

There

·s the inward side which is called variously unity, peace, barony, forgiveness, etc.
's

There is also an outer dimension which

manifest in character, conduct, love, saintliness, etc.

In

outer sense of transcendence it would be proper to conclude
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enabled him to manifest the ultimate in saintliness is real.
For it would be strange indeed if that which produced real perfection and completion of character were itself completely withou
basis in reality.

In other words, the reality of a religion can

be judged by its fruits.

If there is ultimate transcendence in

the fruit of the religious experience, then there is no compelling reason why we should not conclude that there is ultimate
reality in the root or basis of the religious experience.
But even if it is granted that the object of religious ex~erience

which could ultimately fulfill man's need for self-tran-

scendence would be real, it does not follow from this that it is
an easy task to determine which object can do this or, indeed,
~hether ~

object can do this.

That is, the problem with this

test is that it is difficult to determine whether or not a man
is really transcending in such a way as to be completely satis~ied

or ultimately fulfilled.

fulfillment?

What are the earmarks of ultimate

Can one see them from the outside, i.e., in the

life of another?

Can one even recognize them in bis own life

if they were to appear?
In attempting to offer suggestions which answer this problem
it would seem wise first of all to agree with James that religious fruits must be judged on the whole, rather than on the
~asis

of trying to judge the value of specific acts which are

alleged to flow from specific attitudes. 1 5

Indeed, Schleier-

l5w1lliam James, Varieties .2f. Religious Experience, p. 268.
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macher was probably correct in saying that specific ethical acts
don't follow from specific religious beliefs.
produces action only as a

~1urn

Rather, "Religion

of activity flows from. a sum of

feeling • • • • But while a man does nothing [specifically] from
religion, he should do everything with religion." 16 Now let us

I

agree with James, who calls this collective fruit of religious
experience on the whole, "Saintliness," that it includes such
things as felicity, purity, charity, and self-discipline. 1 7

Or,

in other words, by fulfillment is meant an inner unity and tranquility which enables one to live in harmony and charity with the
world around him.

The purpose of ultimate fulfillment is to

overcome or transcend the internal and external dichotomies which
sepRrate a man from himself and which separate him from other
selves.

Fulfillment, then, will be the achieving of wholeness

in one's life as a whole.

It is a whole-liness of life which

results from a commitment of one's life as a whole to the whole
which alone can wholly satisfy it. 18
The outward characteristics of this wholly filled life
should be obvious from a man's ability to transcend.

That is,

if one is able to overcome the barriers that divide himself and
other men, then he is transcending.

And if be is transcending

b.imself, then he is having his need to transcend fulfilled.

And

16 Schleiermacher, .Q!1 Religion, pp. 57-59.
1 7James, Varieties .2f Religious Experience, pp. 280-285.
18 This "whole-ness" of life is what is commonly referred to
as "holiness. 11
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this fulfillment in his own life of transcendence can be counted
s evidence that there is a transcendent which made his selfranscending possible.
As to the inward characteristics of fulfillment, only the
will know for sure whether or not he has a sense of
with himself and with the transcendent.

If he experiences

and harn,iony of soul; if he has no struggle of soul but
in the resolution of tensions made possible by the higher
to which he has committed himself, then he can be assured
has fulfillment.

Of course, self-deception is always

Only constant self-examination and self-scrutiny can
ard against this possibility.
But if a life is wholly unified, always capable of transeenthe limitations of itself and the hindrances in its environent, then there is reason to believe that it has fulfillment.
fulfillment in the sense that it has finally 'arrived' nor in
sense of a final static goal, but in the sense of the continability to find unity within and to unify without.

That is,

ulfillment is the ability to maintain a fullness or wholeness
f life, despite the constant attempts from. both within and withut to divide it.

And if the object of one's religious experi-

nce is able to bring him this kind of fulfillment, then there
's no good reason why he should not consider this object real.

it would be strange indeed if that which can really unify
is not itself real.

If the ultimate source of unity and ful-

illment in human ex erience is
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wrong concept of the real or else it would seem that the question
of reality loses its significance.
But we have already carefully defined what is meant by reality, and we have concluded that the reality question is significant.

The thinking person does want to know if the object of

is ultimate commitment is nothing more than a projected or unecognized part of himself or whether it is something really
other than himself.

So, we can only conclude that if there is

n object of religious experience which can bring ultimate fulillment, then it must be real.

Of course, if an object of reli-

ious experience does not bring unity and fulfillment into one's
then there is no basis therein to conclude that it is real.
ut in any case fulfillment is still a key to reality.
the Criteria for Testing the
Rea i~_g! the Transcendent
---

Analyzin~

Now that we have suggested several tests for determining the
eality basis for the transcendent, we should analyze more closely how it is that these tests function in relation to religious
exrverience and in making a decision about the reality of its ultimate ooject.

Just what is the role of these tests or criteria

nd how do they relate to the traditional proofs?
The Relation of These Tests to 'l'raditional Proofs
Each of these three nests bear3 some relationship to at
least one of the traditional proofs.

The test of need bears a

similarity to the traditional Cosmological and Teleological arguents.

The test of ultimacy is similar to the Ontological
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argument.

Also, the test of fulfillment relates to the ontologi-

cal argument.

But in all cases there are crucial differences.

Let us examine them briefly.
Relation of Need to the Cosmological and Teleological Arguments .--First of all the need criterion is similar to the Cosmological argument and Teleological argument, since they both imply
that there is a

~

to explain the world which we experience by

something beyond it.

In the Teleological argument there is a

need to explain or account for the apparent design in the world,
viz., the adaptation of means to ends, etc.

The argument is

built on the premise that the order and arrangement of things as
we see them does not explain itself; the design in the world is
in~

of something else to justify it.

Likewise, the Cosmolog-

ical argument is built on the premise that something is needed
to account for the existence of things as we experience them in
this world.
exist)

That is, we experience things

but~

!12!

~(i.e.,

.£2 .a£i

that~

~ i2_

(i.e., that

exist).

We experi-

ence things that are 'may-bes' but not •must-bes,• that are contingent but not necessary beings.

On the basis that these beings

really exist when there is no necessity that they exist (for they
are not necessary beings) it is argued that they need an explanation as to why they

.£2

exist rather than do not exist.

So in the

Teleological and Cosmological arguments there is an appeal to the
need for an explanation for the facts of design and contingency.
But as we have already seen, this

~

for an explanation

is not a logical necessity (i.e., in the sense of rational

22?

inescapability) for an explanation beyond the things experienced.
That is, it is possible that they just

~

there is no need to explain why they exist.

(or, exist) but that
In other words,

their existence could have just happened or simply be given; it
ould simply be there or gratuitous.

Since this seems to be a

logical possibility, then if one is going to raise the question
as to why they are there or exist when they do not have to be
here, then he must justify asking this causal question.
explain why he is asking "why?tt

He must

That is, he must explain why he

feels that an explanation of their being there (i.e., their existing) is called for.
It is not sufficient simply to say that man is the animal
hich asks causal questions, for this gives only a psychological
explanation of how it came about that men ask questions like this
about anything.

Rather, it is necessary to justify the applica-

ion of the causal question to things that exist but might not
ave existed.

At this point there seems to be one basic answer:

hese kinds of beings
hemselves.

~

an explanation; they don't explain

But here again we have made a complete circle, for

o affirm that they need an explanation is precisely what is to
e proven.

There is no rational need (i.e., logical necessity),

or there are definitely other logical possibilities (viz., they
ight just be without an explanation or they might just happen
to

~

by chance).

But what kind of need is this?

Surely it is not merely the
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_psychological need in the indi11idual to ask the question why,
regardless of the fact that there is not any rational necessity
for asking this question about these things which exist.

For

mere psychological need of asking causal questions (i.e., rational curiosity) is not a sufficient ground for demanding an ontologically causql explanation.

It would make sense, however, to

-

raise the auestion
of need for an explanation if man has an exis,
-tential need to know, i.e., if it is a matter of his very existence.

In other words, if man has a need to justify his very

existence, an ultimate need to explain why he is rather than is
not, then .it would make sense to ask the causal question or existence.

That is, the Cosmological and Teleological arguments

would make sense (even though they are not demonstrative proofs)
if the basic sense of need which prompts one to elaborate these
arguments is an objective need rooted in a sense of cosmic contingency.
In brief, we might say that if there is a real need at the
basis of the Cosmological argument which can adequately explain
why men posit a first cause as necessary, then it is not a logical
need but an existential need; it is not a rational need but an
experiential one; it is not cognitive but cosmic.

For nothing

short of a 'life and death' sense of cosmic contingency is adequate to explain the necessity and ultimacy which religious men
attribute to the transcendent.

Certainly no mere psychological

curiosity about causes adequately accounts for the motivation to
nosit a necessarv cause of ever:vthin'2: which exists.

If'. hJ.vev..,r.
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a man feels a sense of absolute dependence on the universe for
his very existence, then it is understandable how this existential need could be the basis for concluding an ultimate and necessary cause from premises which fall short of rational inescapabil i. ty.

That is, it is not difficult to see how the religious

an could move (without rational necessity) from the existential
necessity of explaining bis own being to the logical necessity
of postulating an ultimate cause.

If there is a need for an

ltimate cause it is basically an experiential need arising out
of the fact that a man finds himself, and perhaps his world,
tterly and inexplicably contingent or dependent.
And if this sense of ultimate need is not merely a subjecive psychological phenomenon of certain men but is really an
objective need of all men (whether they subjectively sense it or
ot), then it is reasonable to assume that the object of this
eed is real.

For if there is a real need for the ultimate

there is no reason why the ultimate should not be real.
Relation of Ultimaci

~

the Ontological Argument.--The Onto-

ogical argument, it will be remembered, is based on the

pre~ise

hat in tbe one unique case of an absolutely perfect being, exis-

redicating existence

ence or reality must be attributed to it.

This necessity for

of an absolutely perfect being arises out

of the .fact that such a being cannot be lacking in any perfection, since it is necessarily perfect by definition.

And even

though the argu'llent is formulated arourid the logical n'3cessity
of concludin

that a necessar
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exist, yet the conclusion does not really follow with logical
necessity.

It is not a rationally inescapable argument.

This

fact is admitted by both some friends and by most foes of the
argument.

Malcolm admitted that it is possible that the very

concept of an absolutely perfect being is contradictory, in which
~ase

one cannot consider the argument conclusive.

Plantinga ar-

gued that it was ROSsible that a necessary being might just happen to have existed or might just happen not to have existed,
either alternative of which would invalidate the logical necessity of the conclusion that this Being must exist. 1 9
But if it is not logically necessary--if there is no logical
need--to conclude that there is an absolutely perfect being, then
why do men come to this conclusion?

Or, what is even more basic,

why do men even come up with the concept of an absolutely perfect
being?

Here again the need must surely be more than a rational

curiosity, for at best that would only explain why the question
is raised but not why it is answered the way it is.

That is,

curiosity might ask whether or not there 1£ such as an absolutely
werfect bing.

But this doesn't explain why men conclude that an

absolutely perfect being is necessary.
~ompelling

There must be some more

reason for this conclusion than the psychological.

And we have already seen that such a reason is not logical, for
there is no rational necessity for concluding that such a being
exists.
l9see discussion above in Chapter Four.
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Here again the basic reason or need for postulating a perfect being can be supplied from experience.
feel that they not only have an ultimate

~

That is, some men
but that they also

a need for the ultimate which can satisfy or fulfill that
in an ultimate way.

Whether or not this need is objective

or merely subjective is not for us to decide here--that is the
ask of applying the tests or criteria of ultimacy and fulfillent--but simply to note that religious men do feel this way.
the fact that they possess this tremendous conviction that
object of their religious experience must be ultimately peri t is to be worthy of an ultimate commitment and if it
be capable of ultimately fulfilling them) indicates at
that they feel a need for an object which is ultimately

It is in this way that the tests of ultimacy and fulfillment
the experiential bases of the Ontological argument.

For at

heart the Ontological argument is a conceptual attempt to
how the logical necessity (i.e., rational need) for what is
the base an experiential need.

And to the degree that

that he has come in contact with this ultimate perfecta satisfy his life completely, to this degree his
xperience of ultimate fulfillment may also be at the base of
concept of ultimate perfection.
But just how does this concept of an ultimately or absoluteperfect being arise from experience?

Malcolm suggests that
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"a greater tban which cannot be conceived." 20

Anselm argued that

one could arrive at the concept of an absolutely perfect being by
uilding the concept gradually from the less perfect through the
ore perfect until be can arrive at the concept of the
fect. 21

~

per-

Smith says that it is derived from the experience of

the Christian revelation in which God is depicted as the absolut
ly exalted. 22 But neither of these latter two explanations shows
men conceive this as a necessary way to view the transcendent
only (at best)

~

the transcendent can be viewed in this way.

Unless these latter explanations intend also to point out that
somewhere someone must have had an experience of ultimate

~

efore he would have been prompted to view the transcendent as
ltimately perfect, then they really do not account for the acual origin of the idea of an absolutely perfect being.

It does

ake sense, however, if the concept of an ultimately perfect being arises out of the sense of ultimate need which religious men
experience.

For only an ultimately perfect being is adequate to

ulfill an ultimate need for perfection.
In fact, anything short of ultimacy in perfection is a reliiously inadequate concept of the transcendent.

For nothing

hort of the best being possible is worthy of the best devotion

20Malcolm, "Anselm's Ontological Arguments,n ~ Ex:istence
of God, p. 66.
21 Anselm, "St. Anselm's Reply to Gaunilo," ~ Ontological
......,_.........e.-n.,.t , p. 24.
22 John E. Smith, Ex:perience ~ Q2£_, p. 129.
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possible.

Nothing short of ultimacy in perfection is worthy of

ultimacy in concern.

Nothing short of what is totally perfect

is worthy of a total commitment.

And since a religious ex:peri-

ence by its very nature involves an ultimate commitmant 9 then the
recognition of the ultimate perfection or worth of its object is
necessary in order to make the commitment a worthy one.

In

t1~is

sense we agree with Findlay who, despite his futile attempt at an
Ontological disproof, argued that a God limited in perfection is
religiously inadequate.

"An object of this sort," he wrote,

"would doubtless deserve respect and admiration, and other quasireligious attitudes, but it would not deserve the utter selfabandonment peculiar to the religious frame of mind. 112 3 In
brief, it is idolatrous to be totally committed to any object
which is less than ultimately perfect.
In summary, the experience of ultimate need is the basis of
the Cosmological type argument (which includes the Teleological
and the Moral arguments). 24

The crucial question is whether or

not this need is objective or real.

If it is a real objective

need (as opposed to a wish or subjective need), then we would con~lude

that it argues for the reality of the object of this need.

Further 9 by saying that man has an ultimate need one would be
arguing that man has a need for the ultimate.

For only an

2 3Findlay, "Can the .Existence of God be Disproved?" New
Essays la Philosophical Theology, pp. 52-53.
--24The Moral argument too is built on the premise that there
is a need to explain the sense of duty or "oughtness" which men
have.
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~timate

can satisfy an ultimate need completely.

And to be wor-

this ultimate commitment the ultimate object must be ultiately perfect.

For nothing short of what is ultimately perfect

can fulfill the requiremen0B of being worthy of an ultimate comitment.

It is in this sense that the absolutely perfect being

of the Ontological argument arises from the need for an ultimately worthy object1:o justify an ultimate commitment.

Of course, if

this need is unjustified then the reality of the object may be
rought in question.

But if there is a real need and if there is

an ultimacy about the object which can bring ultimate fulfillent, then these may be used as tests for the reality of the object of religious experience.

The objective need functions as

he experiential basis of the Cosmological argument ann the ultiacy of the object serves as the experientinl basis to the Ontoargument.

That is to say, the sense of

~

for an ulti-

ate is the experiential basis for men going on to posit the raional need for a cause to explain the world.

And the feeling

hat the ultimate would have to be ultimately perfect to fulfill
his need and to warrant an ultimate commitment is the experienial grounds which leads men to elaborate an Ontological arguent.

And whereas neither of the arguments is logically 'air-

ight', yet they do have a basis in experience and are reducible
o tests for the reality of one's religious experience.

If

~

there is a real need for an ultimate and if that to which one
gives an ultimate commitment is really ultimate and is ultimatel

fulfillin

then one has no reason to doub
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object of his religious experience is real.
The Basic Assumption of these Tests Examined
Throughout the discussion of the tests it was asserted that
if there is an ultimate need, or if the object of this need is
really ultimate, or ultimately fulfilling, then it was more reasonable or probable than not to conclude that the object is real.
But just what is the basis for asserting that it is more probable
than not?

\.Jhat kind of probability is this?

We have already

called into question rationally inescapable proofs and disproofs.
But if the reality of the transcendent is neither rationally impossible nor logically unavoidable, then what would be the basis
for a.f'firming that it could be more or less than merely possil e.·>

Would this probability or improbability a priori or a pos-

teriority?
The probability or improbability of the reality of the transcendent is not a priori in the sense of being independent of experience, for the tests are based in experience and are designed
to be applicable to experience.

Nor, on the other hand, is this

probability a posteriori in the sense that it depends on a statis
tical average of how many times human needs were fulfilled, etc.
~ather,

by probably we mean whatever within the realm of possi-

bility can be reasonably expected to be so.

But it is proper to

ask just what is meant by "reasonable."
Perhaps we can best explain what is meant by "reasonable" by
referring again to the principle of sufficient reason which was
used in the Cosmological proof for God's existence.

The
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tha~

justification of the principle of sufficient reason given was
one could not deny the principle of sufficient reason without
having a sufficient reason for this denial.

For in this event he

is using the principle of sufficient reason to deny the principle, which would be a contradiction.

But in retort it was poin-

ted out that this argument would be true of a universal denial of
the principle of sufficient reason (for that broad a denial would
include the <Enial itself),, but it would not be true of a partial
denial.

That is, one could say without contradiction that he did

have a reason for saying that
the world is one of them.

~

things do not have reasons and

Therefore, it is not rationally ines-

capable to conclude that there must be a sufficient reason to explain the existence of the world. 2 5 For, on this argument, the
world is one thing which does not need a sufficient reason.

That

is, the world is a special case to which the principle of sufficient reason does not apply. 26
However, even though it is not rationally inescapable to
hold that the rule of reason applies to the universe as a whole,
nevertheless it is "reasonable" to believe that it does.

That

is, there is no reason why the universe as a whole cannot be reasonable• and in fact men rather generally tend to believe that
2 5Richard Taylor makes this same point in a restatement of
the Cosmological argument. See Chapter Seven of his Metaphysics,
(New Jersey: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1963), pp. 91-92.
26 This objection goes back at least as far as Hume's Dialogues, IX, where Cleanthes asked, "Why may not the materiaI""""universe be the necessary existent Being • • • ?"
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it is reasonable.

And even tbough there is no self-evident rea-

son for holding that the universe is reasonable, there is some
evidence for believing that it is.

This evidence is not purely

rational nor is it purely empirical.

It is based rather in basic

and is confifmed by

~

general behavior

2f

In brief the evidence for holding that basic human
eeds are fulfillable is that men expect that they are and world
events confirm that they are fulfillable.

An examination of hu-

an consciousness supports that fact that men do have a native
expectation that needs are fulfillable, even when their own paricular needs have not always been fulfilled.

And the course of

osmic events may be used to support the premise that the unierse does not produce needs which it does not intend to fill.
the expectation from within and the confirmation from
support the contention that purpose is at work in the uni
erse as a whole, that this is not an absurd and irrational world
In other words, there is no reason why the principle of reashould not be extended to the universe as a whole, even thoug
not logically necessary to do so.

And if the world as a

does operate according to the principle of sufficient reaon, then we may rightly conclude that whatever real needs there
re call for a fulfillment which one can reasonably expect.

The

eal question is whether or not religious experience is based on
real objective need or merely in a subjective wish.
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Summary

~

Conclusion of the Chapter

A religious experience is one involving an ultimate commitent to an object which transcends the individual.

This trans-

cendence may occur in many directions and on many objects and
still be essentially religious in nature.

However, if the object

of an ultimate commitment is not really ultimate, then the experience is not adequately

r~ligious.

For to be ultimately commit-

ted to what is less than ultimate is both unsatisfactory and unorthy, to say nothing of it being idolatrous.
Several tests have been suggested for determining the reality of the object of religious experience.

First, if it can be

shown that man really needs' to transcend, then the transcendent
is probably real.

For it is not reasonable to suppose that

there are basic human needs that are not some how fulfillable.
Second, if the object is really ultimate, then there is no reason
to believe that it is not ultimately real.

For if the object is

adequate there is no reason to suppose that it is not real.
Finally, if the religious experience is ultimately fulfilling
then the object which makes this possible is .no doubt real.

For

if it can really ultimately fulfill, then it is reasonable to
assume that the ultimate is real.

In brief, if man really has

an ultimate need, or if the object of this need is really ultiate, or if it can fulfill a man ultimately, then these may be
taken as indications that the object o.f one's religious experience is real.

And

on the contrar

if
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does not have an adequate object (i.a., an ultimate one) nor an
adequate fulfillment, or if it can be shown that man

rea11~

"'

bas

no ultimate need. then these would be indications that the object
of that religious experience is not real.
These three tests for the reality of the transcendent are
the experiential bases for the traditional arguments for the existence of God.

The Cosmological type arguments (including the

Teleological and the Moral arguments) both involve the contention
But this need is neither that of psychological curiosity nor logical necessity; ra-

that there is a need for an explanation.

ther, it is based in the experiential need for the transcendent
which is felt by the religious person.

The Ontological argument,

despite its logical form is really based in the need for an

!!!1!-

matel:v .Perfect object which alone is worthy of one's ultimate
commitment.

For less than an absolutely perfect object would not

be worthy of an ultimate comm.:'.":1ent and probably would not be
fulfilling either.

These tests, however, differ from the tradi-

tional proofs in that the tests are based in experience and they
are not categorical approvals or disapprovals of religious experience but, rather, ways of determining which if' any of the objects of religious experience are adequate and therefore real.
Since the tests do not provide any :proof for the reality of
the transcendent but only at best a probability, it is best to
understand the basis of their probability as being neither
strictly a priori nor a posteriori, but as being a probability
which is based in basic human eXPectation.

Aiken, Henry D.
1956.
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